In Favor of Entrenchment Justifying Geoengineering Research in Democratic Systems Samantha M. Koreman Dartmouth College Author Filippo Zinni Lori Kohen Antonio Almazan Editors Fall 2019 Download full text PDF (10 pages) Abstract This paper critically evaluates the ability of structurally democratic governments to address long-term, existential problems such as climate change using the example of geoengineering. The solution to these problems is to curtail strict democracies and, instead, entrench the right of future generations in valid constitutions. Theoretical Framework Climate change is a problem that harms current generations and that will continue to harm future generations. Current generations are harmed as a result of changing temperatures, rising ocean levels, and unpredictable weather patterns. Future generations will experience much more severe effects. Most ethical theories acknowledge that individuals have some obligation to future generations. Unfortunately, this acknowledgement does not always translate into the field of political theory. Because of moral facts about representation and non-moral facts about the motivation that individuals have for stepping foot in the political arena, current democratic political institutions are ill-equipped to implement policies on behalf of current generations. This is a serious problem when it comes to solving for the harms caused by climate change. One potential solution to climate change is geoengineering—the new realm of “deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s natural systems to counteract climate change.” However, democracy has difficulty justifying this solution. In order to rightfully implement long-term climate change solutions like geoengineering research, it is necessary for democratic political institutions to entrench the rights of future generations in their constitutions. This paper will first establish a two-pronged problem for democracy. Then, it will apply that problem to geoengineering. After addressing potential solutions to the geoengineering dilemma, this paper advocates for entrenching the rights of future generations into a democratic constitution as a solution for the two problems discussed in the first two sections of the paper. Finally, this paper addresses multiple counterarguments to entrenchment and concludes that entrenchment is, in fact, a viable solution to justifying geoengineering research in the policy arena. I. A Problem for Democracy If we assume that we have some obligations to future generations, then it is necessary to solve a two-pronged problem for dealing with claims of intergenerational justice in modern democratic societies. Although some people claim that democracy has many benefits related to the idea that citizens get to have input in important political decisions through electing representatives and voting on specific policies, a major downside of the democratic procedure is that on a purely structural level, it is ill-equipped to solve long-term problems. The first prong of this democratic dilemma is that procedural accounts of representative democracy require that representatives be responsive to their constituents. This occurs through voting and tests of public approval. Neither of these methods allow representatives the leeway to directly make decisions on behalf of future generations as future generations are not the constituents of political representatives—as they do not yet exist. It is impossible for future generations to elect representatives or even have any measurable approval or disapproval for current policies. For policies with long time horizons, it will only be after the policies are implemented that future generations will weigh in on whether they approve of said implemented policy. This concern over time horizons establishes the second prong of the problem of integrating concerns about intergenerational justice in democratic procedures—because representatives want to be elected and maintain high approval ratings, they will often choose to focus on short-term projects. These short-term projects are policies that current people prioritize in their day-to-day lives. While this prong is an issue in general for democracy’s ability to pass policies that address long-term problems, it is especially problematic in the case of policy concerning climate change. While many people are in favor of addressing climate change, they rarely vote for a politician based on a policy to address climate change. Even if a small portion of the population did vote in this manner, it would still be difficult for policymakers to collectively act to pass policies that mitigate climate change as they need to cater to all constituents. For example, as in the case of America’s coal industry, politicians will often advocate for investing in economic advances that lead to increased resource use. One might have an easy answer to this and say that politicians can simply invest in decoupling in order to satisfy both current and future peoples. However, this two-pronged problem is not so easily addressed in cases where these sorts of justifications for certain environmental policies in a representative democracy reach counterintuitive conclusions that run in opposition to the interest of current people. II. The Dilemma of Geoengineering If we are to accept the context above claim that democracy is unable to establish a stable obligation to future generations, then a dilemma regarding geoengineering becomes apparent—geoengineering research to “arm the future” is unjustified and undesirable while actually implementing geoengineering is justified. Current geoengineering research focuses on the possibility of manipulating the Earth in such a way as to mitigate—or, hopefully, to solve for—the effects of climate change. While there are many proposals in the scientific community regarding specific forms of geoengineering such as injecting sulfate aerosols into the Earth’s atmosphere to increase the Earth’s albedo and decrease the Earth’s temperature, all forms of current geoengineering research are affected by the dilemma of democratic procedure. There exists an important higher-order claim in discussions of policy justification that the rationale for certain advocacies and the way that those rationales interact within an overarching political framework is important for determining the extent to which policies are justified. Proponents of geoengineering research often make the argument that even if our current population is not in favor of actually implementing geoengineering, it is important to “arm the future” with the information needed to implement geoengineering if future generations are put into a position where they must implement geoengineering for their own survival. Contrastingly, a rationale for implementing geoengineering does not categorically ignore the overarching context of democracy. An argument of this sort could proceed in the following fashion: current people are being harmed as a result of climate change. Constituents also have an interest in mitigating climate change. There has already been substantial research into geoengineering policies that prove it is both feasible and cost-effective. Therefore, there is a justification for politicians to support the implementation of geoengineering to benefit current people. This is not mere conjecture—in recent memory, members of the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States have lobbied for funds for real-world geoengineering testing and testified to congress proclaiming the wonders of geoengineering. Members of the Trump administration and high-level Republicans have publicly advocated for geoengineering as a method of solving for climate change and some pundits claim that their reason for doing this lies in protecting the interest of constituents in the oil industry. Current people have an interest in implementation and would benefit from a successful deployment of, for example, stratospheric spraying—the introduction of “small, reflective particles into the upper atmosphere to reflect some sunlight before it reaches the surface of the Earth” would act as a way to almost immediately decrease the temperature of the planet and mitigate the current effects of climate change. The question then becomes why politicians have not made more of an attempt to secure funds to create a real-world test for geoengineering. The answer is deceptively simple—people may not like climate change, but they also do not like the idea of messing with the environment or they believe that there exists a slippery slope in geoengineering, potentially leading to continued adjustments of the environment. While public opinion might be in favor of the idea of researching geoengineering, they are wary of implementation. III. One Potential Response to the Geoengineering Dilemma One might claim that interest in geoengineering research within the current population is reason enough for politicians to advocate for it. This is not a categorical solution—it is only contingent on the beliefs of current people and those beliefs could change. If geoengineering research proved to be useful and effective, it might be the case that current people would lose interest in its novelty. Support for policies can fade, and in the case of climate change it would be a mistake to let solutions be determined solely by what could be transient interest. If one accepts that a successful implementation of geoengineering will take time, resources, and extensive research then it can be argued that choosing to stop researching geoengineering is a harm to the future generation that requires that research for its survival. IV. Addressing the Democratic and the Geoengineering Dilemmas Up until this point, this paper has put forth two problems—democracy’s two-pronged dilemma and the geoengineering paradox. The two-pronged dilemma states, first, that democracy does not have a structure to address the interest of future citizens and, second, that it is ill-equipped to work on long-term projects to address long-term issues. The geoengineering paradox has been presented as an application of democracy’s two-pronged dilemma and states that democracy justifies implementing geoengineering but not researching it. If one accepts these problems and believes that we have some obligation to future generations, then a solution is needed. A solution to democracy’s two-pronged dilemma and the geoengineering paradox is for democratic states to entrench the rights of future generations in their constitutions and laws using legal language that requires policymakers to maintain a certain element of respect for future generations. This would entail positively affirming that human rights extend to the future. Ideally, this entrenchment would be flexible and focus on ideals of intergenerational equality—it would prioritize the interest of future generations to maximize their ability for free choice and maintain a standard of living that is at least at the median of the standard of living of current generations. The content and interpretation of the entrenchment of the rights of future generations is somewhat variable, but the benefits to entrenchment are multifold. First, entrenchment would allow policymakers to permissibly make decisions in the interest of future generations and avoid the first prong of the democratic problem. It would provide a structural justification for pursuing policies beyond that which can be justified by an obligation to be responsive to their constituency. Although future generations still cannot express approval or disapproval for current policies, a policymaker has reason to virtually represent their interests to the best of their ability. The second benefit is also clear—entrenchment solves the second prong of the democratic problem. Entrenchment provides a constitutional obligation to give care towards future generations and take on long-term projects. Even in cases where short-term projects might support a bid for reelection, policymakers must consider whether these short-term projects conflict with the rights of future generations. A practical example can be seen in a political debate on whether to invest in jobs in coal or green energy. Although coal jobs might have some small, short-term benefits to a single politician’s constituency, it would be impermissible to make a conscious choice to support an industry that has the ability to exacerbate environmental harms. Instead, the politician might advocate for investing in renewable energy and training programs to transition coal miners to work at a new renewable energy plant. In cases where there are geographic concerns about the feasibility of renewable energy, the burden of the politician would be to determine whether any industry practices could be changed in order to improve the sustainability of the local coal plant. Entrenchment implies consideration of the future rather than a categorical prioritization of interests. Third, and most relevant to the geoengineering dilemma, entrenchment allows for there to be an overarching political context that legitimizes the rationale for research in the name of “arming the future.” It allows politicians to support geoengineering research even in the context where the benefits of the policy will not be realized for decades-long after their time in office is done. It represents fulfilling a contractual obligation. If a politician were to propose a policy that would violate the constraints of entrenchment, then she would be liable to something like impeachment. Impeachment acts as a way to punish politicians who break laws. As entrenching the rights of future generations would be akin to proposing a law constraining conduct, the violation of entrenchment would be a violation of the law. This would give individuals and structures within the government the ability to impose sanctions on those policymakers who would seek to disrespect future generations. V. Responding to Potential Objection to Entrenchment Even if one accepts that entrenching basic rights for future generations addresses democracy’s two-pronged dilemma and the geoengineering dilemma, there are still a few powerful objections to entrenchment. A. Entrenchment is Undemocratic One could make the argument that any entrenchment of any value into a constitution is undemocratic as it could constrain the ability of policymakers to be responsive to their constituents. Values that are entrenched in a constitution—a document made by one group of people that often continues on to future generations—do not always represent the views of current people. To entrench the rights of future generations in a constitution would be to impose values on future generations; something inherently undemocratic. This is a relatively weak argument for two main reasons. First, entrenchment in this case is something that allows for procedural fairness and respects democratic tenets of equality. If one was a proponent of democracy, then she would advocate for both of these features as prerequisites for a democratic process to take place. Second, and most powerfully in the context of this paper, entrenchment explains the reason that the paradox of geoengineering exists. People often recognize respect for future generations as a value that they either have or ought to have. Although they themselves may disagree with implementing geoengineering, that does not mean that they categorically want to take that choice away from others. Although democracies do not necessarily need to possess liberal values, they often do because of concerns about fairness and equality. In order to ensure that future generations maintain an ability to choose, it is necessary to implement certain political protections against current generations unknowingly limiting the options of future generations. B. An Epistemic Worry One more powerful objection to entrenchment is the notion that current people do not even know what is in the interest of future people. After all, one of the benefits of democracy is that people can voice their own interests and concerns to policymakers. Future people cannot do this as they do not yet exist. Norms and values change over time, and opinions about policy can often be shaped by these changes. Apart from a concern about what interests future people will have, there may also be a second, purely epistemic worry that consists of something akin to the following: we cannot know what the future holds with any certainty, and we cannot make policy to address problems that we do not know about. Therefore, any policy to help the future will rely on incomplete information. First, this epistemic question applies to current people too. If individuals do not vote, policymakers are still tasked with considering them in their decisions. We do not say that they have done something wrong if policymakers make an imperfect decision—we only say they made a mistake when the decision they make directly violates the rights of those people who are not their constituents. For example, a decision to invest in infrastructure in one town that 40% of the town refrained from voting on. That by itself is not a problem. If the infrastructure investment requires bulldozing the home of someone who did not vote for this plan, then that person could say that her personal rights were disrespected and the policymaker did something wrong. Second, certain interests have remained the same. Basic goods that are key to survival are a prerequisite for having higher order interests, interests that relate to ethical determinations of what a good life would entail. In terms of higher order interests, “although moral variety undoubtedly exists, it is less extensive than is often supposed…[as] commonalities define the distinctively human forms of life.” Certain interests are human interests, and entrenchment focuses on the consideration of these interests. Even if one disagrees with the idea that there can be one common conception of the “good life” as espoused by the Skidelskys’, approaches of determining a good life based on what a rational individual would want or what capabilities we wish individuals to have also require attention to ensuring basic goods. Basic goods are “in general necessary for the framing and the execution of a rational plan of life” and capabilities require asking “what is so-and-so able to do and be?” Food, clean water, and shelter are all requirements for safe living, and all of those requirements are threatened by climate change. Third, in terms of the specific policy of “arming the future” with geoengineering research, current people are not telling the future what to do. Instead, current people would be maximizing the choices that the future can make by providing them with information. Entrenchment as a justifying account of why it would be permissible to “arm the future” does not entail an epistemic overreach as no decision is being made; the future does not need to use the information that they would be given. They have the freedom to refuse to implement geoengineering if they do not believe it is what is best for them. Finally—to address the purely epistemic worry that nobody can predict the future on a policy level—it is important to recognize that it is likely the case that climate change will pose an existential risk to some future generation. Although it is always difficult to calculate epistemic uncertainty, it is plausible to say that we are relatively certain that if climate change is currently affecting people, it will likely affect future people as well. It is also worth noting that in our current democratic system, policymakers do recognize climate change as an existential risk to future generations and often act in the international arena to combat it like with the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Accords. C. Prioritizing the Present Another strong objection to entrenchment is the worry that policymakers would be prohibited from prioritizing the present. If there are side constraints against harming the future, policymakers may feel like they either cannot make any decision or can only make decisions that benefit the future for fear of being impeached for shirking their duties to the future. First, this misunderstands the goal of entrenchment. Entrenchment states that there is a prohibition against harming future generations with current policies. It prohibits policymakers from ignoring future generations in their calculations. It allows policymakers to permissibly take action that benefits future generations without someone claiming that they are shirking their obligations to the present. It does not state that policymakers should only prioritize future generations; it simply places a side constraint on what sorts of policies can be permissibly implemented. We still may not harm the present with our policies. Second, stating that a certain group has rights that should be protected does not imply that the current generation does not have rights. Entrenching the rights of future people does not take away the rights of current people. Certain policies might prioritize future people over current people, but in the case of justifying climate change policy that is not the case,especially when it comes to geoengineering research to “arm the future.” Third, to address the worry about undue prioritization in regard to taxation, there is a mistake in assuming that geoengineering research does not benefit current people. Scientific research has numerous fringe benefits. It benefits scientists and educational institutions in terms of providing funding and jobs as well as attracting new talent. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that an individual’s taxes go towards something that will benefit her in specific terms. If someone agrees to exist within the bounds of government and pay taxes, she agrees to pay for a set of government services rather than a specific service. There is no real mechanism to withhold a person’s taxes from being used towards services that do not directly benefit her as money is fungible. Finally, a worry about considering the interests of future people is akin to worrying about the interests of current people. A democratic system gives everyone input into the decision-making process, but equality of input does not entail that everyone’s input will be included in the final decision. Consideration of future interest does not imply that those interests will always override current interests; it is the job of policymakers to make reasoned decisions rather than a problem with entrenchment. To this final response, there is a separate worry, namely the way that democracy often considers interests is via some majority rules system. It is because of this that there can exist a tyranny of the majority where the interests of the minority are systematically discounted. If consideration of future people is meant to mean that policymakers are to consider each of the votes of the infinite future people, then it may mean that in a democratic system would always side with the infinite future people because they numerically outweigh current people. This interpretation of entrenchment is a mistake. First, consideration of basic interests does not require counting individual votes as the interests remain the same and simply act as a constraint. Second, side constraints on what policymakers can permissibly vote for exist in our current system in order to curtail the harms of the tyranny of the majority. While individual policies can fall into the trap of the tyranny of the majority, policymakers do not have the right to infringe on the basic rights of the minority. VI. Conclusion If one wishes to justify funding geoengineering research to “arm the future,” then it is necessary to solve democracy’s two-pronged problem and address its relationship with the dilemma of geoengineering. While policymakers have the ability to make any law, it is important that the laws they create are justified by a broader framework. By entrenching the rights of future generations to basic necessities that would be harmed by climate change, policymakers would have a codified reason to invest in policies that can “arm the future” with information about how to quickly counteract climate change. Works Cited Gardiner, Stephen M. “Is ‘Arming the Future’ with Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil?” Climate Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2010. Keith, David. A Case for Climate Engineering. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 2013. Keith, David W. “Toward a Responsible Solar Geoengineering Research Program.” Issues in Science and Technology. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine: The University of Texas at Dallas, Arizona State University, 2017. Lukacs, Martin. “Trump presidency ‘opens door’ to planet-hacking geoengineer experiments.” The Guardian, 27 March, 2017. www.theguardian.com/environment/true-north/2017/mar/27/trump-presidency-opens-door-to-planet-hacking-geoengineer-experiments Oxford Geoengineering Programme. “What is geoengineering?” University of Oxford Martin School. 2018. www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/what-is-geoengineering/what-is-geoengineering/indexd41d.html Skidelsky, Edward and Skidelsky, Robert. How Much is Enough?: Money and the Good Life. New York, NY, 2012.

*Feature* John R. Allen John R. Allen is a retired United States Marine Corps four-star general, and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A). He was appointed by President Barack Obama as the special presidential envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). He is currently the President of the Brookings Institution, and his most recent research addresses the effects of artificial intelligence in a variety of sectors. Allen’s piece in JPPE’s second issue explores the effects of artificial intelligence on the future of education. Fall 2018 Artificial intelligence (AI) and emerging technologies (ET) are poised to transform modern society in profound ways. As with electricity in the last century, AI is an enabling technology that will animate everyday products and communications, endowing everything from cars to cameras with the ability to interact with the world around them, and with each other. These developments are just the beginning, and as AI/ET matures, it will have sweeping impacts on our work, security, politics, and very lives. These technologies are already impacting the world around us, as Darrell West and I wrote in our April 2018 piece “How artificial intelligence is transforming the world ,” and I highly recommend that anyone just discovering the topic of AI policy read it thoroughly. There, Darrell and I describe several important implications related to AI/ET, but chief among them is that these technology developments are on the cusp of ushering in a true revolution in human affairs at an increasingly fast pace. As AI continues to influence and shape existing industries and allows new ones to take root, its macro-level impact, particularly in the realm of economics, will become more and more apparent. Control over the research and development of AI will become increasingly vital, and the winners of this upcoming AI-defined era in human history will be the countries and companies that can create the most powerful algorithms, assemble the most talent, collect the most data, and marshal the most computing power. This is the next great technology race of our generation and the stakes are high, particularly for the United States. If American society is to embrace the full range of the social and political changes that these technologies will introduce, then it is the education and training we provide our youth and workers that will fuel the engines of future AI, and therefore geopolitical success. I've studied and written extensively about the effects of AI/ET on the evolving character of war toward a concept I’ve called hyperwar – or, a new era of warfare in which, through AI, the speed of decision making is faster than anything that has come before. At a superficial level, this topic often devolves into a discussion of “killer robots,” or at the very least the impending use of AI in lethal autonomous weaponry. While those discussions are relevant and inextricably linked, they represent a narrow understanding of the greater issues at hand. The concern over AI’s potential or theoretical military applications must not distract us from how far-reaching the impact of AI will be in nearly all other policy domains. Health care, education, agriculture, energy, finance, and yes, national security, will all be reshaped in some way by AI – with education being the pivot point around which the future of the United States revolves. This is not solely a matter of social redress – which is by itself is extremely important – but in fact is a larger national security issue. The way we use education to prepare our next-generation of leaders will directly determine whether the US retains its leadership in critical fields of relevance in the emerging digital environment. Without a sufficiently educated population and workforce, the US likely will slip behind other states for whom AI/ET is not only means for improved social organization, but for strategic superiority, and potentially for digital and physical conquest. A future in which the United States is second in the race for AI technology would create a situation of national technological and digital/cyber inferiority, which could in turn result in national strategic subservience – something simply unimaginable in a world of growing strategic competition with systems of government very different from ours. Many Americans grew up with the understanding that the US’ capacity to fight and win a nuclear war was defined by its superiority in the Strategic Triad, the three legs of our strategic deterrence: our missile squadrons, our bomber fleet, and our ballistic missile submarines. Behind that dizzying array of hardware was the undisputed power of US intellectual and technical capabilities, and behind that was a near unlimited supply of talented engineers, each trained by a system of education undisputed in its excellence. That system was built from the ground up to produce crucial STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) protégés in the quantities needed to ensure American strategic superiority, which contributed directly to the US and its allies prevailing in the Cold War. For the health of our American way of life, our competitive advantage, and the strategic security of our nation, the basis for tomorrow’s system of education must reflect a deliberately tuned and calibrated system that proactively emphasizes AI/ET, big data analytics, and super-computing. Unfortunately, in both relative and absolute terms, the US is falling behind in the race for superiority in these key technologies and AI. Where the US strategic advantage of the 20th Century was secured by American nuclear superiority, US superiority in the 21st Century will likely be preserved, safeguarded, and sustained through a system of education that envisages the changes necessary and is sufficient to embrace and apply relevant technologies. It will also be underwritten by educators who grasp the profound shifts in the pedagogical skills essential to the educational needs of the 21st Century. The need to adapt is great – and for this system to be fully embraced it must come in the form of a comprehensive and national US strategy for education in the digital age, to include the resources necessary to bring education into the digital classroom, and to educate and train entire generations of educators to be relevant in the 21st Century and beyond. The United States must at all costs preserve its position of primacy in AI, big data, and super-computing through leaders who understand these issues on a fundamental level and have the political will to develop and resource a comprehensive plan for reimagining our national education efforts. In thinking about the essence of a US national education strategy adapted to the digital age, several important questions arise pertaining to the way we think about education and develop the next generation of leaders: What will be the implications for how we educate, train, and develop teachers? A discussion on the impact of AI on education will point dramatically to those who facilitate the process in our schools. The very term “teacher” may be insufficient to adequately capture the role of this key individual in the educational experience. Teaching and learning requirements may be substantially re-ordered and the dynamic of learning versus teaching in an AI-based system of education will be very different. And while teachers today are in many ways the unsung and underappreciated heroes of the American workforce, the teachers of the digital age may define the future of America. This will raise important questions about requirements for teaching degrees and related certificates in this new environment, and the necessary adaptation of the science of pedagogy to these changes. Ultimately, the key question will be “are the teachers of today ready to develop the leaders we will need tomorrow?” A difficult question, to be sure, and the answer today is no. The national education strategy must focus on their development as it focuses on the students as well. What will the AI-based classroom look like? With AI, every aspect of the traditional learning environment is up for reimagining. Will classrooms continue to be physical spaces? Or instead, will it be a virtual "space" using networked augmented or virtual reality technologies? The answer is yes to both, and the student in tomorrow’s AI based educational experience will be exposed to an immersive, digital education heretofore unimaginable. The distributed, networked, virtual reality classroom is both enormously exciting, and at the same time frightening for the enormity of its potential. There are major challenges to measuring success in an AI-based educational process. For instance, if our students can become more deeply involved in the pathways of their own learning through AI, measurement will occur moment to moment, as well as the success of remediation. In the best-case scenario, we will know at the end of each student’s day if s/he is meeting academic requirements and quickly correct deficiencies as necessary to stay on track. In any case, there are profound moral questions to consider with a system such as this, and policymakers must understand the underlying dynamics of the technologies at play if they are to fully support society. What will this kind of system of education do to reduce inequalities in our society? One of the most profound aspects of education in the AI environment is that these technologies could unleash the potential and productivity of a huge sector of American and global society hitherto constrained by their educational experience and resulting lack of opportunity. Local governments, schools, and especially the private sector will need to routinely intersect to create synergy and symbiosis to enhance our educational processes. Through the AI-powered digital space, “opportunity for all” may become a reality for those who previously had little means of achieving their own piece of the American Dream. The profoundly limiting feature of these opportunities lies in internet and 4G and 5G penetration within the United States, and the sometimes appallingly scarce educational resources committed in some areas in America. There are large segments of the US where our education systems, and our youth, have limited-to-no access to the internet and to Wi-Fi. If we hope to achieve our digital potential, and to continue to maintain our lead in AI and other emerging technologies, a national program to bring Wi-Fi and the internet to all our citizens is absolutely essential, and will in any case help to close the sometimes yawning gaps created by racial and income inequality in the US. AI/ET promise to usher in a bold new era of human history, one where the machines we create will oftentimes be smarter, faster, and more powerful than those who created them. This reality has profound implications for the field of education and introduces complex ethical, legal, and societal implications that academics, policymakers, and average citizens alike will need to contend with as every aspect of society reshapes around them. Further, the United States risks strategic inferiority if it does not embrace a full reconsideration of education in the digital environment, to include a comprehensive strategy for reimagining our education system at the national level. Today, we are not training our young leaders with the tools required to be successful in the digital age, and that has deeply troubling implications for the future of American society. Nevertheless, just as the United States persevered through the Cold War through technological superiority, I am hopeful that the 21st Century will yet again be one defined by American leadership – with our best and brightest from across the entire society leading the charge in digital era.

Sydney Bowen A “Shot” Heard Around the World: The Fed made a deliberate choice to let Lehman fail. It was the right one. Sydney Bowen On the morning of September 15, 2008, the DOW Jones Industrial Average plunged more than 500 points; $700 billion in value vanished from retirement plans, government pension funds, and investment portfolios (1). This shocking market rout was provoked by the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc., which would soon become known as “the largest, most complex, most far-reaching bankruptcy case” filed in United States history (2). Amid job loss, economic turmoil, and choruses of “what ifs,” a myriad of dangerous myths and conflicting stories emerged, each desperately seeking to rationalize the devastation of the crisis and explain why the Federal Reserve did not extend a loan to save Lehman. Some accuse the Fed of making a tragic mistake, believing that Lehman’s failure was the match that lit the conflagration of the entire Global Financial Crisis. Others disparage the Fed for bowing to the public’s political opposition towards bailouts. The Fed itself, however, adamantly maintains that they “did not have the legal authority to rescue Lehman,” an argument played in unremitting refrain in the years following the crisis. In this essay, I discuss the various dimensions of the heated debate on how and why the infamous investment bank went under. I examine the perennial question of whether regulators really had a choice in allowing Lehman to fail, an inquiry that prompts the multi-dimensional and more subjective discussion of whether regulators made the correct decision. I assert that (I) the Fed made a deliberate, practical choice to let Lehman fail and posthumously justified it with a façade of legal inability, and that (II) in the context of the already irreparably severe crisis, the fate of the future financial landscape, obligations to taxpayers, and the birth of the landmark legislation TARP, the Fed made the ‘right’ decision. I. The Fed’s Almost Rock-Solid Alibi: Legal Jargon and Section 13(3) Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, Former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, and New York Fed general counsel Thomas Baxter Jr. have each argued in sworn testimony that regulators wanted to save Lehman but lacked the legal authority to do so. While their statements are not lies, they neglect to tell the entire – more incriminating – truth. In this section, I assert that Fed officials deliberately chose not to save Lehman and justified their decision after the fact with the impeccable alibi that they did not have a viable legal option. In a famous testimony, Bernanke announced, “ [T]he only way we could have saved Lehman would have been by breaking the law, and I’m not sure I’m willing to accept those consequences for the Federal Reserve and for our system of laws. I just don’t think that would be appropriate ”(3). At face value, his argument appears sound; however, the “law” alluded to here– Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act–was not a hard and fast body of rules capable of being “broken,” but rather a weakly worded, vague body that encouraged “regulatory gamesmanship and undermined democratic accountability” (4). i. Section 13(3) Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act gives the Fed broad power to lend to non-depository institutions “in unusual and existent circumstances” (5). It stipulates that a loan must be “secured to the satisfaction of the [lending] Reserve Bank,” limiting the amount of credit that the Fed can extend to the value of a firm’s col- lateral in an effort to shield taxpayers from potential losses (6). Yet, since the notion of “satisfactory security” has no precise contractual definition, Fed officials had ample room to exercise discretionary judgment when appraising Lehman’s assets. This initial legal freedom was further magnified by the opaqueness of the assets themselves – mortgage-backed securities, credit default swaps, and associated derivatives were newfangled financial instruments manufactured from a securitization process, complexly tranched and nearly impossible to value. Thus, the three simple words, “secured to satisfaction,” provided regulators with an asylum from their own culpability, allowing them to hide a deliberate choice inside a comfort- able perimeter of legal ambiguity. ii. Evaluations of Lehman’s Assets and “Secured to Satisfaction” The “legal authority” to save Lehman hinged upon the Fed’s conclusions on Lehman’s solvency and their evaluation of the firm’s available collateral–a task that boiled down to Lehman’s troubled and illiquid real-estate portfolio, composed primarily of mortgage-backed securities. Lehman had valued their portfolio at $50 billion, purporting a $28.4 billion surplus; however, Fed officials and potential private rescuers, skeptical of Lehman’s real-estate valuation methods, argued that there was a gaping “hole” in their balance sheet. Bank of America, a private party contemplating a Lehman buyout, maintained that the size of the hole amounted to “$66 billion” while the Fed’s task team of Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse CEO’s determined that “tens of billions of dollars were missing” (7). Esteemed economist Lawrence Ball, who meticulously reviewed Lehman’s balance sheet, however, concluded to the contrary–there was no “hole” and Lehman was solvent when the Fed allowed it to fail. While I do not claim to know which of the various assessments was correct, the simple fact remains–the myriad of conflicting reports speak to the ultimate subjectivity of any evaluation. “Legal authority” became hitched to the value of mortgage-backed securities, and in 2008 their value had become dangerously opaque. In discussing the Fed’s actions, it is necessary to point out that the Federal Reserve has a rare ability to value assets more liberally than a comparable private party–they are able to hold distressed assets for longer and ultimately exert incredible influence over any securities’ final value as they control monetary policy. The Dissenting Statement of the FCIC report aptly reveals that Fed leaders could have simply guided their staff to “re-evaluate [Lehman’s balance sheet] in a more optimistic way to justify a secured loan;” however, they elected not to do so since such action did not align with their private, practical interests (8). The “law” could have been molded in either direction–the Fed consciously chose the direction of nonintervention just as easily as they could have chosen the opposite. iii. The Fed’s “Practical” and Deliberate Choice Section 13(3) had been invoked just five months earlier in March 2008, when the Fed extended a $29 billion loan to facilitate JP Morgan’s purchase of a differ- ent failing firm, Bear Stearns. In an effort to separate the Fed’s handling of Bear Stearns from Lehman, Bernanke admits that considerations behind each decision were both “ legal and practical ” (9). While in Bear Stearns case, practical judgement weighed in favor of intervention, in Lehman’s case, it did not: “if we lent the money to Lehman, all that would happen would be that the run [on Lehman] would succeed, because it wouldn’t be able to meet the demands, the firm would fail, and not only would we be unsuccessful, but we would [have] saddled the taxpayer with tens of billions of dollars of losses” (10). While an exhaustive display of arguments and testimonies that challenge the Fed’s claim of legal inability is cogent, perhaps the most chilling evidence lies in an unassuming and incisive question: “Since when did regulators let a lack of legal authority stop them? There was zero legal authority for the FDIC’s broad guarantee of bank holding debt. Saving Lehman would have been just one of many actions of questionable legality taken by regulators” (11). iv. Other Incriminating Facts: The Barclay’s Guarantee and Curtailed PDCF Lending An analysis of Lehman’s failure would be incomplete without discussing the Fed’s resounding lack of action during negotiations of a private rescue with Barclays, a critical moment in the crisis that could have salvaged the failing firm with- out contentious use of public money. Barclays began conversing with the U.S. Treasury Department a week prior to Lehman’s fall as they contemplated and hammered out terms of an acquisition (12). The planned buyout by the British bank would have gone through had the Fed agreed to guarantee Lehman’s trading obligations during the time between the initial deal and the final approval; yet, the Fed deliberately refused to intervene, masking their true motives behind a legal inability to offer a “‘naked guarantee’–one that would be unsecured and not limit- ed in amount” (13). However, since such a request for an uncapped guarantee never occurred, the Fed’s legal alibi is deceitfully misleading. In truth, Lehman asked for secured funding from the Fed’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), a liquidity window allowing all Wall Street firms to take out collateralized loans when cut off from market funding (“The Fed—Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF),” n.d.). While Lehman would not have been able to post eligible collateral under the initial requirement of investment-grade securities, they likely would have been able to secure a loan under the expanded version of the program that accepted a broader range of collateral. The purposeful curtailment of the expanded collateral to Lehman is one of the most questionable aspects of the Lehman weekend, and is perhaps the most lucid evidence that the Fed made a deliberate choice to let the firm fail. The FCIC de- tails the murky circumstances and clear absence of an appropriate explanation for the act: “the government officials made it plain that they would not permit Lehman to borrow against the expanded types of collateral, as other firms could. The sentiment was clear, but the reasons were vague” (14). If there had been a rational ex- planation, regulators would have articulated it. Instead, they merely repeated that “there existed no obligation or duty to provide such information or to substantiate the basis for the decision not to aid or support Lehman” (15). The Fed’s refusal to provide PDCF liquidity administered the final nail in Lehman’s coffin–access to such a loan made the difference in Lehman being able to open for business that infamous morning. v. An Intriguing Lack of Evidence The Fed did not furnish the FCIC with any analysis to show that Lehman lacked sufficient collateral to secure a loan under 13(3), referencing only the estimates of other Wall Street firms and declining to respond to a direct request for “the dollar value of the shortfall of Lehman’s collateral relative to its liquidity needs” (16). Diverging from typical protocol, where the Fed’s office “wrote a memo about each of the [potential] loans under Section 13(3),” Lehman’s case contains no official memo. When pressed on this topic, Scott Alvarez, the General Counsel of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, rationalized the opportune lack of evidence as an innocuous judgement call: “folks had a pretty good feeling for the value of Lehman during that weekend, and so there was no memo prepared that documented why it is we didn’t lend... they understood from all of [the negotiations] that there wasn’t enough there for us to lend against and so they weren’t willing to go forward” (17). While this absence of evidence does not prove that the Fed had access to a legal option, it highlights a disconcerting and suggestive vacancy in their claims. Consider an analogous courtroom case where a defendant exercises the right to remain silent rather than respond to a question that may implicate them–similarly, the Fed’s intentional evasion of the request for concrete evidence appears an incriminating insinuation of guilt. The lack of “paper trail” becomes even more confounding when coupled with the Fed’s inconsistent and haphazard statements justifying their decision. Only after the initial praise for the decision soured into a surge of public criticism did any mention of legality enter the public record. Nearly three weeks after Lehman’s fall on October 7th, Bernanke introduced a strategic “alibi:” “Neither the Treasury nor the Federal Reserve had the authority to commit public money in that way” (18). Bernanke insists that he will “maintain until [his] deathbed that [they] made every effort to save Lehman, but were just unable to do so because of a lack of legal authority” (19). However, when considering the subjectivity of “reasonable assurance” of repayment, the malleability of “legal authority,” and the convenient lack of evidence to undermine his statement, Bernanke’s “dying” claim becomes comically hollow. If the Fed had truly made “every effort” to rescue Lehman, they would have relied on more than a “pretty good feeling”–had they truly been sincere, the Federal Reserve, a team of seasoned economists, would have used hard numerical facts as guidance for a path forward. vi. The Broader Implications of “Secured to Satisfaction:” a Logical Fallacy While the Fed’s lack of transparency is unsettling, perhaps the most unnerving aspect of the entire Lehman episode is the precarious regulatory framework that the American financial system trusted during a crisis. The concept of “secured to satisfaction” is not the bullet-proof legal threshold painted by the media, rather it was a malleable moving target molded by the generosity of the Fed’s estimates and the fluctuating state of the economy, instead of precise mathematical facts. A 2018 article by Columbia Law Professor Kathryn Judge exposes the logical fallacy of Section 13(3)’s “secured to satisfaction,” citing how “subsequent developments can have a first order impact on both the value of the assets accepted as collateral and the apparent health of the firms needing support” (20). The “legal authority” of regulators to invoke Section 13(3) is a circular and empty concept, hitched to nebulous evaluations of complex and opaque securities, assets that were not only inherently hard to value but whose valuations could later be manipulated. By adjusting the composition of their balance sheet (Open Market Operations) and altering interest rates, the Fed guides the behavior of financial markets, thus subtly inflating (or deflating) the value of a firm’s collateral (21). Indeed, in the years following the government’s support of Bear Stearns and AIG, the Fed’s aggressive and novel monetary policy (close to zero interest rates and a large-scale program of quantitative easing) may have been “critical to making the collateral posted by [Bear Stearns and AIG] seem adequate to justify the central bank’s earlier actions’’ (22). Using collateral quality and solvency as prerequisites for lawful action is inherently problematic, since a firm’s health and the quality of their collateral are not factors given exogenously–they are endogenous variables that regulators them- selves play a critical role in determining. Thus, acceptance of the narrative that Lehman failed because the Fed lacked any legal authority to save it would be a naive oversight. Rather, Lehman failed because the Fed lacked the practical and political motivations to exploit the law. II. The Right Choice As Lehman’s downfall is both a politically contentious and emotionally charged topic, it is necessary to approach the morality of the Fed’s decision with sympathy and caution. In the following sections, I intend to illustrate why regulators made the right decision in allowing Lehman to fail by using non-partisan facts organized around four key arguments . (1) Lehman was not the watershed event of the Crisis. The market panic follow- ing September 2008 was a reaction to a collection of unstoppable, unrelated, and market-shaking events. (2) Lehman’s failure expunged the hazardous incentives carved into the financial landscape prior. Policymakers shrewdly chose long-term economic order over the short-term benefit of keeping a single firm afloat. (3) Failure was the “right” and only choice from a taxpayer’s perspective. (4) Lehman’s demise was a necessary catastrophe, creating circumstances so parlous that Congress passed TARP, landmark legislation that gave the Federal Reserve the authority that ultimately revived the financial system. (1) Lehman Was Not the Watershed Event of the Crisis For many people, the heated debate over whether regulators did the right thing in allowing Lehman to fail is synonymous with the larger question: “would rescuing Lehman have saved us from the Great Recession?” In the following section, I assert that Lehman was not the defining moment of the Financial Crisis (as is often construed in the media); rather, the global financial turmoil was irreversibly underway by September 2008 and the ensuing disaster could not have been simply averted by Lehman’s rescue. “ The problem was larger than a single failed bank – large, unconnected financial institutions were undercapitalized because of [similar, failed housing bets] ” (23). By Monday September 15, Bank of America had rescued the deteriorating Merrill Lynch and the insurance giant AIG was on the brink of failure–a testament to the critical detail that many other large financial institutions were also in peril due to losses on housing-related assets and a subsequent liquidity crisis. Indeed, in the weeks preceding Lehman’s failure, the interbank lending market had virtually froze, plunged into distress by a contagious spiral of self-fulfilling expectations. Unable to ascertain the location and size of subprime risk held by counterparties in the market, investors became panicked by the obscured and so ubiquitous risk of housing exposure, precipitously cutting off or restricting funding to other market participants. This perceived threat of a liquidity crisis triggered the downward spiral of the interbank lending market in the weeks preceding Lehman’s fall, a market which pumped vital cash into nearly every firm on Wall Street. The LIBOR-OIS spread, a proxy for counterparty risk and a robust indicator of the state of the interbank market, illustrates these “illiquidity waves” that severely impaired markets in 2008 (24). (Sengupta & Tam, 2008). As shown in the figure below, in the weeks prior to the failure of Lehman Brothers, the spread spiked dramatically, soaring above 300 basis points and portraying the cascade of panic and contraction of lending standards in the interbank market. The idea that Lehman was the key moment in the crisis might be accurate if nothing of significance happened before its failure; however, as I outline below this was clearly not the case. The quick succession of events occurring in September 2008 – events which would have occurred regardless of Lehman’s failure – triggered the global financial panic. A New Yorker article publishing a detailed timeline of the weekend exposes how AIG’s collapse and near failure was completely uncorrelated to Lehman (25). On Saturday September 13, AIG’s “looming multi-billion-dollar shortfall” from bad gambles on credit default swaps became apparent. Rescuing AIG became a top priority throughout the weekend, and on Tuesday, the day after Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection, the Fed granted an $85 billion emergency loan to salvage AIG’s investments (26). Given the curious timing, AIG’s troubles are often chalked up to be a market reaction to Lehman’s failure; however, proper facts expose the failures of AIG and Lehman as merely a close succession of unfortunate, yet unrelated events. In a similar light, the failure and subsequent buyouts of Washington Mutual (WaMu) and Wachovia, events that further rocked financial markets and battered confidence, would have occurred regardless of a Lehman bailout. Both commercial banks were heavily involved in subprime mortgages and were in deep trouble before Lehman. University of Oregon economist Tim Duy asserts that, even with a Lehman rescue, “the big mortgage lenders and regional banks [ie. WaMu and Wachovia] that were more directly affected by the mortgage meltdown likely wouldn’t have survived” (27). The financial system was precariously fragile by the fall of 2008 and saving Lehman would not have defused the larger crisis or ensuing market panic that erupted after September 2008. Critics of the Fed’s decision often cite how the collapse of Lehman Brothers be- gat the $62 billion Reserve Primary Fund’s “breaking of the buck” on Thursday, September 18 and precipitated a $550 billion run on money-market funds. Lehman’s dire effect on money and commercial paper markets is irrefutable; however, arguments that Lehman triggered this broader global financial panic neglect all relevant facts. The Lehman failure neither froze nor would a Lehman rescue have unfrozen credit markets, the key culprit responsible for the escalation and depth of the Crisis (28). Credit markets did not freeze in 2008 because the Fed chose not to bailout Lehman–they froze because of the mounting realization that mortgage losses were concentrated in the financial system, but nobody knew precisely where they lay. It was this creeping, inevitable realization, amplified by Lehman and the series of September events, that caused financial hysteria (29). As Geithner explains, “Lehman’s failure was a product of the forces that created the crisis, not the fundamental cause of those forces” (30). The core problems that catalyzed the financial market breakdown were an amalgamation of highly leveraged institutions, a lack of transparency, and the rapidly deteriorating value of mortgage-related assets–bailing out Lehman would not have miraculously fixed these problems. While such an analysis cannot unequivocally prove that regulators made the right decision in choosing to let Lehman fail, it offers a step in the right direction–the conventional wisdom that Lehman single-handedly triggered the collapse of confidence that froze credit markets and caused borrowing rates for banks to skyrocket is unfounded. While I have argued above that Lehman’s bankruptcy was not the sole trigger of the crisis, it was also not even the largest trigger. Research by Economist John Taylor asserts that Lehman’s bankruptcy was not the divisive event peddled by the media–using the LIBOR spread (the standard measure for market stress), Taylor found that the true ratcheting up of the crisis began on September 19, when the Fed revealed that they planned to ask Congress for $700 billion to defuse the crisis (31). Arguments advanced by mainstream media that saving Lehman would have averted the recession are naively optimistic and promote a dangerously inaccurate narrative on the events of 2007–2009. The failure of Lehman did indeed send new waves of panic through the economy; however, Lehman was not the only disturbance to rock financial markets in September of 2008 (32). This latter fact is of critical importance. (2) Lehman’s Collapse Caused Inevitable and Necessary Market Change “The inconsistency was the biggest problem. The Lehman decision abruptly and surprisingly tore the perceived rule book into pieces and tossed it out the window.” –Former Vice Chairman to the Federal Reserve Alan Blinder (33). Arguments that cite the ensuing market panic and erosion of confidence that erupted after Lehman’s failure are near-sighted and fail to appreciate the larger picture motivating policy makers’ decision. Regulators’ decision not to rescue the then fourth largest investment bank, an institution assumed “too big to fail,” dispensed a necessary wake-up call to deluded and unruly Wall Street firms, which had been lulled into a costly false sense of security. The question of whether regulators did the right thing in allowing Lehman to fail cannot be studied in a vacuum; it must be considered alongside the more consequential question of whether regulators made the right decision in saving Bear Stearns. In 2007, the Fed’s extension of a $29 billion loan to Bear Stearns rewrote the tacit rules that had governed the political and fiscal landscape for centuries, substantiating the notion that institutions could be “too big or too interconnected to fail.” The comforting assumption that regulators would intervene to save every systemically important institution from failure was a turning point in the crisis, “setting the stage for [the financial carnage] that followed” (34). After the Bear Stearns intervention, regulators faced a formidable and insuperable enemy: the inexorable march of time. It would be an unsustainable situation for the government to continue bailing out every ailing financial firm. “These officials would have eventually had to say ‘no’ to someone, sometime. The Corps of Financial Engineers drew the line at Lehman. They might have been able to let the process run a few weeks more and let the bill get bigger, but ultimately, they would have had to stop. And when they did expectations would be dashed and markets would adjust. If Lehman had been saved, someone else would have been allowed to fail. The only consequence would be the date when we commemorate the anniversary of the crisis, not that the crisis would have been forever averted. ” (35). The Lehman decision corrected the costly market expectations created by Bear Stearns’ rescue and restored efficiency and discipline to markets. Throughout the crisis, policymakers, unable to completely avoid damage, were forced to decide which parties would bear losses. Lehman’s demise was a reincarnation and emblem of their past decisions–their precedent of taxpayer burden had further encouraged Wall Street’s excessive leverage and reckless behavior (36). Saving Lehman would have simply hammered these skewed incentives further into markets, putting the long-term stability and structure of capitalist markets at risk. Taxpayers would have been forced to foot a bill regardless of the Fed’s final decision: if not directly through a bailout, then indirectly through layoffs and economic turmoil (37). Instead of saddling taxpayers with the lingering threat of a large bill in the future, the Fed made the prudent and far-sighted decision to hand them a smaller bill today. The Fed heeded the wisdom of the age-old adage, “better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.” Put simply, the economic “calculus” of policymakers was correct. While rescuing Lehman may have seemed tantalizing at the time, the long-term costs would have been far more consequential than the short-term benefits (38). Political connotations often accompany this argument, evocative of what some have christened the Fed’s “painful yet necessary lesson on moral hazard;” however, partisan beliefs are extraneous to the simple, economic facts of the matter. From a fiscal perspective, policymakers made the right choice to let Lehman fail by shrewdly choosing long-term economic order over short-term benefits. (3) The Right Decision from a Taxpayers’ Perspective Given financial markets’ complete loss of confidence in Lehman and the unnervingly fragile state of the economy, an attempt at a Lehman rescue (within or above the law) would not only have been a fruitless, but also a seriously unjust use of taxpayer dollars. The health of an investment bank hinges upon the willingness of customers and counterparties to deal with it, and according to former Secretary Geithner, “that confidence was just gone” (39). By the weekend, the market had already lost complete confidence in Lehman: “no one believed that the assets were worth their nominal value of $640 billion; a run on its assets was already underway, its liquidity was vanishing, and its stock price had fallen by 42% on just Friday September 12th; it couldn’t survive the weekend” (40). For all practical purposes, the markets had sealed Lehman’s fate and a last-minute government liquidity line could have done nothing to change it. In testimony, Bernanke aptly characterizes a loan to supplant the firms’ disappearing liquidity as a prodigal expenditure, “merely wast- ing taxpayer money for an outcome that was unlikely to change” (41). After the fallout of the Barclays deal, many experts have argued that the Fed should have provided liquidity support during a search for another buyer, since temporary liquidity assistance from the government might have extinguished the escalating crisis. However, such an open-ended government commitment that allowed Lehman to shop for an “indefinite time period” would have been an absurd waste of public money (42). If the Fed had indeed provided liquidity aid up to some generous valuation of Lehman’s collateral, “the creditors to Lehman could have cashed out 100 cents on the dollar, leaving taxpayers holding the bag for losses” (43). The loan would not have prevented failure, but only chosen which creditors would bear Lehman’s losses at the expense of others. On September 15, “Lehman [was] really nothing more than the sum of its toxic assets and shattered reputation as a venerable brokerage”(44). It would have been an egregious abuse of the democratic tax system if the government were to bail out Lehman, leaving the public at the whims of the fragile financial markets and saddling them with an uncapped bill for Wall Street’s imprudence. While virulent rumors of Lehman’s failure as political save-face by regulators may prevail in mainstream media, I maintain that the Fed’s deci- sion was the right one for the American public (45). (4) TARP: Lehman Begat the Legislation that Revived the Financial System In considering the relative importance of Lehman as the cause of the crisis, scholars must also consider the more nuanced and hard-hitting counterpart: “How important was Lehman as a cause of the end of the Crisis? ” While in the context of the suffering caused by the Great Recession and the polarizing rhetoric of “bailing out banks,” this question is politically unpopular; I broach it nonetheless, since it is an important facet of the debate on whether regulators made the “right decision.” Lehman’s failure was vitally important to the end of the Crisis–it allowed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to pass Congress, a critical piece of legislation that equipped regulators with the tools ultimately necessary to repair the financial system (46). Every previous effort of the Fed (creating the PDCF, rescuing Bear Stearns, the conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie) was not enough to salvage the deteriorating financial system–by September 2008 “Merrill Lynch, Lehman, and AIG were all at the edge of failure, and Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley were all approaching the abyss” (47). The Fed needed the authority to inject capital into the financial system, and as described in Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine , Lehman’s unexpected fall acted as the final catastrophic spark necessary to “prompt the hasty emergency action involving the relinquishment of rights and funds that would otherwise be difficult to pry loose from the citizenry” (48). With authority to inject up to $700 billion of capital into suffering non-bank institutions, TARP preserved the crumbling financial system by inspiring them to lend again. The government offered $250 billion in capital to the nine most systemically important institutions, and used $90 billion in TARP financing to save the teetering financial giants, Bank of America and Citigroup (49). Exactly how much credit TARP deserves for averting financial catastrophe is unclear, yet the fact remains that coupled with Geithner’s Stress Tests, TARP helped stop the county’s spiral into what could have been a crisis as dire as the Great Depression. IV. Conclusion In this essay, I have shown that the Fed exploited the vagueness of Section 13(3) to ad- vance their political, economic, and moral agenda to let Lehman fail, and asserted that policymakers made the right choice in allowing Lehman to fail (weighing economic facts, the implications of future economic landscape, taxpayers’ rights, and the passage of land- mark legislation). It may have been easier for regulators to hide behind legal jargon and technicalities than to defend the economic rationale and practicality of their onerous decision to an audience of distressed Americans; however, this ease is not without the costs of continued confusion, misleading conventional wisdom, and bitter citizenry. Lehman’s bankruptcy will forever be synonymous with the financial crisis and (resulting) wealth destruction.” -Paul Hickey, founder of Bespoke Investment Group (50). Lehman’s failure left an indelible mark in history and a tireless refrain of diverging and potent emotions towards regulators: contempt for the Fed that “triggered the Crisis,” disdain for the government that bailed out Wall Street with TARP, and hatred of impressionable leaders who “bowed” to political pressure. It is indeed easier to accept a visceral and tangible moment like Lehman’s failure as a cause of suffering than the nihilistic and elusive fact that the buildup of leverage and the burst of the housing bubble caused the crisis. However, it is not enough for only academics and policymakers to understand that “Lehman’s failure was a product of the forces that created the crisis, not a fundamental cause of those forces” (51). Conventional wisdom must be rewritten for the sake of faith in the government and the prevention of future crises. Our acceptance of why Lehman was allowed to die must move beyond the apportioning of responsibility or the distribution of reparations–we must redirect the futile obsession over the legality and morality of the Fed’s decision towards the imbalances in the financial system that caused the Crisis to begin with. Endnotes 1 Public Affairs, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 340. 2 Ibid. 3 Clark, “Lehman Brothers Rescue Would Have Been Unlawful, Insists Bernanke.” 4 Judge, “Lehman Brothers: How Good Policy Can Make Bad Law.” 5 Fettig, The History of a Powerful Paragraph. 6 Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers, 5. 7 Stewart, Eight Days. 8 Public Affairs, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 435. 9 Public Affairs, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 340. 10 Ibid. 11 Calabria, “Letting Lehman Fail was a Choice, and It Was the Right One.” 12 Chu, “Barclays Ends Talks to Buy Lehman Brothers.” 13 Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers. 14 Public Affairs, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 337. 15 Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers, 141. 16 Ibid, 11. 17 Ibid, 133. 18 J.B. Stewart and Eavis, “Revisiting the Lehman Brothers Bailout that Never Was.” 19 Ibid. 20 Judge, “Lehman Brothers: How Good Policy Can Make Bad Law.” 21 Tarhan, “Does the federal reserve affect asset prices? 22 Judge, “Lehman Brothers: How Good Policy Can Make Bad Law.” 23 Public Affairs, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 433. 24 Sengupta & Tam. 25 J.B. Stewart, “Eight Days.” 26 Public Affairs, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 435. 27 O’Brien, “Would saving Lehman have saved us from the Great Recession?” 28 Ibid. 29 Public Affairs, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 436. 30 Geithner & Metrick, Ten Years after the Financial Crisis: A Conversation with Timothy Geithner. 31 Skeel, “History credits Lehman Brothers’ collapse for the 2008 financial crisis. Here’s why that narrative is wrong.” 32 Public Affairs, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 436. 33 J.B. Stewart and Eavis, “Revisiting the Lehman Brothers Bailout that Never Was.” 34 Skeel, “History credits Lehman Brothers’ collapse for the 2008 financial crisis. Here’s why that narrative is wrong.” 35 Reinhart, “A Year of Living Dangerously: The Management of the Financial Crisis in 2008.” 36 Ibid. 37 Antoncic, “Opinion | Lehman Failed for Good Reasons.” 38 Reinhart, “A Year of Living Dangerously: The Management of the Financial Crisis in 2008.” 39 Geithner & Metrick, Ten Years after the Financial Crisis: A Conversation with Timothy Geithner. 40 J.B. 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(2011). A Year of Living Dangerously: The Management of the Fi- nancial Crisis in 2008. Journal of Economic Perspectives , 25 (1), 71–90. Re- trieved from https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.1.71 Skeel, D. (2018, September 20). History credits Lehman Brothers’ collapse for the 2008 financial crisis. Here’s why that narrative is wrong. Retrieved November 17, 2019, from Brookings website: https://www.brookings.edu/ research/history-credits-lehman-brothers-collapse-for- the-2008-financial- crisis-heres-why-that-narrative-is-wrong/ Spector, S. C. and M. (2010, March 13). Repos Played a Key Role in Lehman’s Demise. Wall Street Journal . Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB10001424052748703447104575118150651790066 Sraders, A. (2018). The Lehman Brothers Collapse and How It’s Changed the Economy Today. 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The Imagined Isle Irish Catholic Identity in the Restoration Era Nathan Mainster Brown University Author Matthew Dowling Armaan Grewal Kara Huang Shreya Raghunandan Rudra Srivastava Editors Fall 2018 This essay explores to what extent an Irish Catholic nation formed in the Restoration Era. The Bleeding Iphigenia, written by Nicholas French, Bishop of Ferns, in the early 1670s and published in 1674, informs the reader of the principal metaphor which governs the tract: “The author hath drawne another Iphigenia of the body of a noble, ancient Catholic Nation clad all in red Robes.” He then claims to speak on behalf of said nation, writing that he, “presents to the view of our gracious King Charles the second a Catholic People, his faithful subjects wounded by thieves, and left half dead.” His request is also spelled out: “I beseech you, gentle Reader, pray to God for my afflicted Country, and for the Catholic Religion therein persecuted.”[1] The confidence with which French asserts the existence of a Catholic nation is striking; most scholars, including Joseph Leerssen, Tom Garvin, and Jim Smyth, maintain that neither an Irish Catholic nation nor a concept of nationalism appeared until the eighteenth century. The inherent social and political complexities of the Restoration era (1660-88), originating from a gaping ideological and power vacuum following the frenetic confusion of the Interregnum, coupled with the self-interested imperative of rebuilding of pre-Cromwellian life, effectively forestalled religious or national coalescence. Experiences of the war and of the post-war settlement did not fall neatly along confessional lines; in many cases, Protestants and Catholics of certain classes or political persuasions had more in common with each other than with their co-religionists. However, in the discursive realm, the confusion of the Restoration era provided fertile ground for the unification of the Irish Catholic interest. By the time of the Glorious Revolution, Protestant lawyer Richard Cox claimed that, “the Old English...are now so infatuated and degenerated, that they do not only take part with the Irish, but call themselves Natives.”[2] Protestants and Catholics clashed bitterly over a multitude of issues, and the politics of memory ensured that battles fought during the 1640s were replayed in an intellectual context. In an attempt to justify their positions during the Interregnum, Irish Protestants aggravated the memory of the 1641 rebellion, focusing on the epoch wherein Catholic loyalty to the crown may have been called into question. New pamphlets emphasizing the barbarity of the Irish Catholics during said revolt proliferated, and old ones, such as Sir John Temple’s famous 1646 account, enjoyed consistent reprintings. The Irish parliament indirectly participated in these politics of paranoia by forming a “committee for the preservation of the rights of Protestants” in Ireland, in response to falsified reports of another rebellion.[3] Combined with the bitter realities of mass dispossession, political disenfranchisement, and marginalization, one would think that the volatile Restoration period would foster an atmosphere conducive for Catholic nationhood. However, such a notion was not fully-fledged during the Restoration. Instead, the time period laid the ideological framework for such a concept by embedding the notion of Ireland as a Catholic nation in propagandistic discourse, thus recognizing Catholic unity as a desirable goal. Though Irish Catholic nationhood did not develop in a visible sense, it became a standard theme of contemporary political dialogue, in which several complex versions of unity were promulgated to support the view of individual authors. The idea of nationhood emerged from the fray, guaranteeing that following the Restoration period “Ireland” became a decidedly Catholic entity. The Divisions in Catholic Irish Society The disappointing reality of Catholic Ireland in the Restoration period was one marred by entrenched intra-communal conflict. The ancient divisions between the Old English and Gaelic ethnicities, the two major Catholic groups, were far from obscured. Though intermarriage and centuries of interaction had helped to diffuse certain quotidian cultural distinctions, sentiments of prejudice, distrust, and alienation overwhelmingly predominated.[4] State-sponsored discrimination, even by the likes of Catholic heroes such as the Earl of Tyrconnell, and mutual animosity, served to definitively prevent Catholics from cooperating across ethnic lines.[5] Irish Catholics were no more unified by the experience of the land settlement. On 23 October 1641, sources suggest that Irish Catholics possessed 69 percent of Ireland’s profitable land; during the Interregnum, this figure was reduced to 10 percent. However, when the Stuarts were restored to the throne, Catholic land ownership increased significantly to 30 percent due to the briefly-operational court of claims, which rather clumsily attempted to restore unjustly dispossessed Catholics, royal sympathy, and access to patronage.[6] This rather arbitrarily orchestrated and haphazard process ensured that Catholic experiences with the settlement were myriad. Spokesmen for dispossessed Catholics such as Sir Nicholas Plunkett and Richard Talbot, and later the Earl of Tyrconnell, spent much of the 1660s at Whitehall lobbying for the restoration of their co-religionists. They asserted that the 1648 peace entitled Irish Catholics to full restoration of property of which they had been stripped by Parliamentarians, and as such undermined the legitimacy of the Cromwellian claims.[7] Perhaps the greatest single effort occurred in 1670, when 52 dispossessed Irish Catholics and their supporters sent Talbot to present a petition to the King and parliament for full Catholic restoration. Delivered in the name of the King’s, “Most distressed subjects of your kingdom of Ireland who were outed of their estates by the late usurped government and are not yet restored,” the petition claimed that under the terms of the 1648 peace treaty, most, if not all, Catholics were entitled to repossession, and requested an “Act of Indemnity” and fair revision of the settlement act. The argument was underscored by a narrative of unwavering Catholic loyalty from the Interregnum to the present in the face of Cromwellian temptation. This argument fell on deaf ears: the Crown rejected the proposal, citing the material and political benefits already wrought by the land settlement.[8] The land settlement meant that 20 percent of dispossessed lands did return to Catholic hands. Patronage or sound political connections proved to be of paramount importance in procuring articles of restoration, and men such as Viscount Muskerry, the Marquis of Antrim, the Talbots of Malahide, and the Earl of Carlingford found their estates restored or expanded thanks to covert political machinations.[9] Consequently, a powerful minority of “new interest” Catholics emerged and effectively stonewalled any legislation altering the settlement throughout the Restoration period. Indeed, they wholeheartedly endorsed bills to confirm their titles at the expense of their unrestored co-religionists. In 1678 and 1680, Lord Lieutenant Ormond unsuccessfully attempted to call a parliament to pass legislation which would fully complete the land settlement. Under the proposed acts, the dealings of the court of claims were to be formalized and a commission was to be entrusted to investigate uncertain titles. In other words, further possibility of restoration would be curtailed. Predictably, responses to the bill polarized around the experience of the settlement; restored Catholics such as Colonel John Fitzpatrick and Nicholas Taaffe, Earl of Carlingford actually traveled to London to support the legislation and to counter the claims of unrestored Catholics or their advocates who simultaneously pleaded their case at Whitehall. The legislation was eventually killed in its crib due to the unstable political climate resulting from the so-called popish plot, but the similarly difficult experience of James II in attempting to overturn the land settlement provides equally illuminating insight. Upon his accession, distraught Catholics rejoiced over the prospect of a co-religionist as their sovereign and hopes for a reversed land settlement ignited anew. Yet once again the vocal minority of restored Catholics consistently and forcefully lobbied against any alterations. In 1689, the Earl of Tyrconnell, new Lord Deputy of Ireland, fulfilled his dream of the past two decades and called a parliament to overturn, or at least drastically transform, the land settlement. His efforts were met with immediate opposition. A petition presented to James composed by “new interest” Catholics and Old Protestants warned of the inevitable downturn the Irish economy would face should land be confiscated from the settlement’s beneficiaries. It rejected the disaffected Catholics’ contentions that the court of claims did not operate for sufficient time to evaluate the Irish situation effectively, and affirmed the conservative Declaration for Ireland of November 1660 as the basis for the settlement. The petition ended with a cautionary warning of desertion from the Jacobite camp if the land settlement was overturned: “Suffer me to make one step more, and query: Whether the Catholic Purchasers now to be turned out of possession, will join heartily with those that enter upon them?” This faction aligned themselves with Old Protestant representatives in the House of Lords to block the legislation. In the end, those in favor of repeal represented the larger interest, and James, forced to choose between war funding and bankruptcy, conceded to their demands and began to repeal the settlement. Even religion itself proved to be a divisive force. Questions of the monarch’s role in ecclesiastical structures and Irish Catholics’ often contradictory obligations to Rome and London precipitated not only acrimonious debate, but also persecution and bitterly vindictive conflict. These debates found their visible manifestation in the proposed 1661 remonstrance. This petition, attempted to reconcile the dissonance in Catholic theo-political theory created by their dual loyalty by affirming the supremacy of secular loyalty to the crown. The petition was also a political document responding to contemporary Stuart policy, whose ultimate object was to assert the right of Catholics to participate in a political society which increasingly appeared to cater solely to Protestant interests.[10] The remonstrance emphasized the Catholic duty of, “being entrusted by the indispensable Commission of the King of Kings with the Cure of Souls...and teaching the People that perfect Obedience...they are bound to pay to your Majesties Commands,” yet they still found themselves, “loaden with Calumnies, and persecuted with severity.” They lamented that they could not “with freedom appear to justify [our] Innocence, all the Fictions and Allegations against them are received as undoubted Verities;” and thus seek to “humbly beg your Majesties pardon, to vindicate both by the ensuing Protestation” their loyalty. The petition claims that, “These being the Tenets of our Religion, in point of Loyalty and Submission to your Majesty’s Commands, and our dependence of the See of Rome no way intrenching upon that perfect Obedience...we are bound to pay to your Majesty,” and elaborates on these “tenets”: "We do acknowledge and confess your Majesty to be our true and lawful King, supreme Lord, and rightful Sovereign of this Realm of Ireland, and of all other your Majesties Dominions. And therefore we acknowledge and confess our selves to be obliged...to obey your Majesty in all Civil and Temporal Affairs ... as the Laws and Rules of Government in this Kingdom do require at our hands. And that notwithstanding any power or pretension of the Pope... or by any Authority, Spiritual or Temporal, proceeding or derived from him, or his See, against your Majesty, or Royal Authority, we will still acknowledge and perform, to the uttermost of our abilities, our faithful Loyalty, and true Allegiance to your Majesty."[11] The remonstrance prioritized temporal loyalty over spiritual, denied the pope any tangible jurisdiction over monarchs, and implied that the pope’s role in secular affairs was an advisory one devoid of real political power if the monarch opposed his judgment. It was signed by 98 Catholic peers and sent to Ormond in 1661. The document immediately provoked rancorous debate. Most Catholic clergymen, who necessarily relied on Rome for patronage without a legal, state-sponsored episcopate of the Gallican variety, followed the lead of their backers and refused to sign the document for its judgments regarding papal power.[12] Bishops Anthony MacGeoghegan of Meath and Nicholas French of Ferns pamphleteered vociferous opposition to what they considered religious treason. Peter Walsh, one of the few clergymen who backed the remonstrance, who was also a supporter and confidant of Ormond’s, defended the document in various written works throughout the Restoration period. Formal protests were submitted, and a synod of Catholic clergymen in 1666 meant to resolve the issue only further retrenched animosity.[13] The movement collapsed and no remonstrance was ever submitted to the Crown.[14] Yet the ideological divisions within the Catholic community by no means ended with the defeat of the remonstrance. Not only did the questions it raised dominate clerical discourse for the remainder of the Restoration period, but the internal debate it generated also had concrete implications for the shape and character of the Restoration church. The appointments of the fervently anti-remonstrant Peter Talbot to the Archbishopric of Dublin and Oliver Plunkett to that of Armagh in 1669 fundamentally transformed the politics of Catholic ecclesiastical structures. Encouraged by the death or marginalization of many of the remonstrant clergy, Talbot embarked on a campaign of vindictive persecution against the remainder. They were relieved of official positions and denied material support. He was reported to have proudly proclaimed that the remonstrant clergy “would all hang” and ruthlessly purged them of all offices within the church.[15] Furthermore, the pamphlet debate continued in full fury well into the 1670s and did little to mend fissures in Catholic ecclesiastical ideology. Given these firmly-rooted ethnic, economic, and spiritual divisions, any claims that a common Irish Catholic nation made itself visible in the Restoration would be extremely difficult to substantiate. Yet, do these fissures necessarily mean that no Irish Catholic nation developed at all? Contemporary pamphleteers did not think so. Nicholas French’s The Bleeding Iphigenia was by no means the only tract which referred to the Irish Catholics as a “nation.” In fact, every side of Irish Catholic discourse in the Restoration era over the aforementioned issues of the land settlement and the Remonstrance often addressed “All Irish Catholics,” either described a coherent Irish Catholic nation or called for one, compartmentalized all Catholic experiences into one which fit their theses, and denounced efforts to divide the Irish Catholic polity in a tract which was contributing to just such a phenomenon. Though each version of history, each founding memory, and each sense of what “Irish Catholic” meant was distinct, all tracts contended that their prescribed formula could create this new idea or explain its existence. How is this difference between discourse and practice possible? Perhaps the issue arises from how the modern reader perceives nationhood. Instead of conceptualizing it concretely, as manifested in a coherent body of united individuals with a common ethnicity, culture, or interests, it may be more accurate to conceive of it as Ernest Renan did: as a people unified through common experiences and shared memories.[16] If we conceptualize it as such, it becomes evident that the idea of Irish Catholic nationhood appeared constantly in written work of the time, not as one singular, exclusively-defined identity, but as a fractured concept which agreed on little more than the fact that such an idea existed or should exist. As we have seen, Irish Catholic experiences varied widely in the Restoration era. Yet, discourse often attempted to ignore entrenched complexities in order to impose upon reality a set of homogenous experiences which all Catholics ostensibly suffered together. The reconstruction of history – over the recent war as well as more distant moments – provided the memorial basis for Catholic unity in the discursive realm. In using historical memory as a propaganda tool, each author to be examined asserted that their treatises could bring or explain Catholic unity under their terms, which often sought to justify or persuade the legitimacy of a short-term ambition. * * * The rhetoric of unity regarding the land settlement will be examined first. As Danielle McCormack has noted, the success of Catholic lobbying for restoration in this period was principally predicated upon proving the legitimacy of the 1648 peace, whose indemnity clause would directly contradict the Restoration policy of inordinately limiting the potential of Catholic innocence.[17] To support their positions, Catholic advocates of restoration simplified the 1640s into an era of nationalized, confessional conflict of English Protestant versus Irish Catholic. Yet, though the search for material interests undeniably acted as the principal imperative for this type of language, the effects of its presence took on quite a different form. Pamphleteers employed discourse as a bandage to patch up undeniably present acrimony by framing the past as an era of unity, and thus implied either that unity still existed or could be attained, and affirmed the image of Ireland as a state closely associated with Catholicism. The anonymously written pamphlet Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland from 1668 articulates the obdurate, oppositional position taken by Catholics such as Nicholas French and Oliver Plunkett, espousing a view of history wherein Irish Catholics since 1641 had displayed indefatigable, flawless loyalty, yet nevertheless had been betrayed in the land settlement by Ormond, the king’s ministers, and self-interested, land-grabbing Protestants.[18] This ideological history is intended to lump all Catholic experiences into a single, inflexible memory so as to purge the discourse of the complexities of the social reality and Catholic culpability for wartime atrocities and subsequently affirm the validity of Catholic claims to land. The opening line of the tract states that the author’s intention is to recount, “the sad and deplorable state of the Irish Nation, and the apparent injustice, and inequality used in the present Settlement of that Kingdom.”[19] He substantiates this claim of extant Irish nationhood by claiming the existence of a force which binds them all together: “It cannot be denyed, but that the Roman Catholicks of Ireland have infinitely suffered, during the late Usurped Government.”[20] A few sentences later, he entirely omits the qualifier of Catholicism, believing it instead to be implicit in the statement wherein he simply describes the sufferers as “the Irish alone,” thus conveniently ignoring the significant portion of Irish Catholics (and Protestants) whose experiences differed from those of his vision of a unified Catholic community collectively double-crossed by the settlement, and retrenches the link between Irishness and Catholicism.[21] Having thus postulated the existence of an Irish Catholic nation indivisibly united by the universal experience of dispossession, and casually conflated Irishness with Catholicism in a manner which inextricably and exclusively binds the two identities, the author then recounts a historically revisionist understanding of the past to defy Protestant land claims. As the antithesis to his purportedly unified Catholic body, he conceives of the enemy as one equally monolithic Protestant beast, fueled by greed, vengeance, and unfaltering support of Cromwell, blurring all nuance present in the equally complex reality of Irish Protestantism. He claims that the land settlement was legislated and supervised entirely by Protestants, and transmuted into law by, “a Parliament, which met on the 8th. day of May 1661. The Lower House of this Parliament was all composed of Cromwellists, and but very few of the Irish Peers were admitted to sit in the House of Lords, under the pretence of former Indictments. This Parliament made the first Act of Settlement...This Act decides all the doubtful expressions of the Declaration in favour of the Cromwellists, and to the disadvantage of the Natives, it allows only a Twelve-months time for the tryal of Innocents; But those Irish Gentlemen who served His Majesty abroad, together with the generality of the Nation pretending to Articles, (half a score persons only excepted, who were particularly provided for) are forever debarred by this Act, to recover their Estates without previous Reprisals, which is a thing not to be had in nature.”[22] Several important rhetorical devices are present in this passage. First, the word “Catholic” is never uttered. It is implicit in the word “Irish,” which is placed in direct opposition with a “Cromwellist” interest. The pamphlet, whose object is a searing takedown of former Protestant royalists such as the Earl of Clarendon or the Duke of Ormonde, erases their monarchist credentials by portraying them as greedy post-Cromwellists attempting to deprive loyal Irish Catholics of their land much like the Lord Protector did. Thus “Cromwellist,” in this context, does not necessarily refer to political leanings; rather, it likely denotes any Protestant beneficiaries of the land settlement regardless of their political affiliation during the war. This statement confessionalizes not only nationality, but also political loyalties during the war in an attempt to invalidate Protestant claims under accusations of treason. The essentialist implication that Protestants by nature are inherently inclined towards parliamentarianism is a cogent reduction of the historical narrative meant to promote the author’s vision of the Irish Catholic: resolutely royalist yet deferentially shocked at the loss of their lands to the “enemy.” The author underpins his position with a host of ethical and legal arguments. Morally, he claims that the: “parties pretending are the Irish Proprietors, and the London Adventurers: The first enjoyed it for so many ages...and they lost it at length upon the account of Loyalty, fighting for the Kings Interest against the Murderers of his Royal Father: the last...have no other Title but what they derive from the Ordinance of an usurped Government, for having disbursed vast sums of Money to countenance Rebellion, to pull down Monarchy, and put up a pretended Commonwealth. And yet the Land is adjudged for them, and confirmed to them and their Heirs forever...”[23] Furthermore, Cromwellian settlers, he asserts, are not technically entitled to their land until the 1641 Catholic, “rebels be declared by the two Houses of Parliament to be wholly conquered; until a Commission….[examines] who are the Rebels, and who are Innocents.”[24] Oftentimes, the distinction between logos and ethos are blurred. The author laments that the “Duke of York should now enjoy all that Land, by no other Title but that of the Regicides. The Land was given them by a Tyrant, for murthering the King, let the World judge of the goodness of their Title.”[25] This rather incisive averment insinuates that James’s land claim is illegal precisely because of its immorality; it was acquired through the crime of regicide. Implicit in this statement, of course, lies the contention that all Protestant claims to land are void by virtue of their ostensible parliamentarian and thus regicidal tendencies. Yet, according to the author, Protestants alone controlled the outcome of the settlement and ensured that Catholic capacity for reinstatement was minimal. First, the Catholic gentlemen in exile with the King were never reinstated. Next, the Protestants made it so difficult to “qualifie an Innocent, that it should be Morally impossible to find any such” in Ireland.[26] In a final, devastating act, Parliament in 1664, “decreed, that no benefit of Innocency, or Articles, shall be allowed... to any of the Irish Natives.” [27] The King is absolved of all culpability in this grand Protestant conspiracy, and blame instead is placed on the greedy minister Clarendon and the Earl of Orrery, who, “assured to the King, that there was a sufficient stock of Reprisals to, “satisfy all interests” and thus maintain the loyalist credentials of the Catholics.[28] The Protestants, furthermore, are motivated by lustful material concerns, not love for the king. This passage is worth quoting at length: ...the first Minister of State...telling, as for a final reason, that the Protestant English Interest cannot be maintained in Ireland, without extirpating the Natives…. True Religion was ever yet planted by preaching and good example, not by violence and oppression: An unjust intrusion into the Neighbours Estate, is not the right way to convert the ancient Proprietors...And as to the present Settlement of Ireland, it is apparent to the World, that the Confiscation of Estates, and not the Conversion of Souls, is the only thing aimed at. If by the English Interest we understand the present Possession of the London Adventurers, and of Cromwell's Soldiers, there is no doubt it is inconsistent with the restoration of the Irish, neither can the New English Title to Land be well maintained, without destroying the old Title of the Natives; even as the Interest of the late Commonwealth was incompatible.[29] In this version of history, divisions within the Irish Protestant community are effectively erased. They are replaced instead by an immutable bloc of irreligious, selfish, politically radical colonialists labeled the “English interest” who use the cover of missionary work to ultimately destroy the Catholic Irish--or the natives, as the author would say--for the worldly sake of appropriating their property. The Catholic experience is presented with an equal lack of nuance. Ignoring the existence of legally restored Catholics, the author maintains that Ormond “is gone with all his Greatness, and the miseries of the poor Irish do still continue” and laments the state of “that Nation, who are deprived of the Benefit of Law, Justice, and public Faith,” of course referring to the Catholic nation.[30] Furthermore, this narrative of history does not stop with the Restoration. The author sees the struggle between Irish Catholic royalism and English and Scottish Protestant radicalism as ongoing, and uses the memory of the attempted Presbyterian coup by Colonel Thomas Blood and the English Civil War, as sufficient justification for promoting Catholic interest in Ireland: For that the true Interest of England (as relating to Ireland) consists in raising· the Irish as a Bulwark, or balance, against our English and Scotch Presbyterians….when the Presbyterian practises and Covenant began to disturb these Kingdoms, the Papists and Prelatiques in Ireland (as well as in England) joined their hearts and hands against Presbytery for the King. [31] Thus, in arguing for the overturn of the land settlement, the author of A Narrative constructs his vision of an Irish Catholic nation: a unified, loyal polity, whose history consists of having fought heroically during the war yet being tragically betrayed by the king’s selfish ministers and their Protestant and imaginably Cromwellian or neo-Cromwellian supporters. Though egregiously misrepresenting the actual experience of the war, the nature of the land settlement, and the complex character of confessional identity in Ireland, it serves as adequate foundational history for his equally distorted vision of a unified Catholic nation. His conflation of “Irish” and “Catholic” further embeds the image of the entity of “Ireland” as fundamentally Catholic, and ignores the serious ethnic, social, and theological distinctions of the population. This position, however, was met with backlash from other members of the Old English community. Archbishop of Dublin and celebrated anti-remonstrant Peter Talbot’s 1674 Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects is an essential piece to examine, not only because its message differs vastly from that of A Narrative, but also because its purpose is slightly different and adds a complex element to the debate.[32] This text was not written with the purpose of obtaining anything material, and grounds its arguments in theological rather than political justification. Just like the author of A Narrative, Talbot uses the concept of Catholic unity, justified by the common experience of 1641, to accomplish a distinct goal: to end what he sees as immoral and heretical practices. Talbot follows the lead of the author of A Narrative and addresses the pamphlet to all of the “Roman-Catholics of Ireland,” thus implying that he believes Catholic unity exists, and sets out to prove it on his terms.[33] His main area of concern is the ostensible Irish Catholic obsession with property, decidedly sinful in his eyes. He affirms, “that the Happiness of Man in this present state consists more in possessing the riches of a good Conscience than the conveniences of this world.”[11] Yet he recognizes that, “Tis the depraved condition of human nature which makes us affectionately covet...such paltry trash.”[34] The “paltry trash” referred to is property confiscated by the land settlement, and his treatment of the incident manages to be wholly out of touch with both the new interest Catholics and the dispossessed faction. Again, what is an Inheritance? A parcel of land whereof our Ancestors were Masters as long as they liu'd; which term of Life (the only interest any of them could pretend to) is valued but at seven years purchase: Is it reasonable then think you, to fix your hearts so…passionately upon that earth, as if your Souls were to turn into it as well as your Bodies? Poor Souls! After a mans death hee has no expectation of any good for his Temporal Estate, being quite out of all circumstances of enjoying the least convenience from it.[35] Talbot here makes the oft-vaunted religious claim that acquisitive interests are inherently sinful. Such a belief carries additional weight in the phrenetic context of the Restoration era and the politics surrounding the land settlement. His call for salvation to, “be your comfort, not that empty one of possessing estates already disposed” was an unequivocally bold statement, because the tract aims to unite Irish Catholics on its terms.[36] As we have seen, the land settlement polarized Irish Catholics along lines of the repossessed and the dispossessed. Talbot’s argument essentially claims both sides to be reprehensible. Talbot spends several lengthy paragraphs asserting that, “Disobedience to our King necessarily implies disobeying God,” and denounces rebellion, “against His Majesty’s Government, Person, or Subjects,” as religiously and politically unforgivable.[37] He then supplements his contention with a more political rationalization for the deleterious essence of material concerns: they lead to rebellion. He asks, “how can it be imagined that [God] will allow of so great a crime as rebellion upon any score….much less upon that meer Temporal motive of saying or regaining an Estate?”[38] Challenging the land settlement, if not explicitly an act of revolt, can easily lead to one. Thus, “Let not the vain hopes of better Times, or the desire of passing a short Moment something more commodiously plunge you into the intolerable miseries of Hellfire for all Eternity... You have lost your real Estates, let not Imaginary ones fool you...”[39] His principle over which Catholics could find unity is one of collective responsibility: either to stop pressing for restoration, or to ensure that their Catholic brethren lay down their claims. And the shared experience which provides the imperative for such collective responsibility? The war. Talbot’s idealized understanding of 1641 stands in direct opposition to the view espoused by the author of A Narrative, who argues that, “ The Irish insurrection...hath not been accompanied with that Insolence and Malice in the beginning...which...some Pamphlets have charged the Irish with.”[40] His view is more in agreement with the Protestant narrative which emphasizes Catholic atrocities and greed instead of monarchical loyalty. He writes: You have had experience of...Preachers who pretend great zeal to God and the King’s service, and yet, at the same time Rebellion, and Murders were proou'd against them. These are the men you must not give ear to, nor converse with, lest you be infected with their Doctrine and perverted by their Example….And yet if either these, or I, or an Angel from Heaven should go about to persuade you that it is lawful to molest your Protestant neighbors, or defraud them of their goods, or enter upon their possessions by any means or method which the Law of the Land doth not allow, give them no credit...[41] This theologically-underpinned incarnation of Catholic unity is derived from a necessity of repentance. Like that of the author of A Narrative, Talbot’s vision of a united Catholic Ireland is prescriptive rather than descriptive; a means to an end rather than a factually accurate statement. Old English discourse over the land settlement, then, engendered several iterations of an Irish Catholic identity, none of which were reconcilable with each other nor with reality. Yet there are striking methodological parallels: both tracts assume the existence of a united Catholic Ireland as a critical element of their rhetorical strategy. Such a rhetorical strategy was a conscious choice and the considerations that went into it should not be taken lightly. One may assume that claims of unity would be the most effective way to convince others of their point; unity was evidently an ideal that appealed to much of the literate Old English community. A Gaelic perspective on the land settlement and memory of the Cromwellian wars is essential to any comprehensive assessment of the extent to which Catholic Irish identity formed in this period. The relative paucity of surviving Gaelic sources for everyday native Irishmen renders any evaluation of their contribution to Catholic discursive identity problematic. Yet one does remain which can offer insight into the way the Gaels constructed their version of Ireland: Gaelic poetry. Historical memory in Gaelic poetry was a familiar concept by the time of the Restoration. For centuries, Irish poets evoked the names of legendary heroes, battles, and kings to draw a firm line connecting their patrons to extant days of Irish glory.[42] During the Restoration period, however, a salient change took place. Gaelic poets began to treat the Irish heroic past as more self-consciously legendary, and presented it in stark contrast with recent memories of English conquest. Every element of English culture, society, and politics was acrimoniously criticized with relentless vigor and poetic wit. As such, Dáibhí Ó Bruadair, the most renowned poet of the era, claims in his poem “Thou Sage of Inanity” that the English historical pedigree pales in comparison to that of the Irish.[43] He derides a defender of Ormond who claims, “That his father or himself or any offspring of that race E'er performed such deeds as those,” performed by the Irish, as having, “been hoaxed by thy conceit.”[44] Shameful, cowardly Englishness is placed in direct dialogue with powerful, resplendent Irishness. This theme is expanded into the cultural realm and the traditionally English conception of civil and moral superiority is shrewdly reversed. The Restoration-era poems of Ó Bruadair depict a cultured, refined Gaelic Ireland ruined by boorish English brutes representing Cromwellian plantation and the Restoration settlement. Ó Bruadair laments this tragic state, writing in his 1674 poem “Woe Unto Him Who Hath Failed”: Every prayerful, faultless, noble, charming chieftain of the flock, Scattered through the land of Fionntan, growing with no lowly growth, Who hath been compelled to part with state and wealth and native nook...”[45] These “Noble-born, cultured, and high-minded chieftains” have been replaced by “ignorant dullards” and “ostentatious upstart[s] swollen high with pompous pride” whose pastimes include “plundering maids, single, defenceless, in delicate health.”[46] The title of the poem from which the last excerpt is taken, “Proud as a Chief is the Bailiff,” embodies the contempt with which the Gaelic poets treated the English upstarts who believed that they represented the rightful, moral and political governing class of Ireland. As Joseph Leerssen has noted, the English language was often used as a signifier in Gaelic-language texts for Saxon incivility. Restoration-era poems often contained Gaelicized loanwords from English--such as “clóca” or cloak, “cóta” or coat, sbuir or spurs, buat or boot, sdocaidhe, or stockings, locaidhe, or curls, ráipéar, or rapier, and sgarfa, or scarf, which were deliberately employed to disrupt the rhythm and rhyme scheme of the poem; these intentionally painful interruptions easily communicated to the reader or listener the invasionary nature of the English settlers.[47] Ó Bruadair explicitly treats with the contamination of the Irish language in his 1675 “I Shall Put a Cluáin On Thee,” where he writes, “Now the Béarla Teibidhe is the language which Ó Lonargáin used to talk...on account of the excessively silly bombast of the poets in Freamhain.'' Béarla Teidbidhe, the dialect of Irish which more liberally utilized loanwords from other languages, functions as a literary device signifying the degradation and decline of the Irish language by “silly bombast.”[48] From a confessional perspective, theologian Francis O’Molloy printed a comprehensive overview of the Irish language in 1677, which contained a lengthy tract lamenting the seemingly concurrent decline of the Gaelic nobility and language, writing: Pity the people for want of literacy after the destruction of their letters...Ireland has fallen under the shower against the host of its ancestors. The music of tunes has not remained, nor proper instruction, nor learning. The Irish do not even understand the Irish language, they speak it carelessly, they do not read it with any propriety; they abandon it, and leave honour behind….If you ask them to read verses in their own sweet mother tongue...they cannot. This is what happened to the Irish from Ireland.[49] The use of language as a symbol for not only cultural, but also national distinctions, is essential to note here for two reasons. First, it places the bardic poet, master of the Irish language, at the center of Gaelic national identity. Gaelic poetry in this time was something of a moribund cultural relic, existing in a world that had long considered it a vestigial curiosity. Indeed, Ó Bruadair died hopelessly impoverished, and much of his later poetry focuses on this destitution.[50] Ascribing language a primary role in the formation of Irish identity assigns the poet a relevance which he had most certainly lost. Second, by linking language and idealized history, Gaelic poets implicitly grounded Irish national identity in both ancient and recent historical memory: the glorious past, the apex of Irish linguistic hegemony and its cultural byproducts; and the depressing present, wherein language is under threat of extinction thanks to an influx of English colonialists bent on aggressive acculturation of the Gaels. Such perceptions of English savagery are reflected in Gaelic poetic treatments of social class. Gradually, the English of all classes replaced the lower classes of all ethnicities as the paradigm of boorishness and stupidity. Prior to the Restoration period, foreigners were categorized with poorer Gaels in criticisms of the uncultured and barbaric enemies of refined Gaelic Ireland. It was a classist—as opposed to a nationalist—distinction. Yet, Restoration poetry increasingly defined the brutes as distinctly English “boors” whose humble patrimony did not warrant their wealth and status, and whose rough, bumbling language and contemptible manners stood in stark opposition to those of the refined, well-spoken Gaels.[52] This conflation of ancient and recent memory also featured heavily in political rhetoric surrounding Gaelic perspectives of James II and their high expectations for his rule. Leerssen affirms that Gaelic poets rejoiced upon James II’s accession, due to his heritage and Catholic faith; thus, poems from the period were tinged with an arrogant optimism. Diarmaid Mac Carthaigh, for example, writes, “Behold there the Gaedhil in arms...they have powder and guns, hold the cities and fortresses; the Presbyterians, lo, have been overthrown, and the Fanatics have left an infernal smell after them,” thus drawing on a recent memory of conquest. Several lines later, he remarks, “Prophets and saints in great numbers have prophesied that Erinn would sure get help at the promised time; by Thy wonderful power, O Christ, and thy nurse’s prayer, everything they predicted shall certainly come to pass.”[53] James II’s accession was lauded in both recent and ancient terms; it was an event foretold by ancient Irish history to relieve the Gaels of their more recent suffering.[54] By contextualizing the often disconnected quilt of Gaelic history within a framework grounded in fresh experiences of collective trauma sustained by a vaguely-defined group of people in “Erinn” devoid of very present internal distinctions, these Gaelic poets implicitly “nationalized” a confederated Ireland in opposition to “Fanatics”; Protestants. This concept of unity is underpinned by the trajectory of the word “Éire,” which underwent linguistic signification during the Restoration period from a term denoting specific dynastic regions to one which conveyed the entire island.[55] Furthermore, the Irish side of the dichotomy between English and Irish is not necessarily exclusive to the Gaels. In fact, it lended Gaelic history a quasi-democratic character; in defining Irishness as a set of cultural and linguistic practices in opposition to Englishness, anybody who agreed with this contemporary critical assessment of Englishness and indulged in or sympathised with Gaelic customs could subscribe to the ancient legacy of old Gaeldom. Whether this happened or not is not relevant; what matters is that this poetry laid the basis for Irish Catholic national identity. Like Old English discourse, its artificial construction of a Catholic Irish memory had serious implications for Irish nationalism; Joseph Leerssen notes that the rise of Irish nationalism in the eighteenth century was characterized by a fascination with and appropriation of Gaelic culture which crossed confessional boundaries, emphasizing the importance of a language, culture, and history in direct opposition with that of the English.[56] Yet there is one important caveat: Gaelic discourse surrounding the land settlement did not explicitly address unity transcending ethnic boundaries as much as it laid out the historical and cultural groundwork for an ostensible common experience. Gaelic writers erased dynastic distinctions, spoke of common experience, and denigrated English language, manners, and history while touting their Gaelic counterparts, thus permitting unity. It was not clear from this literature who could participate in this unity and how qualified it would be. This will be discussed in the next section, focusing on Gaelic religious discussions. * * * As has been shown, the Irish Catholic clergy—and much of the laity—were irreconcilably factionalized throughout the Restoration period, with the initial split precipitated by the proposed 1661 remonstrance which would have subordinated the pope’s jurisdiction to the king’s. Internal acts of vindictiveness by squabbling Catholics in positions of authority, combined with Ormond’s deliberate rehashing of the issue in order to weaken Catholic political activity, served to isolate his Catholic allies from enemies based on who subscribed to the remonstrance, and allowed him to persecute the identified foes, ensuring that Catholics could not even appeal to their common religious beliefs for unity well after the remonstrance failed.[57] But, as with the land settlement, polemicists attempted to surmount these obstacles through discourse by either denying the reality of conflict, or attempting to impose unity artificially through their tract. And once again, as with the land settlement, the context of the topic to be dealt with dictated the experiences used to found this unity. The land settlement was a direct result of recent conflict; thus, memories of the 1640’s were evoked and framed so as to suit the agenda proffered. The remonstrance debate took place within the context of centuries of constantly evolving Catholic theology. Accordingly, the time frame for memories evoked was significantly enlarged. Father Peter Walsh’s mammoth-sized 1673 tract History and Vindication of the Loyal Formulary, or Irish Remonstrance is the first text to be examined.[58] Walsh, a Franciscan monk, was one of the earliest defenders of the remonstrance when the conflicts first began in the 1660s; he notably convinced Ormond to let the clergy summon a synod to ratify it. Walsh’s advocacy of unity is more subtle than that of some other tracts analyzed in this essay. Its implicit, rather than explicit, nature likely derives from the nature of the work. It is intended to defend a coherent set of principles and the man who constructed it from accusations of treachery rather than accomplishing anything concrete through mass support. Remonstrant Catholicism was a significant theo-political departure from orthodox Irish Catholicism, and should be treated as a micro-identity within a larger Catholic body with its own ideological history to ground it. In this case, instead of attempting to forge an Irish Catholic identity out of the shards left behind by its bitter internal conflicts, this tract attempts to construct a wholly new paradigm parallel to the defunct alternatives. As such, unity is implicit insofar as the memories evoked attempt to justify subscription to a piece of reformatory legislation so large it can more or less be considered a separate sect of Catholicism. In short, this tract is purely ideological; unity was the express goal. It does frame the remonstrance as an end to dissolve the penal laws, but that is not the priority. The end of the penal laws is another justification for the benefits of the remonstrance. So how was a “Remonstrantist” identity fashioned? Walsh envisioned the remonstrance model as an acceptable, patriotic manifestation of Catholicism in an increasingly hostile Stuart state which would affirm monarchical loyalty while simultaneously foregoing certain unsavory papal principles in the process. Due to the increased crackdown on Catholicism in the early 1670s, “the old and fatal Controversy” was rehashed in public debate and called into question the loyalty of all Catholics.[59] Walsh explained his remonstrance as, “ a conscientious, Christian...and satisfactory profession of the duty which by all Laws... they...owe His Majesty against all pretences of the Pope to the contrary.”[60] Walsh does not blissfully ignore the existence of deep divisions which may prevent adherence to his vision; instead, he embraces them, writing that soon after the drafting of the Remonstrance it was, “impugned by sundry Ecclesiastics of the Roman Communion and chiefly by many of those Irish who had received most benefit by it.”[61] The reason behind this open admission of failure is twofold. One, it is easier to deny Catholic divisions when there is no public referendum on the issue by which one can concretely gauge the extent of conflict. The synod provided such a referendum and thus its failure was historically impossible to deny. The second reason is that this embarrassment substantiates one of his key arguments: the steady degradation and increasing corruption of Rome over the last several hundred years. Crafting the narrative of his history as a constant, descending slope from Pope Gregory VII to the present, Walsh paints a picture of a corrupt, tyrannical institution which generates political instability by presenting itself as a parallel power structure to secular hierarchies. He claims that over the past six hundred years, Rome has been operating under a set of principles which, “many Thousands of the most Learned, Zealous; Illegible word Godly Illegible word, Priests, and Doctors, as well as [the laity], who never approved... but always reproved, condemned, abhorred, detested; and protested against them both, as not only heretical, but tyrannical.[62] Chief amongst these he names the unchecked, absolute power of the papacy. He enumerates specific examples of malevolent papal authority intended to evoke contemporary politics in such a way as to galvanize support for his ecclesiastical program against Rome which may eliminate differences between Irish subjects. He writes: That by divine right...the Bishop of Rome is Universal Monarch and Governor of the World, even with.... spiritual and temporal authority over all Churches, Nations, Empires, Kingdoms, States, Principalities; and over all persons, Emperors, Kings, Princes... and People...and in all things and causes whatsoever, as well Temporal and Civil, as Ecclesiastical or Spiritual….That He is empowered with lawful Authority, not only to Excommunicate, but to deprive, depose, and dethrone (both sententially and effectually) all Princes, Kings, and Emperors; to translate their Royal Rights, and dispose of their Kingdoms to others, when and how He shall think fit…. That whoever kills any Prince deposed or excommunicated by Him, or by others deriving power from Him, kills not a lawful Prince, but an usurping Tyrant; a Tyrant at least by Title, if not by Administration too: and therefore cannot be said to murther the Anointed of God, or even to kill his own Prince.[63] Tyranny, usurpation, and regicide were all terms typically lobbed at the Cromwellian regime in Catholic discourse. By framing these crimes as inherent to the Catholic Church, and not to the inevitable outcome of radical Protestantism, Walsh accomplishes several discursive feats. One, he sets familiar terms of objective abjectness within a new context and places the blame on a supposedly friendly institution, therefore forcing Catholics to make a choice between loyalty to their beliefs and loyalty to Rome. Two, he implies that his prescription is the only feasible path for Catholics who wish to remain loyal, and thus forces a second introspective confrontation regarding royal or papal allegiance. Three, he maintains that said tendencies are inherent not in the religion but in the institution, implying that following his example will not change liturgy or customs but will simply purge ecclesiastical structures of institutionalized corruption. Four, he constructs a narrative that renders a, “System of Doctrines and Practises... contrary to those...manifestly recommended in the...Gospel of Christ... in the belief and life of the Christian Church universally for the first Ten Ages thereof,” entirely culpable for the, “misfortunes and miseries whatsoever of the Roman-Catholics in England, Ireland, Scotland.”[64] Thus, in Walsh’s world of untenable Church institutions which act as the source of all present Catholic suffering, the only viable way forward lies in subscribing to remonstrance principles. These “misfortunes and miseries” are embodied in the penal laws. Following his affirmation of Rome as the cause of all Catholic tribulation, he expands upon the statutes as a shared traumatic experience to encourage unity over the remonstrance. He affirms that: All Roman-Catholics... without any distinction of Sex, or Age...from the most illustrious Peer, to the most obscure Plebeian...lie under all the rigorous Sanctions, and all the severe Penalties of so many incapacitating... Laws...And your Predecessors, before you, have well nigh a whole Century of years been continually under the smart or apprehension of the severity of them.[65] Such an evaluation of the present state was not entirely true. Irish Catholics often circumvented the penal laws which were rarely enforced during the Restoration period. Yet it is important to remember that this tract was published in 1674, and likely written two years before, at which time the indulgence controversy in England had ushered in a period of harsher persecution and a crackdown on Irish Catholics.[66] Using the aberrational reality of the contemporary political climate, Walsh seizes the opportunity to affirm that such experiences were the normative standard. Yet instead of using shared experiences of oppression to galvanize resistance to the crown, he contextualizes them within his own narrative of uniquely Catholic culpability. Thus, he contends that only Catholics can change their own situation, making subscription to the remonstrance an absolute necessity for any Catholic who wished to ameliorate their present struggles. Within this discourse, that would be all of them. One final point that is necessary to fully illustrate Walsh’s utilisation of memory to craft a remonstrant identity is his claim that the blame for the seemingly never ending cycle of Irish rebellion can be entirely attributed to the pope’s corrosive influence. This counters the oft-articulated English and Protestant claim that the Irish, or Catholicism, for that matter, are inherently rebellious, and supplements his assertion that loyalty to the crown was not only of paramount importance for Irish Catholics, but is also possible under the proper ecclesiastical leadership. Here, Walsh describes a Catholic Ireland forced into repeated rebellion against the Crown by malevolent Roman overlords. And Pope Pius V, His Declaratory Sentence...against Queen Elizabeth. And the Bull or Breve of Gregory XIII...granting to all the Irish that would join and fight in the Rebellion of the FitzGeralds of Desmond against Queen Elizabeth, even the same plenary pardon and remission of all their sins, which is granted to those engaged in a Holy War against the Turk...And that other of Clement VIII...of the like tenor and direction to the Irish Nation in general, animating them to join unanimously in Tyrone's Rebellion against the self-same heretical Queen... And lastly...that Bull or Breve of Plenary Indulgence...given yet more lately to all the Roman-Catholics of Ireland, who had join'd in the Rebellion there begun in the year 1641...witness in the second place all the no less unchristian, than unhappy effects of these very Bulls, Breves, Judgments and Indulgences.[67] Significantly, Walsh fails to add that many Catholics in all conflicts listed refused to rebel, and thus makes this history, just like his other narratives, available to all Catholics. It also skirts around the complicated question of Catholic culpability and the extent to which they acted illegally in the 1640s by affirming that Rome was the reason for any malicious action. Thus, Walsh’s defense of the remonstrance should really be considered a formulation of a specific brand of Catholic identity, just like those of the other authors. He draws on a range of memories, constructing various histories intending to support his argument, and connects these histories to contemporary politics in such a way as to provide a direct catalyst for unification. Catholic nationhood is rarely mentioned explicitly; it functions in this tract not as a means to an end but instead as the ultimate objective. The end goal is a new brand of Catholicism, loyal to the king over Rome, freed from the shackles of forced insurrection, and instead fully integrated, and presumably welcomed, into the Stuart political nation. Yet not everyone approved of such a radical restructuring of Catholic theo-political doctrine. Peter Talbot, Archbishop of Dublin and self-appointed nightmare of remonstrants, produced a pamphlet the following year in 1674 titled The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh: His New Remonstrant Religion. It thoroughly excoriates Walsh and his perceived treason, spends an undue amount of time examining laws regarding public whipping and the extent to which they apply to Walsh.[68] Even when he is not indulging his fantasies of subjecting Walsh to corporal punishment, the rage in Talbot’s writing is still palpable. He accuses him, perhaps correctly, of intending to found a “new religion” and becoming, perhaps incorrectly, the “Pope of this new Remonstrant Church.”[69] He labels him a traitor, and maintains that by accusing, “all Bishops, and by consequence the Representative Roman Catholic Church, or...its supreme Pastor together with all the other Bishops of the said Communion, of holding and swearing the lawfulness of Treason,” he has become the “greatest Rebel...of the Irish nation.”[70] It is significant, of course, that the Irish nation means Catholicism, and we shall see that in this tract, as in his The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects, Talbot constantly portrays Ireland as a categorically Catholic nation. This conflation of Ireland with Catholicism is intended to explain the reason why Walsh’s church failed in Ireland. Just as Walsh attempted to create a distinct, remonstrant Irish Catholic identity, so too does Talbot attempt to claim the existence of an opposing number which interprets history and shared Catholic experiences differently. The bulk of Talbot’s evidence for Walsh’s treachery lies in his accusations that Walsh’s remonstrance articulates nothing more than Anglican Protestantism. He argues that the remonstrance affirms that the, “King is the only supreme Governor of England, and of all other his Dominions, as well in all Spiritual or Ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal,” religious authority is duly denied to the pope, and thus the King is given, “all the spiritual power and authority in his own Dominions.”[71] He draws an immediate parallel with Protestantism, noting how, If you will read the Statutes 1. Eliz. 1. & 8. Eliz 1. You will find that the Kings of England’s supremacy, is so spiritual and sublime, that there needs no changing the signification of the word spiritual into temporal, and that a King of England (if he should think fit) may, according to the principles of the Protestant religion, established by the lawes of the land, giue power by letters patents, to any of his lay subjects to consecrate Bishops and Priests… [72] Thus, in practice, Walsh is, “the greatest Traitor and Rebel that breathes,” to the Catholic faith, stemming from his attempt to create a separate Protestant Church to make himself its pope rather than out of a genuine reforming impulse.[73] However, Talbot does not limit the scope of his argument to legal queries over the separation of temporal and ecclesiastical power. He uses the notion of collective memory and a constructed Catholic identity to prove that Walsh is truly operating contrary to the interests of all Irish Catholics. His selection is a curious one: the martyrdom of Thomas Becket, the Archbishop of Canterbury who was murdered on King Henry II’s (unintentional) orders in 1170. The reasons for this choice are twofold. First, Talbot needs to formulate a narrative honoring Rome for the same period of time that Walsh did to provide a viable opposition model. Thus, he claims, “it’s much better….to justify…. doctrine of...the whole Roman Catholic Church, ever since S. Thomas his Martyrdom, then the fancies of a dull ignorant Friar.”[74] Walsh, however, objects against it the Martyrdom and Miracles of S. Thomas of Canterbury; it being evident out of all Histories, both sacred and profane; that S. Thomas suffered, was canonised and declared a Martyr, for defending the immunities of the Church, and particularly that of Churchmen from the coercive supreme power of secular Courts.[75] Becket’s murder is the founding moment for Irish Catholics because of its contemporary relevance; he died defending the ecclesiastical court’s integrity and independence from a crown increasingly attempting to encroach on spiritual authority. Yet there is something else implicit in such a choice, something far more salient. By claiming that Walsh, who has become a Protestant, has succeeded in bastardizing the memory of saint Thomas Becket, Talbot further retrenches the Irish Catholic and English Protestant worldview. Though Henry II was a Catholic, he was the English king who conquered Ireland, and as we have seen, Talbot’s criteria for Protestantism is predicated on how one perceives the divisions (or lack thereof) between temporal and spiritual power as vested in the monarch. Thus, Talbot ahistorically assigns to Henry the faith of Protestantism to define the Irish Catholics in opposition to the English monarch who, like those of the Restoration, desired for himself ecclesiastical supremacy. Having described a common experience to unite all Catholics, Talbot thus claims that a pan-Catholic identity already exists, with a rich history of papal loyalty and devoted to the separation of secular and ecclesiastical authority dating back to the martyrdom of Becket. He again claims that as Walsh believes, “that the oath of supremacy may be taken with a good conscience by Roman Catholics,” the entire, “Roman Catholic Church belives, and tells vs the contrary,” thus Walsh has, “no reason to be angry with Catholics, if they do not rely upon [his] word in any point that concerns their conscience or religion.”[76] By describing Walsh as a Protestant, Talbot attempts to unite all Catholics against him and avoid afracturing Catholic unity; Walsh is no Catholic. Yet unlike Walsh, Talbot is not attempting to create unity. He is attempting, like the author of A Narrative or himself in The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects, to justify its existence. As such, he isolates Peter Walsh as a lone figure in a defunct movement attempting to combat centuries of Catholicism. By what authority, he asks, may Catholics subscribe to the Remonstrance? None but your own authority; nothing but your saying, that the Roman Catholic Church hath err'd rashly and obstinately for these 600. last years, because it admitted not a Spiritual Supremacy in temporal Soueueraigns. Really Mr. Walsh, I do not believe your sole authority is a sufficient argument to prove the Church hath erred. To proue so rash an assertion you would fain make us mistrust the testimonies of holy and learned Authors of the Church History, as Baronius, Bellarmin, and others…[77] Talbot invokes the concept of nationhood to counteract Walsh’s ability to create a separatist Church. He even explicitly refers to it; he asks whether Walsh would “disgrace [his] own nation” by “promoting protestancy... and dividing...Catholics by his Remonstrance.”[78] Thus his crime extends beyond religious heresy into the secular sort; it also consists of attempting to divide his version of the Catholic nation. This division is a conditional one, however, in the subjunctive tense. It does not exist, of course; it is only the foolish attempt of a deranged traitor. Yet it is not enough to deny Walsh the privilege of support. To claim a united nation in opposition to Walsh, Talbot needs to deny his blatant persecutions of remonstrants. As we have seen, Talbot, in his position as Archbishop of Dublin, gleefully tormented the few remonstrant clergy remaining in his diocese. Yet he instead baldly lies about it: “I neuer persecuted, him nor any of his...Friars Remonstrants, in whose behalf he petitioned.”[79] Talbot, then, uses memory to controvert and invalidate Walsh’s construction of identity and instead articulates an iteration of Catholic identity that he claims as not only a viable alternative, but perhaps more importantly, already the reality. *** How did the Gaels perceive the remonstrance? Clues can be discerned from poetry. As we examined in the last section, the land settlement produced a wealth of tracts chronicling a collective set of experiences for all of Ireland; yet the question of who is included is left rather ambiguous. That question will be answered in this section. In his 1670 poem “O God of the Universe,” Ó Bruadair laments, Dark is the light of the sun and the heavenly elements, And rent is the covering surface of earth's grassy countenance, I deem it no wonder that they should then wholly extinguished be, Seeing that clerics transgressing their oaths into treason fall.[80] The decidedly critical outlook of the remonstrants – or rather, “The corrupt and un-Irish conceits of this renegade forger-clique” – finds a scapegoat in Peter Walsh.[81] In his 1670 tract “‘Tis Sad for Erin’s Fenialí Bands,” Ó Bruadair condemns Walsh as “guilty of the wounds inflicted on the land of Fál, Whicli lies to-day beneath his hand all powerless to act or stir.”[82] Yet such criticisms raise important questions. If the remonstrant clergy and Walsh are traitors, who are they betraying? The Catholic religion, or Ireland itself? Either way, the implications are massive. If Walsh is betraying Catholicism, then Ó Bruadair is claiming the existence of another vision of Irish Catholicism more in line with Talbot’s thinking. If the answer is Ireland, then by consequence all Catholics must be counted as Irish. In examining Ó Bruadair’s treatment of Catholicism as it relates to his already-discussed perception of a Gaelic Ireland, a mostly coherent, yet at times contradictory, vision of who Ó Bruadair considers Irish emerges. His 1680 work “Those Who Once Knewest The Law” sheds some light on these queries. The poem is written in response to the news that one Master Verling, a lower Gaelic nobleman, converted to Protestantism for admittance to Trinity College, Dublin.[83] The poet writes: Those who once knewest the law of the flock that cleaved closest to Christ, And who therefore have let themselves be by the cruellest slavery oppressed, Reflect in thy mind on thyself and observe how accursed the deed To yield to the heart's base desires and sell heaven for a short spell of life.[84] Verling’s treachery is not to Gaeldom but to Catholicism as a whole, and the oppressed peoples mentioned are all Catholics, not just ones of a certain ethnic persuasion. These few short lines reveal a startling conclusion: what Joseph Leerssen mistakenly considers an exclusive, Gaelic identity developing in the Restoration period should really be understood as an Irish Catholic identity.[85] Yet still, this issue is complicated by the fact that the culture and history of Ireland Ó Bruadair espouses is very much a Gaelic one. It is thus necessary to examine his perception of Old English eligibility for this collective memory. Paradoxically, in his rather exclusionary language which separate Gauls from Gaels, he lumps Catholics of all persuasions into a de-ethnicized confessional identity. As reverend Mac Erlean notes, Gauls is a complicated term. It may designate Gauls, Vikings, Normans, or English. Until the seventeenth century, Gauls were characterized and distinguished by different physically descriptive terms such as “fair,” or “bright.” Yet, as the social upheaval of the seventeenth century introduced various new settlers into Ireland, words such as “old” or “new” began to be used, and physical descriptions such as “fair” or “black” became transmuted so as to solely convey moral judgements.[86] Thus “Gall” by Ó Bruadair’s time was a decidedly ambiguous term. As such, we find various pieces praising them, even though they are not Gaels: Many daring soldiers, many swords and volumes, Many masts and currachs, Did that fleet's crew bring across the sea from Britain, Everlasting radiance. The diploma of these Galls is Christ's religion And their prince's patent, The prescription of five hundred years' possession. 'Tis no living falsehood.[87] Thus, the Anglo-Irish conquerors of the twelfth century are distinguished from the Cromwellians of the 1640’s because of their religion. Though their religion does not make them “Gaels,” it does establish a bond with them, symbolized in this particular poem by the marriage between the “Choicest wheat of Erin's Gaels and Galls.”[88] Catholic Gauls are included in the land of Erin, and as we have seen in the previous section, are also included in the land’s Gaelic past which was founded for this united island. The most important Gaelic-language work in forging a discursive Catholic union between Gaels and Gauls is Ó Bruadair’s poem “Love of Sages,” written in praise of John Keating, the Old English Chief Justice of Ireland who acquitted the Gaelic noblemen accused of complicity in the supposed 1682 “Popish Plot.”[89] In the poem, Ó Bruadair identifies two types of Galls. One includes the, Royal champions for the king’s cause murdered Made these sons of malediction proud; Soon the frauds of sullen, hateful scoundrels Flourished fierce without a spark of shame.[90] This classification refers to the Protestant English officials who poisoned the king’s ear with fantasies of Catholic rebellion. The other group – or as Ó Bruadair writes, it, “Galls like these” – including Keating, “shield of our protection/Against the wicked tramp’s perfidious snares.”[91] This second category comprises the Catholic Galls of Ireland, or the Anglo-Normans, to whom the Gaels “owe allegiance.”[92] To further complicate this conception, Ó Bruadair makes several bold statements in his praise of Keating which seem to contradict the notion that these Gauls are even foreigners. First, he lauds the “the chivalrous blood of that generous true Irish Gall,” a seemingly blatant linguistic paradox.[93] Several lines later, he similarly praises him for bringing “comfort to your oppressed Countrymen.”[94] Thus, the distinction between Gael and Gall persists, yet the Galls seem to count as Irish. How so? Catholicism, of course, unites them. The Irish nation conceived by Ó Bruadair and the other Gaelic poets reviewed in the Restoration period is one not of Gaels, as Joseph Leerssen maintains, but of Catholics. As we have seen, Gaelic language, culture, and history were touted with characteristic fervor in these thirty volatile years. Yet these were defined not in opposition to the Old English, but to the English Protestant invaders. The memories that were drawn upon were indeed Gaelic, yet they were memories to which all Catholics could subscribe; thus his praising of Keating for appreciating the Gaels for who they were.[95] In uniting them in the present as one Catholic force, Ó Bruadair further implies that they also should subscribe to this history, as all of Ireland increasingly became united as one single geographic, religious entity. Thus, just as the Old English pamphleteers attempted to resolve economic and ecclesiastical animosities by professing some sort of unified Irish Catholic identity (implicitly surmounting ethnic differences), the Gaelic poets, in their quest to comprehend the transformed society around them, smoothed over ethnic differences and the complexities of recent experience to articulate a coherent version of Ireland. This Ireland which was Gaelic in culture, language, and history, was now also available to Catholic Gauls as a result of supposedly shared recent experiences. Like those of the Old English writers, such affirmations had little grounding in reality. Yet their existence is vital to understanding how Irish nationalism, in the eighteenth century, took place within a context of “cultural-political osmosis” wherein even the English-speaking, Protestant population adhered to this vision of Ireland in direct opposition to England. In conclusion, an Irish Catholic nation did form in the Restoration period, insofar as it appeared in discourse as an appealing alternative to confusing and oftentimes depressing social realities. It transcended ethnic, economic, and theological bounds, yet never appeared in the same form more than once. Irish Catholic identity can only really be described as a rhetorical chameleon, used constantly – in many more works than just the above discussed – yet changing to adapt to the circumstances of the propaganda. Gaelic poetry and the remonstrance discourse, more or less devoid of ulterior motives other than asserting the continued role of the poet in society and formulating a remonstrant versus anti-remonstrant identity, respectively, came the closest to articulating a clear, ideologically-founded Catholic nation. Yet all of the tracts examined, and several more which I have not had the space to assess here, have one common theme: the discourse is massively disconnected from reality. Any development of Irish Catholic identity in this period was purely rhetorical and was not reflected by any actual events. This is not to say these tracts have no importance in posterity. They certainly do. Nationhood as defined by the parameters set out in this particular essay, is inherently both rhetorical and practical; it must originate in articulations of experience and a call for unity before this actually happens. Rhetorical unity is necessarily anticipatory of actual nationhood; Restoration articulations of nationhood may be considered, with the benefit of historical hindsight, to have anticipated what Tom Garvin deems, “Irish separatist nationalism as a popular political creed,” that originated in the eighteenth century.[96] The seventeenth century provided the rhetorical framework and memorial precedent; the eighteenth century, with its mass persecutions of all Catholics and economic and political imperialization of Ireland, provided the immediate impetus to subscribe to the memory.[97] We should be careful not to rely too heavily on hindsight, however, and should focus equally on the immediate impact of the discourse within the context of the Restoration era. The literature of the 1660s, 70s, and 80s had the immediate effect of enforcing the image of Ireland as a Catholic nation, and in describing Ireland in opposition to English Protestantism, it became an inherently, if unwittingly, subversive entity. This discourse also offers one more important revelation, alluded to earlier in this essay: given that Irish unity was employed in such a myriad of tracts from this period, one may assume it was an effective rhetorical tool and appealed to broad swaths of the Catholic population. Thus, though they could not agree on how they should unite, it appears that many Irish Catholics did agree that indeed they should. Given the Protestant ascendancy, increasing imperialization, and marginalization of Catholics in political life, the fact that this was the case is not surprising. Yet it is also not surprising that unity did not happen: the brunt of this oppression was not felt by the entire population. The Stuarts did not perfect the art of confessional, economic, and political persecution in Catholic Ireland. The Hanovers, however, did. Endnotes [1] Nicholas French, The bleeding Iphigenia or An excellent preface of a work unfinished, published by the authors frind, [sic] with the reasons of publishing it.] 1675. 2, 3, 6 [2] Tim Harris, “Restoration Ireland: Themes and Problems” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled, edited by Coleman A. Dennehy (Hampshire, England, 2008). 13 [3] Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 35-8 [4] Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 11-14 [5] Tim Harris, “Restoration Ireland: Themes and Problems” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled, edited by Coleman A. Dennehy (Hampshire, England, 2008). 13 [6] Tim Harris, “Restoration Ireland: Themes and Problems” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled, edited by Coleman A. Dennehy (Hampshire, England, 2008). 10 [7] Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 87 [8] Ann Creighton, “Grace and Favour: The Cabal Ministry and Irish Catholic Politics, 1667-1673” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled, edited by Coleman A. Dennehy (Hampshire, England, 2008). 152 [9] Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern (Gill and MacMillan: Dublin, 2006). 235 [10] Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern (Gill and MacMillan: Dublin, 2006). 237-8; Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 98 [11] Peter Walsh, P. W's Reply to the Person of Quality's Answer: Dedicated to His Grace, the Duke of Ormond. Paris: [s.n.], 1682. 88-80 [12] Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern (Gill and MacMillan: Dublin, 2006). 238-9 [13] Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern (Gill and MacMillan: Dublin, 2006). 239 [14] Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 96-98; Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern (Gill and MacMillan: Dublin, 2006). 239 [15] Ann Creighton, “Grace and Favour: The Cabal Ministry and Irish Catholic Politics, 1667-1673” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled, edited by Coleman A. Dennehy (Hampshire, England, 2008). 144-6 [16] Ernest Renan, What is a Nation? (Lecture at Sorbonne, 11 March 1882 in Discours et Conferences, Paris, Caiman-Levy, 1887). 277-310 [17] Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 87 [18] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland: Whereby the Just English Adventurer Is Much Prejudiced, the Antient Proprietor Destroyed, and Publick Faith Violated : to the Great Discredit of the English Church, and Government, (if Not Re-Called and Made Void) As Being Against the Principles of Christianity, and True Protestancy. Lovain: [s.n.], 1668 [19] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 1 [20] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 1 [21] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 1-2 [22] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 7, [23] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 12 [24] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 11-12 [25] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 17 [26] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 5-6 [27] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 8-9 [28] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 10 [29] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 16 [30] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 25 [31] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 25 [32] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. Represented by Peter Talbot In a Letter to the Roman-Catholiks of Ireland, Particulary Those of the City and Diocese of Dublin. [Douai: s.n., 1674.] [33] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 1 [34] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 1 [35] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 1-2 [36] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 7-8 [37] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 10 [38] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 2, 13 [39] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 13 [40] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. 9 [41] Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland, 18 [42] Talbot, Peter, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subiects. 15 [43] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 198 [44] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 220; Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part I, CONTAINING POEMS DOWN TO THE YEAR 1666, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 206 [45] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part I, CONTAINING POEMS DOWN TO THE YEAR 1666, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 207 [46] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 33 [47] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part I, CONTAINING POEMS DOWN TO THE YEAR 1666, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 197, 203; Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 21, 39 [48] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 204 [49] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 62-3 [50] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 205 [51] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 220 [52] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 251 [53] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 224-5 [54] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 227 [55] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 225 [56] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 248-252 [57] Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). 96 [58] Peter Walsh, The History & Vindication of the Loyal Formulary, Or Irish Remonstrance ... Received by His Majesty Anno 1661 ..: In Several Treatises : with a True Account and Full Discussion of the Delusory Irish Remonstrance and Other Papers Framed and Insisted On by the National Congregation At Dublin, Anno 1666, and Presented to ... the Duke of Ormond, but Rejected by His Grace : to Which Are Added Three Appendixes, Whereof the Last Contains the Marquess of Ormond ... Letter of the Second of December, 1650 : In Answer to Both the Declaration and Excommunication of the Bishops, &c. At Jamestown. (London, 1673). [59] Peter Walsh, The History & Vindication of the Loyal Formulary. ii [60] Peter Walsh, The History & Vindication of the Loyal Formulary. ii [61] Peter Walsh, The History & Vindication of the Loyal Formulary. ii [62] Peter Walsh, The History & Vindication of the Loyal Formulary. xiii [63] Peter Walsh, The History & Vindication of the Loyal Formulary. xvii-xviii [64] Peter Walsh, The History & Vindication of the Loyal Formulary. xvi [65] Peter Walsh, The History & Vindication of the Loyal Formulary. iv-v [66] Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern (Gill and MacMillan: Dublin, 2006). 265 [67] Peter Walsh, The History & Vindication of the Loyal Formulary. xi-xii [68] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh: His New Remonstrant Religion : the Articles Whereof Are to Be Seen In the Following Page : Taken Out of His History and Vindication of the Loyal Formulary .... Printed at Gant: [s.n.], 1674. 9 [69] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh. 11, 13 [70] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh. 10, 57 [71] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh. 28 [72] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh. 28 [73] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh. 67 [74] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh. 17 [75] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh.13 [76] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh. 40 [77] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh. 41 [78] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh. 44 [79] Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh. 78 [80] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 4 [81] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 7 [82] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 11 [83] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 262 [84] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 263 [85] Joseph T. Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). 252 [86] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 50 [87] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913).83 [88] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913).83 [89] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913).264 [90] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913).271 [91] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913).277, 281 [92] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 283 [93] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 285 [94] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913).287 [95] Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). 283 [96] Tom Garvin, The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics (New York), 14 [97] Tim Harris, “Ireland,” from his Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720 (2006), 500-12 References Works Cited: Anonymous, A Narrative of the Settlement and Sale of Ireland: Whereby the Just English Adventurer Is Much Prejudiced, the Antient Proprietor Destroyed, and Publick Faith Violated : to the Great Discredit of the English Church, and Government, (if Not Re-Called and Made Void) As Being Against the Principles of Christianity, and True Protestancy. Lovain: [s.n.], 1668 Ann Creighton, “Grace and Favour: The Cabal Ministry and Irish Catholic Politics, 1667-1673” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled, edited by Coleman A. Dennehy (Hampshire, England, 2008). 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Leerssen, Mere Irish and Fíor-Ghael: Studies in the Idea of Irish Nationality, its Development and Literary Expression prior to the Nineteenth Century (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1986). Danielle McCormack, The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016). Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part I, CONTAINING POEMS DOWN TO THE YEAR 1666, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913) Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Poems of Daibhi Ó Bruadair, Part II, CONTAINING POEMS FROM THE YEAE 1667 TILL 1682, Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes by REV. JOHN C. MAC ERLEAN, S.J. (London, 1913). Ernest Renan, What is a Nation? (Lecture at Sorbonne, 11 March 1882 in Discours et Conferences, Paris, Caiman-Levy, 1887). 277-310 Peter Talbot, The Duty and Comfort of Suffering Subjects. Represented by Peter Talbot In a Letter to the Roman-Catholiks of Ireland, Particulary Those of the City and Diocese of Dublin. [Douai: s.n., 1674. Peter Talbot, The Friar Disciplind, Or, Animadversions On Friar Peter Walsh: His New Remonstrant Religion : the Articles Whereof Are to Be Seen In the Following Page : Taken Out of His History and Vindication of the Loyal Formulary .... Printed at Gant: [s.n.], 1674. Peter Walsh, P. W's Reply to the Person of Quality's Answer: Dedicated to His Grace, the Duke of Ormond. Paris: [s.n.], 1682. Peter Walsh, The History & Vindication of the Loyal Formulary, Or Irish Remonstrance ... 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George Boyce, Robert Eccleshall, and Vincent Geoghegan (2001). 240-253 Tyrconnel, Richard Talbot, Earl of, 1630-1691: Tyrconnel's speech to his Privy Council made upon the (expected) landing of the late King James in Ireland : with remarks upon it. 1680 French, Nicholas, The Vnkinde Desertor of Loyall Men and True Frinds [sic]. [Paris]: Superiorum permissu, 1676. Jason McHugh, “Catholic Clerical Responses to the Restoration: The Case of Nicholas French” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled (Hampshire, England, 2008). 108-120 Michael Perceval-Maxwell, “The Irish Restoration Land Settlement and its Historians” in Restoration Ireland: Always Settling, Never Settled (Hampshire, England, 2008). 19-29 A Vindication of the Present Government of Ireland, under his Excellency Richard Earl of Tirconnell (1688)

Two Forms of Environmental-Political Imagination: Germany, the United States, and the Clean Energy Transition Two Forms of Environmental-Political Imagination Germany, the United States, and the Clean Energy Transition Nathan S. Chael Stanford University Author Fabienne Tarrant Lori Kohen Huayu Wang Connor Riley Editors Spring 2019 Download full text PDF (52 pages) Abstract The United States and Germany have followed markedly different paths thus far in the 21st century in their efforts to reduce emissions from energy production and thereby combat climate change through national policy. I extend Professor Jedediah Purdy’s notion of the “environmental imagination” to discuss the “environmental-political imagination,” or implicit vision of the environment, politics, and how they ought to be approached and structured, latent in each country’s central 21st-century climate policy initiative. I find that a general spirit of individuation and conflict marks the United States’ modern environmental-political imagination, while a general spirit of collective enterprise and continuity marks Germany’s. A parallel series of examples is used in each country to illustrate this, including understandings of economy and environment, particular forms of energy and landscape, and ideas of leadership and agency, and finally some objections are considered. I. Introduction “‘We’re the first generation to feel the impact of climate change and the last generation that can do something about it.’ And that’s why I committed the United States to leading the world on this challenge.” [1] – President Barack Obama “Dealing with climate change means facilitating and promoting social and economic change in the best possible way. Germanyʼs Energiewende, or energy transition, is an encouraging example of how that can be done, despite all the challenges its details pose. We intend to continue down this route—with everyone on board, including each individual sector of the economy.” [2] – Dr. Barbara Hendricks, former German Minister for Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety “In a world we can’t help shaping, the question is what we will shape.” [3] – Jedediah Purdy These are, to say the least and state the obvious, complicated political times in both the United States and Germany. From the midst of the complexity and chaos, though, at least one emergent trend stands out: there is a widespread sense that Germany is overtaking at least part of the mantle of global leadership that has characterized the United States’ posture towards the world since the fall of the Soviet Union and before. This phenomenon has been particularly pronounced since the election of President Donald Trump in the US—German Chancellor Angela Merkel has since been pointedly labeled the new “leader of the free world” in numerous news outlets[4]—but is surely reflective of deeper and longer-standing political and ideological currents in both nations. In this essay I wish to trace the legal and philosophical contours of this trend in one particular arena: that of environmental policy, and in particular energy policy. German and American environmental attitudes have, and have long had, marked differences, and these attitudinal differences manifest in a correspondingly deep divergence between the two countries’ environmental laws. A particularly rich and currently relevant pair of examples of this historical disparity can be found in the Clean Power Plan in the United States and the Energiewende, Germany’s 21st-century suite of goals and policies aimed at a transition to a low-carbon economy. These recent federal policy efforts to spur a transition to lower-emission energy sources in each country reveal a distinctive set of underlying contemporary notions about what Americans and Germans take the environment and its value to be—what the legal scholar and historian Jedediah Purdy has called “the environmental imagination”[5]—and, relatedly, what they take the role of law to be relative to the environment. That is, what an appropriate set of energy and environmental policies looks like, what the nation is responsible for in combating environmental problems that affect both its own people and other nations, and what roles its different individual and institutional actors ought to have in creating and advancing those policies. Taken together, following Purdy, I label this set of underlying philosophical views connecting the environment, law, state, and society the “environmental-political imagination” of each nation, and later in the paper will have much more to say about this concept. The structure of the essay is as follows. First, I describe the contents of, and, in a pre-philosophical way, tell the stories of a pair of recent environmental laws/policy initiatives, the Clean Power Plan (CPP) in the United States and the so-called Energiewende, or “energy transition,” in Germany. While this pair merely scratches the surface of German and American environmental law, I show that they constitute a particularly significant set of policies, and comprise a particularly rich contrast for the exploration of the two nations’ dominant ways of understanding the intersection of environment and politics. In the paper’s second section I elaborate upon the concept of the environmental-political imagination and its specific utility here, then argue for a particular characterization of the environmental-political imagination that underpins each country’s contemporary energy policy initiative. The claim at which I arrive comprises the central philosophical contention of the essay: a spirit emphasizing the individuation and conflict of different spheres of activity, landscapes, interests, and agents pervades the 21st-century American environmental-political imagination, while across the same set of diverse aspects, the contemporary German environmental-political imagination is marked by a sharply contrasting and equally pervasive spirit of collectivism and continuity. After arguing for this view, in the essay’s third section I articulate and provide short responses to some potential objections to my argument, attempting to clarify and trace some of its ramifications. Before beginning in earnest, a few notes on the paper’s methodology. First, while German and American environmental law and their underlying imaginative ideologies have rich and compelling histories, rather than sustaining a full historical argument here I confine myself mainly to this century’s developments, using the CPP and recent developments in the Energiewende as contemporary lenses onto deeply historical phenomena for the sake of scope and analytical clarity. Where necessary, however, events deeper in history are discussed; it should simply be kept in mind that in a larger sense all current laws and ideologies are inextricably rooted in historical factors. I shall have more to say later about how we might understand this temporal issue. Second, it will doubtless be noted that establishing unquestionable causal linkages between such concrete phenomena as environmental laws and such slippery, implicit ones as “environmental-political imaginations” is a difficult, nigh impossible, exercise, particularly without the benefit of a full historical account. To do so is not my aim. Instead, this essay is meant to provide a form of rational reconstruction: given the issues and policies in question, how they came into being, and the way Germans and Americans both in and outside government think and talk about them, I aim to give the most plausible and revealing characterization of the underlying logics that root them. Some measure of causality running from these imaginative attitudes to the production of the policies at issue is, I believe, necessarily present (as is some causal connection is from earlier law and policy to these recent attitudes), but the paper makes no attempt to account for all the specific social and institutional factors by which such attitudes are mediated before becoming legally manifest. II. The Clean Power Plan and the Energiewende The issue of climate change driven by anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions into the global atmosphere is fundamentally both an economic and environmental one. Carbon dioxide (CO2), the GHG primarily responsible for increasing global temperatures[6], is emitted in fossil fuel combustion that produces electricity and powers industrial equipment, vehicles, and the many other machines of modern economic activity. The historical causal link between CO2 emissions and economic growth is strong and well-documented[7]. In short, emissions-intensive fuels are the lifeblood of today’s global economy; CO2 emissions, economic production, and climate change thus constitute a tightly linked trio of phenomena, and the United States and Germany are quite similar nations in a host of ways closely related to it. Both are highly industrialized nations with immense economic and emissions output: the US economy is the world’s largest, and Germany’s is fourth largest globally and by far the largest in the European Union (EU)[8]. The US and Germany ranked 13th and 19th in the world, respectively, in per capita GDP in 2015,[9] and 3rd and 8th respectively in per capita CO2 emissions in the same year.[10] The structures of the two economies are strikingly similar: while Germany’s economy is somewhat more reliant on industrial production, both derive about 1% of national GDP from agriculture, between 20 and 30% from industry, and the remaining large majority from the service sector.[11] Beyond these basic economic likenesses, the two federal republics maintain immense bureaucratic apparatuses for research, monitoring, regulation and enforcement related to the environment. Both countries founded federal environmental agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the US and the German Federal Environment Agency (UBA, for its initials in German), in the early 1970s. Both federal-level agencies help set and enforce national-level policy floors that state-level agencies enforce and can augment in their jurisdictions (though, as will be discussed in greater detail, Germany’s federal environment apparatus has expanded significantly since the founding of the UBA).[12] From a distance, then, the two nations appear to share a basic economic and governmental structure relative to environmental issues, with some history in common to boot. Despite social and cultural differences, this might suggest that the United States and Germany would pursue the transition to low-carbon economies based on clean energy along similar pathways. Yet the two nations have in recent years diverged drastically in their federal policy efforts to facilitate this transition. The CPP and Energiewende constitute the central components of this divergence. Though they cannot capture all there is to say on the issue, they provide a striking contrast that will allow for interrogation to its heart. For a brief examination of the facts of each, I turn first to the US and then to Germany. A. The Clean Power Plan The CPP emerged from a context of hesitation and failure on the part of the US government to regulate GHG emissions. In 2007, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA ruled that the EPA had the authority and duty, if it found CO2 to be a driver of climate change, to regulate CO2 emissions and thereby combat climate change under the Clean Air Act.[13] The decision, while empowering the EPA to promulgate the rule codifying the CPP eight years later, was actually a defeat for it at the time: the Bush-era EPA did not wish to regulate CO2 emissions, and argued in the case that the Clean Air Act did not cover them. Two years later, legislative efforts to regulate emissions through a “cap-and-trade” scheme similar to the EU’s, wherein a legal limit of GHG emissions is set and emitters can buy and sell permits to emit beneath that cap,[14] failed when the American Clean Energy and Security Act (also known as the Waxman-Markey Bill) passed the House but was never brought to a vote in the Senate. The deadening impact this had on federal climate action, early in Obama’s first term with Democratic majorities in both legislative chambers, was palpable: in Purdy’s view, “when Waxman-Markey failed, a whole generation of reformist thinking went with it.”[15] Frustrated by legislative stagnation, President Obama later directed the EPA to formulate a rule regulating GHG emissions in the power sector.[16] This rule ultimately became the Clean Power Plan, an EPA regulation designed to decrease power-sector CO2 emissions by 32% by 2030, relative to 2005 levels, by instituting emissions guidelines for fossil fuel-fired power plants and directing states to create and implement their own such standards.[17] About 40% of US CO2 emissions came from the power sector in 2005,[18] so other things equal the CPP alone would cut total US emissions over 12% between 2005 and 2030. This would be the largest legally-mandated emissions reduction in US history, and, accordingly, upon its announcement President Obama labeled the CPP “the single most important step America has ever taken in the fight against climate change.”[19] However, backlash to the CPP from industry and political groups was immediate and intense. Also, before the rule could take effect, the Supreme Court issued an order blocking its entry into force until all litigation challenging it was complete.[20] Then, after President Trump took office, he ordered the EPA to review it, and an EPA proposal to repeal it was soon unveiled.[21] While the CPP remains technically alive as of this writing in August 2018, its repeal is expected to be officially complete soon. When that happens, the rule that the Harvard Environmental Law Program has called “the crown jewel of America’s international climate commitments”[22] will be dead before it ever came alive. The CPP was designed to reduce CO2 emissions predominantly by decreasing the use of coal-fired power plants, which have high emissions intensity relative to other energy sources.[23] Market forces, coincidentally, have recently made a major impact in the direction intended by the CPP, as a dramatic shift in energy prices caused by cheap natural gas usage from shale sources has taken place. US CO2 emissions rose steeply from 1990 to 2005, when shale-sourced natural gas hit the market,[24] and have dropped 12% since then.[25] Still, bracketing this fortunate trend, the overall picture of US climate progress is less rosy: annual US GHG emissions remain about 2% greater than they were in 1990.[26] In the absence of any prospect of federal action to aggressively cut emissions, and in light of President Trump’s 2017 decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, many cities, states, and private enterprises have taken matters into their own hands and pledged to enforce their own emissions cuts.[27] B. The Energiewende The idea of Energiewende , or “energy transition,” in Germany goes back to the late 1970s and early 1980s, when environmentalist groups opposed to nuclear energy and fossil fuels called for a transformation of Germany’s energy sources in the wake of nuclear plant construction and the 1973 and 1979 oil crises.[28] However, the term did not describe a substantive policy initiative until the turn of the millennium, when Germany’s governing coalition of the Green Party and the center-left Social Democrats began to take widespread action to promote a transition to new forms of energy production. Since the passage of the first Renewable Energy Sources Act in 2000, Energiewende has become shorthand for a vast array of goals and timetables for renewable energy production and emissions cuts, research reports supporting these goals and timetables, and legal requirements enforcing them.[29] The action of the Energiewende is not localized to one federal ministry or even branch of government. Instead, its regulations spring from multiple sources: administratively, the Federal Environment Agency (UBA), the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU), and the Federal Ministry for Energy and Economic Affairs (BMWi) all play a part in setting and realizing its goals. The chancellor and legislative branch are heavily involved in Energiewende policy creation as well. The key reports and policy components of the Energiewende are as follows. 2000’s Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) guaranteed a twenty-year period of high prices for electricity from renewable sources sold into the grid,[30] and was updated in 2004, 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2017 to increase the law’s renewables targets and adjust its pricing mechanisms.[31] 2007’s Integrated Energy and Climate Programme, also known as the Meseberg decision, approved a package of fourteen new laws and amendments to provide a policy basis for the doubling of Germany’s emissions reductions targets for 2020 from 20 to 40%, compared to 1990 levels.[32] A long-term plan for Germany’s use of various sources of energy in different sectors was approved in 2010 as a cornerstone of the Energiewende ,[33] and in 2014 and 2016 the federal cabinet approved long-term climate action plans for 2020 and 2050, respectively.[34] In addition to CO2 reductions and renewables increases, a central and heavily publicized component of the Energiewende is its move to abolish nuclear energy production in Germany. After the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, in which a magnitude 9.0 earthquake off the coast of Japan triggered a tsunami which caused a meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, the German government under intense public pressure announced plans to immediately cease operations of eight of its oldest nuclear power plants, with all remaining nuclear plants to be closed by 2022.[35] The Energiewende , for all its progress, has been enormously expensive. Much of the cost of the heavy renewables subsidies has been passed onto consumers: a renewables surcharge on utilities bills has raised the average household’s monthly fee by 50% since 2007.[36] Moreover, the decade-long sprint to close the nation’s nuclear plants necessitates a costly rapid increase in the use of other sources, since Germany has long sourced a large portion of its power supply from nuclear energy.[37] Even beyond costs caused by solar subsidies and cuts to nuclear energy, the Energiewende today faces other challenges: for instance, due to recent rapid economic and population growth, German CO2 emissions reductions have stagnated since 2014 and the country will therefore likely miss its 2020 target.[38] The fact remains, though, that through a concerted policy effort Germany has cut its total CO2 emissions over 26% from its levels in 1990 (the key baseline year for emissions reductions in international climate policy). In absolute terms, it has cut emissions more than any other EU nation since then,[39] and since the passage of the EEG in 2000 it has sextupled its electric power production from renewables, mainly wind and solar, to a full 36% of national supply in 2017.[40] This is an enormous figure by global standards. The Energiewende , though costly and facing obstacles, has made impressive strides. Thus we have two modern, industrialized, immensely productive nations, expected to be regional and global leaders on a variety of issues, with markedly different policy responses to the climate and energy problem: one with a climate policy crafted, immediately challenged, and quickly repealed upon a change of government, and the other making imperfect but steady progress. Furthermore, despite the two countries’ basic similarities, few today would be surprised by this stark contrast. It is generally understood that Germany, to use the jargon of energy policy circles, is “ambitious on climate,” while the United States is not. For the remainder of this paper, I aim to use the facts of these two policy initiatives and their development in order to interrogate this general understanding rather than take it for granted, and thereby go a level or two deeper into the human reasons that might explain why it, and certain facts adjacent to it, hold. Such major differences in the two nations’ contemporary laws on energy and climate provide important loci for insights into the imaginative and ideological characteristics of these nations with respect to politics, law, and the environment. Since these policies mandate (or, in the case of the CPP, attempted to mandate) how they, as states and societies, must respond to climate change, such differences provide comparative lenses onto how Germany and the United States view their relationships to their own populations and other nations that climate change will harm, and to the natural world which provides the resource basis for their economic production and which they in turn affect through greenhouse gas emissions. As Purdy puts it, “Law is a circuit between imagination and the material world”[41]; the laws that exist came about through processes expressing an underlying imagination, and can be expected through the realization of what they require to influence the imagination of the future. Examining this pair of policy initiatives, then, what imaginative structures underlying German and American environmental and political life could help account for this vast difference? III. The Contemporary German and American Environmental-Political Imaginations via the CPP and the Energiewende Before laying out dominant features of the two nations’ environmental-political imaginations, I must briefly elaborate upon the concept of the environmental-political imagination itself, and clarify how it relates to Purdy’s concept of the environmental imagination. Neither concept refers directly to the explicit ideological statements parties make in their environmental platforms, nor theories of the true, the good, or the just in tracts on environmental or political philosophy; as Purdy says, “Imagination is less precise, less worked out, more inclusive than ideas, and it belongs to people in their lives, not philosophers working out doctrines. Imagination is a way of seeing, a pattern of how things must be.”[42] It might be thought of as taking place on the mental level prior to ideology, or as ideology’s raw material. It has to do with the way people, individually and in institutions, think and make assumptions about what exists in nature and the human world, how those things are organized, what is valuable about them, and what ought to be done with them, here in particular with respect to climate and energy, and the collective decision-making proper to the political sphere. It is an implicit, blurry set of notions, perhaps internally contradictory, largely submerged or subconscious, that acts as inputs in the formation of laws and policies that then make explicit what may and may not be done. I borrow this framing of “imagination” from Purdy, but employ it in the discussion of somewhat different material from what is referred to by his concept of the “environmental imagination.” As Purdy uses it, the environmental imagination refers primarily, though not exclusively, to how people understand and act upon the environment at the level of landscape, rather than atmosphere and climate.[43] While Purdy acknowledges that, in the future, different nations or regions might develop their own “ethics and politics of climate change,”[44] he does not examine in a descriptive sense how such different environmental-political imaginations are already at work in different places. My analysis here is meant to fill this gap, to focus on the particular environmental, economic, and political issue of climate change and explore how the US and Germany are in fact seeing and acting upon it by using Purdy’s framing of the environmental imagination as a conceptual starting point. Purdy’s political focus is mainly on how people’s imaginative notions of the environment work their way into political life, since decisions about how to approach and use the environment are made in the political sphere. I wish to inquire further about Americans’ and Germans’ imaginative notions of politics itself: their notions and assumptions about what politics is like, how government ought to be organized and decisions made, and what we owe to others inside and outside the polity. Thus the imagination discussed here is itself both environmental and political. Also, since I shall discuss not only how people imagine the climate or the atmosphere but also how their imaginative notions of the environment—generally, of nature overall—affect their nations’ action on climate specifically, “environmental-political” is more appropriate than “climate-political.” The term thus seemed to be the best fit for a capacious idea that extends Purdy’s notion in a logical way. A. The 21st-Century American Environmental Imagination The contemporary American environmental-political imagination, as seen through the story of the Clean Power Plan, can best be characterized by a sensibility of individuation and conflict. By a sensibility of “individuation,” I mean that there exists a pervasive imaginative stress on the sharp divisions among different problems, parties, and conceptual categories of environment and politics, rather than on their continuities; particularly emphasized is the split between the environmental and the economic spheres. Normatively, there is a corresponding imaginative insistence that starkly individualized approaches to such disjoint issues must be appropriate. By a spirit of “conflict,” I mean that these individuated issues, categories, and parties are often imagined as necessarily at odds with one another: there is a powerful sense that trade-off and adversarial relations are inherent to them and to climate change in particular, and that such conflict cannot be overcome by any sense of reconciliation or unification. Individuation is the more fundamental of the two descriptors here, frequently accompanied with an adversarial tone, since two ideas, issues, outcomes, actors, and so on can only be viewed as conflicting if they are first given sharp individuating boundaries. To illustrate this, I marshal a range of evidence from the CPP and beyond to investigate three aspects of the United States’ environmental-political landscape: its view of the relationship between the categories of the “economic” and the “environmental”; its understanding of particular American landscapes and coal, a particularly significant form of energy; and its latent conception of leadership and agency on climate action. A1. Environment and Economy The American environmental-political imagination contains, first and foremost, an insistence upon a sharp distinction between the economic and environmental spheres. “Economic” and “environmental” are not understood as merely two ways in which to view a larger human-natural system, two modes of its measurement that can be usefully distinguished, but instead as two ontologically distinct categories which in practice ought, so far as possible, to be governed by different procedures and norms. In the context of the CPP, this can be initially seen from the law’s institutional backdrop, the structure of which reflects a sharp conceptual disconnect between economy and environment. President Obama instructed the EPA, and the EPA alone, to prepare what became the CPP.[45] It is true that the EPA was created during a time in American history when recognition of human-environmental interconnection was ascendant,[46] and aids human safety through its insurance of clean air and water, but the EPA is explicitly dedicated to environmental protection alone rather than some larger joint goal of environmental-economic harmony. The implicit assumption in much of its work is that the environment is distinct from the economy and other human spheres and will need to be guarded against them. Some EPA officials have even suggested that the EPA has done its job of ensuring clean air and water too well, such that many Americans lose sight of ways in which economic production impacts the environment.[47] Conversely, the US Department of Commerce, the cabinet ministry that proclaims to be tasked with just “one overarching goal: Helping the American Economy Grow”[48] (emphasis in the original), mentions no environmental, ecological, or sustainability concerns in any of its five strategic pillars that support its central aim. Thus in the executive branch’s structure, the concepts of environment and economy are thoroughly and formally separated. The Department of Energy (DOE) might be expected to mediate the two, but it has a strong defense and pure research bent: at once handling nuclear weapons research, nuclear energy research and operations, and clean and fossil energy research. These specifics of bureaucratic organization may seem somewhat arbitrary, but they dictate both how federal agencies’ fields of action are defined and approached and how official discourse regarding those fields is expressed in public. I submit that both of these have significant consequences for how Americans perceive environmental, economic, and energy issues and their nation’s ways of handling those issues. In the context of this division of labor, President Obama’s executive assignment of the CPP’s preparation to the EPA alone appears symbolic of where climate change fits into the American environmental-political imagination, representing the official assignment of US action on climate change to the environmental sphere alone rather than the economic one. The huge backlash against the CPP illustrates the conflictual, not merely individuating, nature of this aspect of the environmental-political imagination:[49] many perceived the CPP as a conferral of environmental benefits and therefore also a sentence of concomitant economic sacrifice and degradation. A host of challenges were immediately raised against the proposed law, and the ensuing political warfare was intense.[50] This is deeply ironic in light of the fact that the government’s own study of the Clean Power Plan indicated that, in fact, due to long-term increases in energy efficiency, savings on climate adaptation costs, and savings on health expenditures due to reducing vast quantities of harmful fumes like sulfur dioxide in the air, it would likely have saved the US billions per year by 2030 relative to the status quo.[51] Much has been made of the idea that organizations like fossil fuel companies, many of which stand directly to lose from a transition to low-emission energy sources and lobbied hard against the CPP,[52] are the real villains preventing America’s energy transition. Coal and oil companies certainly lobbied hard against the CPP and may have played a large role in spreading the notion that emissions reductions, like environmentally beneficial policies generally, necessarily conflict with economic benefits. However, it was not merely these companies that voiced their concerns: amid both an outpouring of support for and backlash against the proposed rule, the EPA received over 4.3 million comments on it in six months.[53] Much has also been made of the deep partisan divide on belief in and concern about climate change itself,[54] which tracks the two parties’ divergent emphasis on action to protect the environment and action to aid the economy. This divide was clearly visible in the battle over the CPP, for instance, when the 11 Senate Republicans of the Environment and Public Works Committee issued a letter in support of repealing the CPP in 2017 that made no mention of the environment or climate change. That letter mentioned only “the pervasive, negative effects [the CPP] would have had on Americans across the country. The CPP would have driven up energy prices, eliminated American jobs, and hurt local communities that depend on coal.”[55] Importantly, though, the imagined conflict between economic and environmental benefits on climate change policy cannot be merely a result of American partisanship: that Democrats and Republicans predictably gravitated to their sides of that conflict on the Clean Power Plan means that the idea of the environmental-economic conflict itself was already generally accepted, and action to counteract climate change has simply been imaginatively sorted mainly into the pro-environment rather than pro-economy category (this is not to say, however, that both parties are exactly equally narrow-minded in their understanding of climate change). The imagined disconnection and conflict between the two spheres is thus fertile ground for, rather than a simple output of, increased partisan division. Also, while I will not examine the American imagination of markets in depth here, there seems to be a notable similarity between the way Americans notionally separate the economy and the environment and the well-recognized way they notionally separate markets and government intervention in the economy. It seems that in America, pro-environment action is imagined as government interference into the workings of the market, and for that reason is anti-economic. This is despite the fact that in practice governments always set the rules of the market in the first place, and that in many cases, like the CPP, government action would increase overall economic welfare in the context of the market’s failure to internalize all costs. That the CPP’s emissions reductions would actually save America money and relieve it of immense human suffering in the long term might have saved it in another time or place, but could not in the contemporary United States. A2. Coal and Landscape Beyond the pronounced economic-environmental distinction, another form of individuation prominent in the American environmental-political imagination and visible in the narrative of the CPP is the uniqueness assigned to the landscape of America’s coal mining country, along with an associated imaginative privileging of coal miners themselves and their imagined conflict with nature to extract its energy. This reflects a more general American notion that a sharp definitional line ought to be drawn between particular landscapes, and between them and humankind, a notion easily recognizable in American lore and law historically; one example of this is the Wilderness Act of 1964, which provided for protected, isolated areas that would remain “untrammeled by man” and would each keep their “primeval character” in spite of an expanding, modernizing population.[56] However, in the realm of energy production, a somewhat different individuating mood is at work than in wilderness protection, one that associates specific energy resources with specific landscapes and imagines a zero-sum conflict for primacy between them. The CPP would have achieved its emissions reductions mainly through cuts in the use of coal-fired power plants.[57] As the letter from the Republicans of the Senate Committee for Environment and Public Works illustrates, a key source of opposition to the CPP was a sentiment that the nation’s jobs in coal production must be politically protected. As with the CPP cost-benefit analysis indicating that in the long term the plan would actually have been economically profitable, here too there is a deep and ironic seed of irrationality; just over 160,000 Americans work in coal production, less than half of the number involved in the fledgling solar industry, which the CPP would have benefited,[58] and coal production has already steeply declined because of market forces alone, with cheap natural gas largely supplanting it since 2005.[59] Simple interest-group politics are always, of course, a factor, and support for coal jobs as a public position is due in large part to the rhetoric of President Trump, who has thrust coal production incessantly into the political arena, making it a more partisan issue and implicitly highlighting its racial associations (and, though not discussed extensively here, race is yet another sphere of deep divisions in the American environmental-political imagination, as, for instance, the work of the environmental justice movement has sought to show).[60] However, as Republicans and Democrats seized upon rather than created an imagined fundamental conflict between the economic and environmental spheres, President Trump seized upon rather than created the American glorification of the coal industry and its imagined battle with forms of energy hostile to it. Many Americans view coal miners as an interest group with a special claim to reverence, in some sense especially American, their connection to coal country’s lifeways and landscape that is morally and aesthetically unimpeachable even as they level its mountains and plumb its depths for the dirtiest fossil fuel available. Our version of fascination with and elevation of coal is uniquely American. Millions of Americans outside of coal country are able to glorify coal production imaginatively, thanks in part to the very fact that they have never been to coal country, because coal is closely associated with one of America’s many distinct, individuated landscapes, cultures, and forms of productive connection to the environment. Oil is certainly imaginatively American, in the sense that it can make one rich quickly. But no other source of energy evokes the sort of hardscrabble, manful battle with nature that coal does, up in the mountains and away from the friendly confines of civilization. Actual coal production, of course, is much less attractive than it is imagined to be in its symbolic overcoming of an unfriendly nature: as Purdy notes, “mountaintop-removal mining dynamites hills and hollows into a flat, treeless terrain and buries many hundreds of miles of Appalachian streams.”[61] But politically, huge swaths of the country lionize it for its imaginative associations, and even those who resist this celebration must engage with and seek to erode that picture of it. The point is not that no Americans recognize that burning coal pollutes the atmosphere intensely and that relatively few Americans actually make their living in its industry; it is that the fact that the US has been collectively unable to privilege other goals, such as combating climate change through the CPP, over its glorification of the unique landscape and culture of coal bespeaks a deep temperamental inclination toward the particular and the adversarial in the way the nation imagines what ways of relating to the environment ought to be honored and preserved. Coal also plays a role in the notion of the US as particular and individuated itself because of the role it plays in contributing to US energy independence. The US, despite what political advertisements advocating drilling in yet another remote wilderness might have you believe, is highly energy-independent—on net importing just 7% of its total energy use.[62] This fact provides one strut undergirding the spirit of individuation latent in how the nation views itself globally on climate change. In keeping with its degree of energy independence, there is little sense that the country is truly indebted to other nations in the energy arena. A logic therefore prevails that, politically, it is the United States’ right to individuate itself in the international discourse on climate change. This is true even prior to Donald Trump’s explicit protectionism and withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, an ultimate act of individuation; the resonance of his “America First” message, despite its multiple valences, can at least partially be attributed to a widespread sentiment that America is not necessarily dependent on the rest of the globe and can therefore act on its own terms in international affairs. Accordingly, when it is not refusing to participate on a particular issue, it is seen by much of its own population and government as the proper global leader on that issue. This is true of America’s action on climate change through the Clean Power Plan, and I therefore turn now to sketching the particular ideal of American leadership on climate change manifest in the law’s progression. This ideal is glory-seeking and exceptionalist, placing the US on an imagined pedestal above the other nations attempting to reduce emissions. A3. Leadership and Agency While setting about repealing the CPP, the Trump administration has made an extravagant claim about American leadership on climate change: that, because it cut emissions more than any other nation in 2017, it is therefore “leading the world” on addressing climate change overall.[63] These claims are transparently based on bad-faith: the US is the world’s second-largest emitter, far ahead of third place and only behind China that has coal-fired its way to yearly emissions increases since 2000,[64] so any proportionally nontrivial American emissions cut in 2017 was likely to be the world’s largest in absolute terms that year. Moreover, this “world’s largest” title is just one year old, and is due basically entirely to market forces making it increasingly uneconomical to use coal[65] even as the Trump administration attempts to prop it up through the repeal of the CPP. Nonetheless, Trump’s administration is not the only one in the CPP era to loudly proclaim American climate and energy leadership when the full facts of the situation did not support it. As noted in the paper’s epigraph, Obama claimed upon announcement of the CPP that he was “[committing] the United States to lead the world on this issue.”[66] In hindsight, given Trump’s cancellation of the CPP and withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement, Obama’s idealistic portrayal of the CPP as a legal and political commitment to US climate leadership may look like little more than a cruel joke of history, a genuine and dignified gesture of America’s desire to lead for the greater good twisted into a dark irony by a shift in the political winds. Even at the time, it made little sense in light of how much had been accomplished in other portions of the developed world: by 2015, Germany had 15 years of experience with renewable energy tariffs, had set 2020 climate targets, and the whole EU had agreed on 2030 targets with a decade of emissions trading experience behind it.[67] Obama’s insistence on American leadership despite this mountain of evidence indicating that the US was far from a position to lead on emissions reductions is therefore revealing. He was certainly aware of how truly far behind America was in 2015 on climate action, but singular American leadership was nonetheless a central thrust of his pitch of the CPP to the American people. Obama’s rhetoric reflects an American sensibility that, on environmental issues like all others, the US must be unique, particular, special, glorious. This sense of entitlement to climate leadership on the global stage manifests today not in widespread federal government action, but in the individual person of the president. The unilateral actions of Presidents Obama and Trump on the CPP—Obama singly directing the EPA to create it, Trump singly directing the EPA to review and replace it—express, despite their different circumstances, a sense of deserved presidential individuality: that is, a right to define America’s international climate leadership in one’s own way regardless of its previous instantiations. Beyond making for less stable policy, this feature of contemporary American climate politics has the effect of being, if not anti-democratic, only minimally democratic: whichever section of the population elected the last president gets to determine policy on climate and energy, regardless of later public opinion[68] and congressional intervention aside. Any major climate action requires governmental leadership, but the current American version, with its current structure of top-down leadership, leaves little room for individual Americans to play a major role in a clean energy transition. They are simply not viewed as important actors in this context. Their support is not needed, and political leaders do not think to call upon them to help in direct action on climate and energy. Even when Obama did connect environmental concerns, economic ones, and ordinary Americans in his rhetoric on the CPP, he argued merely that it would help keep energy “reliable and affordable for American businesses and families,”[69] which is not exactly a moving call to purposeful collective action on an issue of immense national and global importance. Meanwhile, while millions of Americans, mainly along partisan lines, recognize climate change as a serious problem and some individuals among them have achieved success in discussing it an environmental, economic, and political issue,[70] there has been no grassroots climate movement that has been successful in shifting the national conversation overall or forcing government action. Obama’s unilateral move to force action in a government gridlocked along party lines is ample evidence of this point. A true change in the American popular consciousness analogous to, say, what followed Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring seems out of reach on climate in this moment. Ironically, then, the general pattern of individuation of, and emphasis upon the political import of, distinct institutional actors, relevant landscapes, and concepts of different human and environmental spheres in the American environmental-political imagination fails to elevate the individual himself or herself. Thus a particularly executive-focused version of what is often labeled “American exceptionalism” plays a prominent role in the American environmental-political imagination of climate, as seen through the story of the CPP. But an idea of American exceptionalism is not the fundamental category in that imagination; instead, it fits into its larger spirit of partitioning and antagonism among different notional elements, a sense that—despite the idea that climate change ought to be siloed in the environmental sphere and ought to have no claim on activities outside it—the United States must stand alone at the head of the world’s climate change-battling ranks. This imagination is thus both particular to the environmental-political realm and simultaneously reflective of well-recognized aspects and assumptions of American cultural life. Perhaps nothing captures this better than that the US’s spirit of partition and individuation is not an admission of limitation in each partitioned sphere, whether it be the realm of international affairs, executive leadership, the economic sphere, the environmental, or one of the many landscapes Americans insist upon as particularly special. Instead, this partition bespeaks the idea that by conceptually and legally separating each from the other, the US can grasp the infinite in each; it needs not face limitation; it can have its cake and eat it too. This truth of the environmental-political imagination holds now but is profoundly historically rooted: as Purdy notes, “American democracy had taken shape in historically unique exemption from the basic problem of modern and democratic politics: the problem of managing conflicting interests and values in a world of relative scarcity.”[71] That foundational thread is still clearly visible today. B. The German 21st-Century Environmental Imagination In a deep contrast to its American counterpart, the essential spirit of the contemporary German environmental-political imagination, as viewed through the lens of the Energiewende , can be described by a spirit of continuity and collectivism. The German environmental-political imagination is marked by a sensibility that highlights the ways that humans and the environment are interconnected, believes that all sectors of the human population can (indeed, can only) progress by stewarding nature responsibly, and responds with a persistent, determined concentration upon collectively undertaken gradual reforms designed to benefit domestic society, provide leadership to global society, and preserve nature all at once. In some sense, this notion is similar to the ecological form of the American environmental imagination that Purdy describes, dominant in the latter part of the 20th century,[72] but it is more expansive: it does not merely attempt to capture a fact about how the natural world and humankind are necessarily continuous with each other, but extends also to how different sectors of the human population are interdependent, both inside and outside Germany, and is charged with a forward-looking normative temperament that emphasizes social solidarity in collective action both across society and across time. In order to parallel the American case, I again explore how the economic and environmental spheres are imagined to relate to one another, how culturally important forms of energy and landscape play into prevailing beliefs about how the Energiewende ought to be managed politically, and how leadership on reducing emissions is viewed. As in the American case, critical interpretation of the discourse and structure of government provides the primary evidence base, but a range of other sources, like political party platforms to public opinion polling, supports this characterization as well. B1. Environment and Economy The way the Energiewende is discussed by its prominent advocates, policy leaders, and involved government ministries generally integrates humanity and nature, conceptually fusing notions of what benefits the German economy and what benefits the climate and environment. It evinces a recognition of the interconnectedness of human and environmental systems and an ethic of responsible stewardship of both simultaneously, with neither given fundamental priority, even as it eschews the tone of more traditionally environmentalist rhetoric emphasizing a profound spiritual interconnectedness of man and nature. For example, the very name of 2007’s Integrated Climate and Energy Action Programme, even as it heads a highly technical package of legislation that lays out specific binding mechanisms for Germany’s transition to clean energy, suggests continuity between the natural climate system and humanity’s economic system. The government’s announcement of this package of legislation makes explicit the perspective of unified economic and environmental goals that the name suggests: “The German government's guiding principles for energy policy remain the three objectives of security of supply, economic efficiency and environmental protection.”[73] In the government’s view, these objectives, while they can be usefully distinguished, are not in a deeper sense truly distinct and competitive, with ever-unavoidable trade-offs that must be weighed and decided. If in some cases trade-offs are present, they are not allowed to distract from the larger continuity of the economic and environmental spheres; individuation and competition do not constitute an imaginative focus. Instead, economic ends and climate action are understood as mutually reinforcing: “Efficient climate protection modernises the economy and society.”[74] This language of modernization is telling: in the German environmental-political imagination, human and environmental interconnectedness does not demand the abandonment of current technology or a return, even temporarily, to a pre-industrial way of being, as the American romantic imagination might have it.[75] Instead, humanity can become more modern even as it effectively stewards nature, and along with economic-environmental interconnectedness there is a continuity between today’s Germans and future generations, to whom Germans owe fair treatment. [76] The name of 2010’s Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable, and Affordable Energy Supply (henceforth simply Energy Concept) similarly weaves together economic and environmental goals. The Energy Concept describes a plan to attempt to achieve both, arguing that emissions reductions are not just helpful but fundamental for German economic success, and proclaiming that “a high level of energy security, effective environmental and climate protection and the provision of an economically viable energy supply are necessary for Germany to remain a competitive industrial base in the long term”[77] (emphasis mine). The government’s Climate Action Programme 2020 claims that “Germany benefits from its pioneering role in climate change mitigation. The technical, cultural and social innovations it entails create added value especially for small and medium-sized companies.”[78] Such examples of federal agencies proclaiming the economic benefits of climate change-combating emissions reductions are, in short, abound. However, notably, despite the extensive discussions of the Energiewende ’s potential benefits for the German economy in government publications, none appear to assert economic health as the fundamental reason for why the Energiewende is worthwhile. The vision is instead one of a healthy, collective balance of economic and environmental goals that are irreducibly worthy and in some ways inextricable. Parallel to how American federal agencies institutionally embed the imaginative view of economy and environment as sharply individuated seen in the narrative of the CPP, the German institutional setup reflects a perception of them as integrated, with neither given explicit priority over the other. For example, rather than having a single agency for environmental protection to which CO2 emissions regulations are assigned, in Germany three agencies split the bulk of the Energiewende : the Federal Environment Agency (UBA), the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU), and the Federal Ministry for Energy and Economic Affairs (BMWi). Although divisions between these bureaucracies are helpful for defining which organization focuses on which aspect of the Energiewende, there is clear continuity in the categories and the goals relative to which emissions, sustainable development, and climate are discussed across agencies, as the quotations from multiple agencies in the reports cited above illustrate. The Energy Concept, for instance, was prepared jointly by the BMU and BMWi. The economy is not entirely treated as linked to the environment—there is also a ministry for economic cooperation and development, and of course one for finance[79]—but the BMWi’s deep involvement in the Energiewende shows that on energy issues the economy is not seen as a removed and independent entity to be managed apart from its inescapable linkage points with the natural world, nor is the environment to be managed without due consultation of economic experts. The institutional realization of these viewpoints came early in the Energiewende era, with departmental reorganization in 2005. Also, constitutionally, the German system is conceptually friendlier to the objective of environmental protection than the American one, and has become even more so in recent history. For example, since 1949 the Grundgesetz (GG), Germany’s Constitution, has provided for the “protection of the natural foundations of life and animals” by executive, legislative, and judicial action, with explicit reference to the nation’s responsibility to future generations.[80] A round of GG reform was completed in 2006, granting the federal government more powers in environmental policymaking.[81] German constitutional tradition also allows for the subordination of private property to environmentally protective uses on the basis of social welfare and human interconnectedness: “The potential obligation to ‘sacrifice’ [one’s] property rights to public needs derives from the concept of a ‘situational commitment of the property’ that follows from the view of man as an individual who is dependent on society.”[82] Thus it appears that a German perspective of environmental and economic solidarity is deeply built into the German legal and political consciousness,[83] with neither sphere deserving of absolute priority, and the legal foundations of this view have evolved alongside the Energiewende overall. By contrast, in the absence of explicit constitutional discussion of how nature is to be safeguarded, in the US environmental protection has been defined primarily with reference to and in implicit subordination to the economy: the major US environmental laws derive their constitutional power from the Commerce Clause’s permission for the regulation of interstate commerce.[84] In addition to the foundational structure of the German government that evinces a prevailing integrative imagination of the environment, society, and how they should be legally approached in the Energiewende , several other popular sources suggest a similar conceptualization. One is the ways political parties express themselves in their bids for citizen support. That the Green Party has been influential since the beginning of the Energiewende , and governed in a coalition with the Social Democrats, is a powerful statement of a popular German belief that environmental considerations should be built into political decision-making. Even more revealing, though, is the stance of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU),[85] Angela Merkel’s pro-business, center-right party. While the Republicans in the US have understood 21st-century pro-business conservatism to require general opposition to new environmental protections, the CDU has since 1978 included an environmental pillar alongside its three core party pillars focusing on economic growth. The phrase they used when adding this pillar was “quality-oriented growth,”[86] conveying the notion that proper economic progress and proper environmental stewardship are intertwined. That year’s platform included the following statement articulating how the party viewed the connection between freedom and responsibility, and the social interconnectedness between generations: “The conservation of our life support system is part of the responsible liberty. He who now irresponsibly exploits this system and alters the environmental relationship damages the solidarity between generations.”[87] In 1989, the CDU advocated a tax on CO2 emissions in keeping with an explicitly religious desire to properly care for Creation.[88] All this—which would sound confidently liberal, if not outright radical in the United States—stemmed from Germany’s main conservative party, which has been the one constant in a series of coalitions overseeing the Energiewende from the German Parliament since 2005. Thus, while highly visible in the policy prescriptions of the Energiewende since the turn of the century, the interconnected German imagination I describe has its roots in long-held popular understandings of what nature is and is for, how economic growth ought to be understood, and how citizens of different social stations and ages bear responsibilities to one another. B2. Nuclear, Coal, and Landscape Like as with the passage of and response to the CPP, particular sources of energy and their associations with culture and landscape have figured prominently in the story of the Energiewende . In Germany, both nuclear energy and coal have been hotly debated. Nuclear energy has been at the center of discussion because of a tension between its convenient lack of emissions and popular sentiment against it, and coal for the exact opposite reasons: its high emissions and historical association with German identity. Unlike the executive-led course reversal in the American case constituted by the CPP repeal, however, the German response to these difficulties has been to alter its path to the Energiewende ’s original goal of emissions reductions by phasing out nuclear energy and reducing the use of coal.[89] In doing so, Germany has collectively displayed a persistence and willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the demands it believes follow from its interconnectedness with nature and with other nations. The abolition of nuclear energy in particular illustrates the political strength of German emphasis on interconnectedness, in multiple senses beyond the previously discussed environmental-economic linkage. Strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Germany dates back decades. In the 1970s and early 1980s, local activist movements sprang up to oppose the construction of nuclear power plants on the basis of concerns about pollution of beloved local landscapes like the Saxony wine country. These movements occurred alongside a spirit of grassroots opposition to a view of the military, the nuclear industry, and a too-powerful state as noxious bedfellows.[90] In fact, the original use of the term“Energie-Wende” came in the title of a pamphlet imagining “Growth and Prosperity without Oil and Uranium.”[91] In 1986, the Chernobyl disaster occurred in nearby Ukraine, increasing fears of nuclear energy and support for the anti-nuclear Green Party.[92] More recently, in 2000 the parliamentary coalition of the Greens and Social Democrats passed a law planning the gradual phase-out of nuclear energy.[93]However, Angela Merkel’s CDU reversed this decision when it swept into power in 2009, arguing that, as a zero-emissions energy source, nuclear power would be valuable for achieving the Energiewende’s emissions reductions targets as a “bridging technology” that would “[pave] the way for the age of renewable energy” by acting as a buffer against both high fossil fuel emissions and high renewables costs.[94] Thus there were two schools of thought: one Green, activist, and anti-nuclear, in favor of nuclear phase-out for the purposes of environmental friendliness and more localized energy production, the other in favor of nuclear energy with the an established and pragmatic consideration of the costs of the Energiewende , and pro-nuclear, at least for the near future. Then, in 2011, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster hit Japan. Days afterward, Angela Merkel gave a speech announcing that Germany would be immediately closing eight nuclear plants and would shutter the rest by 2022. Given that roughly 30% of German electricity was nuclear-powered at the start of the millennium,[95] and that nuclear energy had been reinvigorated by Merkel’s initial rise, such rapid closure represented a sudden and radical shift. On its face, such a strong German reaction to a Japanese disaster thousands of miles away seems surprising. Fundamentally, however, this German response to Fukushima was about an imagination of international interconnectedness, the reawakened ability of the population and government to imagine a similar disaster happening in Germany. As Merkel put it, “In Fukushima we have to take note that even in a high-tech country like Japan”—and thus a country like Germany—“the risks of nuclear energy cannot be controlled safely.”[96] Ironically, the factors to blame for Fukushima, which were a magnitude 9.0 earthquake at sea and a resultant tsunami crashing into nuclear plants on the shore of the open ocean, are not comparable risk factors for Germany, something Merkel even acknowledged.[97] But that was not the point, nor was it the point that Germany produced far less nuclear energy than some other advanced high-tech nations, like France and the US, which did not move to shutter their plants after Fukushima. The point was that Germans viewed their own destiny as remarkably bound up with the rest of the world’s, to the extent that a nuclear catastrophe in east Asia meant a whole nation’s nuclear supply in west-central Europe must be shut off. This rapid phase-out of a well-established, zero-emissions fuel source makes achieving the near-term emissions cuts targets of the Energiewende difficult, and doing so cost-effectively even more so.[98] But, at least as of 2015, opposition to nuclear energy remained high, with one poll showing 81% of Germans still in outright opposition to it.[99] Germany’s environmental-political imagination thus has its headstrong elements. That the nuclear phase-out is discussed as central to the Energiewende even though the phase-out makes the central Energiewende goal of fast, hefty emissions cuts much more difficult indicates that a larger integrative vision of how Germany should relate to its neighbors and to the environment drives both denuclearization and decarbonization. Coal, another energy source with a potent imaginative valence of landscape and environment in Germany, was also discussed at the coining of the term Energiewende in the early 1980s. However, unlike nuclear energy, the use of coal was celebrated rather than attacked. Since coal is a particularly “dirty” fuel, in that it emits more CO2 per unit of heat energy produced than other common fossil fuels,[100] such celebration may seem puzzling now, in the context of an Energiewende focused on reducing emissions. However, at the time, the goal of reduced emissions was less clarified, and instead coal was promoted because of its particularly German flavor. The use of heimische Kohle, or “domestic coal,” in place of oil was promoted, where heimische is a version of “domestic” that carries particular warm connotations of the German homeland. Germany has long gotten, and still gets, a huge proportion of its electric power from its vast coal reserves. It remains the world’s largest producer of lignite, a particularly inefficient and dirty form of coal.[101] But, unlike in the US, where the current government has dubiously pitched its replacement for the CPP as a savior for the coal industry, despite American coal’s uneconomically high cost relative to natural gas,[102] Germany has shown itself to be willing to move away from coal despite its historic connotations, its current potential utility in an energy transition complicated by the nuclear phase-out, and its home sourcing in a nation largely dependent on Russia for other fossil fuels. But the emissions reductions logic is clear: as the country’s 2050 Climate Action Plan states, “It will only be possible to meet the climate targets if coal-fired electricity production is gradually reduced.”[103] Accordingly, the country has formed an executive commission to oversee the phase-out of coal, and to ensure it is done in an inclusive way that will allow for a transition for its former workers and regions.[104] What explains this willingness to leave coal behind? I contend that, imaginatively, this readiness stems from an inward-facing sense of continuity and collectivism that complements the outward-facing form that motivated the nuclear phase-out decision after Fukushima. Unlike in the US, where coal is associated with one specific, romanticized landscape and culture over any other, in Germany heimische Kohle is not romanticized to the same extent. This is not to say the German coal industry has not battled the Energiewende, but it lacks the comparative political support of the US industry, and the resulting political mood is far different. Today, amid the effort to forge a new, more modern national energy identity, the old ideal of self-reliance from national coal production has lost its sway as Germans generally prefer to see a modern country unified in the face of climate change, a collective pursuing a responsible Energiewende. They celebrate the connections between landscape and society other ways, like in the country’s fifteen recently established UNESCO biosphere reserves which celebrate a balanced relationship of nature and humankind, and its many nature parks that preserve cultural, historical, and environmental sites together.[105] Germans have become quite confident on this issue: as Rainer Baake, a deputy minister of the BMWi, said bluntly in an interview with The New York Times when asked about high energy costs, “The energy transformation in Germany will be carried out by two main sources—those are wind and solar.”[106] B3. Leadership and Agency Leadership on the energy transition in Germany has long had a public face with deep experience on environmental issues: As Germany’s minister for the environment, Angela Merkel (sometimes called the “Climate Chancellor”)[107] presided over the first-ever UN conference on climate change, held in Berlin in 1994.[108] However, that Germany happened to elect an experienced former environmental minister as chancellor for the best part of the century’s first two decades is far from the whole story of the idea of leadership in the Energiewende. This section more deeply examine the components of leadership and agency in Germany’s environmental-political imagination: who it sees as responsible for taking action, what latitude leading agents have to change the course of existing initiatives, the nature of Germany’s participation on environmental issues in the international sphere, and the values that implicitly drive these understandings. It argues that a collectivist view of leadership focused on reciprocity and persistence prevails, in which each sector of German society (particularly individual citizens) is both empowered and expected to take action that furthers the Energiewende. The federal government is respected in its role as overseer of the Energiewende, but is expected to provide a fair deal from which all will benefit as a result. Internationally, Germany imagines itself as an environmental first mover that leads by example, its internal collective action a display of good-faith responsibility that ought to spur trust and reciprocity in the larger collective of nations. As in the United States, an important portion of Germany’s direction on climate and energy policy comes from the top. Chancellor Merkel has acquired a reputation as a forceful climate hawk, and, as much of this essay’s sourcing thus far has shown, hierarchical federal ministries set a great deal of Energiewende policy. But the way figures at the top discuss the action of the Energiewende makes clear that they conceive of it as necessarily a collective endeavor. Merkel, when announcing Germany’s retreat from nuclear energy, put it this way: “All of us, government and opposition, federal, state and local governments, society as a whole, every single one of us, all of us, if we do it properly, can combine ethical responsibility with economic success in this future project. This is our shared responsibility.”[109] Dr. Barbara Hendricks, then head of the BMU, wrote in her foreword to the 2020 Climate Action Programme that “All of us—all areas of industry and all individuals—have to step up to the plate.”[110] One way this collective spirit manifests is in the federalist relationship between the central government and the Länder, the German states. Whereas the CPP’s direction of each state to develop its own scheme for CO2 emissions reductions set off near-immediate battles in court about whether this fragmented approach constituted “bread-and-butter federalism” or gross federal overreach, the German chancellor and minister for energy and economic affairs meet twice yearly with the heads of all of the sixteen Länder to discuss Energiewende policy implementation and enjoy a close and generally functional, if not frictionless, relationship.[112] A rhetorical approach framing reciprocal collective participation as necessary for a successful Energiewende prevails especially strongly with respect to individual Germans. As one BMU report puts it, “Particularly here [in the Energiewende ] it is therefore important to create opportunities for the public to get involved and to support people in becoming aware of their scope for action...Climate action depends far more than any other policy area on the active involvement of as many people as possible.”[113] The government says that rather than asking individuals to sacrifice their own time and resources to reduce emissions, it will provide opportunities for citizen participation such that they themselves benefit.[114] Furthermore, the government has pledged to cut its own emissions to demonstrate its own responsibility and commitment to the cause.[115] Its statements of support for a ground-up Energiewende have, so far, been more than just so much grassroots talk: a cornerstone incentive of the push for emissions cuts has been the Renewable Energy Sources Act’s high federally subsidized prices, guaranteed for renewable energy sold to the grid by small-scale producers like individuals, households, and local co-ops.[116] Early in the century, the government promoted the adoption of small-scale photovoltaic (PV) solar installations with the so-called “100,000 Roofs” initiative, which provided government loans for people to buy rooftop solar systems. Germans have responded by engaging: by 2003, the program was successfully completed,[117] and by the end of 2017 there were 1.6 million PV installations nationwide,[118] with over 40% of total renewable capacity owned by citizens.[119] Much of this subsidizing has aided rural areas in particular, with farmers coming to own a greatly disproportionate percentage of PV installations and the generally conservative farmers’ association pushing the CDU to greater support of the Energiewende .[120] The mere thought of today’s rural, conservative Americans strongly supporting federal climate change policy illustrates both how vast the gulf is between Germany and the US on this issue and how powerful subsidies can be. For the most part, then, the German population does not aid its country’s climate policy as a sacrifice: it does so while gaining generous federally-designed benefits. But this profitability is part of the nation’s imagination of climate change as an integrated social-environmental problem that offers the opportunity to progress and modernize. The Energiewende is not fully democratic, per se, since the executive branch of the federal government from the beginning has played a strong role in setting its policies, but it has become truly collective in its implementation and its expansion of renewable energy enjoys 95% popular support.[121] Thus, in its rhetoric and action, Germany has to a significant extent successfully cast climate change not merely as an international political issue but as a collective German one, and as an opportunity to be addressed by the fulfillment of a social contract. Everyone must do their part, and accordingly, the benefits will be reaped by all. Unlike the autocratic “picking [of] winners and losers”[122] which the CPP was imagined to be by many in the US, the Energiewende is an “an investment in our own future.”[123] The understanding of this investment transcends the merely financial. For instance, the environment ministry stresses the need not just for technical research and development, but social and cultural research to increase understanding of “how people perceive climate change, what consequences it has for their lives, and...how all sections of the population can be included and social acceptance fostered.”[124] This sort of holistic environmental-political idea—linking often-separated human categories like “social,” “cultural,” and “economic” into a continuous whole addressing the state of the public under the banner of the issue of climate change—is, as we have seen, quintessentially modern German. If the Energiewende is supposed to be an endeavor which involves all sectors of society and is positively viewed by both the government and the public—the first and third of Hegel’s three spheres of consciousness in ethical life[125]—where does that leave German businesses, the key element in Hegel’s second sphere of civil society? How do economic actors understand this initiative that has cost so much? For one, the high level of popular support, combined with consistent governmental action, guarantees that German businesses—though they might not be automatically inclined to accommodate the demands of the Energiewende—have little choice but to make the best of it and adapt, as they are squeezed from above and below. This is particularly true of energy companies: as one former utilities executive put it, the Energiewende is “an irreversible process now.”[126] The country’s two largest power companies have both in recent years split in two, with one company emerging dedicated to traditional fuels and one to renewables.[127] Germany’s environmental-political imagination as realized in the Energiewende is thus not a utopian one, where achievement of the large social transition demanded by sharp emissions reductions arises from simple good will and is painless for all. However, given the demanding goal, what is required is clear: as the 2020 climate plan put it, “The energy industry is the sector with the highest greenhouse gas emissions and the greatest technical and economic potential for reduction.”[128] But while certain big businesses may not be happy, others are, as smaller companies dedicated to the production, installation, equipment, and maintenance of renewable energy technology have sprung up and the Energiewende has gained the support of industry groups like the German Confederation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises.[129] Plus, the collectivist temperament of the Energiewende extends to the hurt businesses: The government has pledged to work, including at EU level, to create job opportunities in regions most affected by the switch to renewables.[130] The dominant German conception of political leadership on environment outside its own borders is close to the imagination just described inside them. The federal government claims and demonstrates responsible leadership by example, acknowledging its interdependence with other nations without which a major dent cannot be made in international environmental issues like climate change, then expects them to follow suit just as it expects its own citizens and private enterprises to contribute to the Energiewende . This ideal of leadership, as read through Germany’s public statements and actions, is recognizable on both the European stage and the global stage. At the European level, Germany casts itself as a proudly trustworthy friend acting in solidarity for the larger collective European cause of which it is a part, willing to take on heavy burdens to encourage action by others. In the BMU’s words, “Germany’s climate policy is embedded in European and international agreements and legal obligations. Germany has always been a reliable partner in international and European climate policy.”[131] Since the early 2000s, it has shown leadership multiple significant times in the EU. First, following the publication of the Stern Report on the Economics of Climate Change in 2006, which argued that the worst effects of climate change could still be prevented with rapid and concerted action,[132] Germany led the EU during its Presidency of the Council of the European Union to its landmark 20-20-20 targets, which committed the EU as a whole to 20% reductions in CO2 emissions, 20% of power from renewable energy, and 20% increased energy efficiency levels by 2020.[133] Shortly after, in 2007, it passed major Energiewende legislation doubling these EU baseline commitments, pledging to cut its own CO2 emissions 40% by 2020.[134] For the most part, the EU has followed suit. As of August 2018, it is on track to meet its 20-20-20 commitment,[135] and several EU countries have now caught up to Germany in terms of emissions cuts and renewables production.[136] To exactly what extent these positive changes would have occurred without Germany taking leadership on the issue through the Energiewende is impossible to say, but its leadership has been immensely publicized and other nations have both followed in its footsteps and learned from its mistakes. Germany’s actions on the global stage in the 21st century have also evinced an imagination of itself as a responsible actor seeking to initiate a reciprocal exchange of actions rather than to gain credit for its own glory. The aforementioned 2007 decision to cut CO2 emissions 40% by 2020, the “Meseberg decision,” also immediately preceded the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference (COP13) in Bali. The government’s statement on the legislation proclaimed, By implementing the key elements adopted in Meseberg, Germany is demonstrating that climate protection can be implemented in all sectors in an economically viable way. With Meseberg we are moving away from the attitude in international climate policy of “you first” towards “this is what I’m doing, what about you?” This is the only way to break the deadlock in international negotiations.[137] The negotiations at COP13 in Bali ultimately achieved somewhat underwhelming results,[138] in part due to strong US objections to a proposal by developing countries. However, Germany’s 21st-century form of climate leadership by example has been durable and persistent despite international mediocrity: seven years after Bali, it put forth a new and more ambitious emissions reductions plan ahead of the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) in Paris, which finally produced a (limited) international breakthrough in the form of the landmark Paris Agreement. Recycling their argument from the domestic context that emissions reductions and renewable power are crucial for economic modernization, ahead of Paris, Germany wrote that “Germany can, and must, play a key role internationally and must demonstrate that taking climate action in an industrialised country does work and, in fact, is crucial for any economy that wants to be competitive in the 21st century.”[139] While climate change is today’s signal international environmental issue, it is not the case that Germany’s sharp international environmental-political desire for responsible, reciprocal action is limited to climate and energy. There is a broader environmental conceptual connectivity, a common language for understanding environmental issues that must be politically approached, at work. For instance, in the context of biodiversity preservation, one of the UN Sustainable Development Goals,[140] a prominent German environmental NGO argued, “only if we in Germany take the lead and preserve...habitats from destruction, will we also be able to expect such conservation ideas to take root in poorer countries.”[141] A likely important factor contributing to this keen perception of international interdependence and leadership on environmental issues in Germany is its position in the center of Europe, caught as the most important nation in a terrestrial geographic web of dense population, commerce, borders, and laws. This position plays a part in both cross-border environmental issues that Germany must aid in solving, and issues of energy dependence: Germany depends on nearby, oil-rich, unfriendly Russia for 40% of its oil imports[142] and a significant quantity of natural gas to boot, a position that increasing its supply of renewables through the Energiewende aims to help it escape. The last feature of leadership and agency as understood in the modern continuous, collectivist German environmental-political imagination that I shall discuss here is its leaders’ respect for the temporal continuity of policy. This is well exemplified in the logical coherence of Energiewende policy since the turn of the millennium. Successive German central governments, for the most part, do not feel empowered or motivated to craft a climate and energy policy that is entirely their own. Instead, they adjust old policies and craft innovative ones atop an established structure that keeps the original fundamental goals intact, bespeaking a respect for prior action and an effective norm that holds it unacceptable to simply throw out the work of previous governments and attempt to start over. This pattern is a temporal corollary to the emphasis on social solidarity and collective action discussed so far that characterizes German environmental leadership. This persistent, collective gradualism is visible in the official discourse of the Energiewende : most laws, policy announcements, and statements by political leaders include provisions for frequent recalibration of the policies designed to cut emissions and increase renewables use.[143] For instance, the government in 2007 assured people at the outset of its doubling of emissions cuts targets that, in the event of ineffectiveness or cost-inefficiency in the design of the policy, its mechanisms would be redesigned.[144] Such assurances are often accompanied by exhortatory language about the value of determination and staying the course. For instance, from the minister of the BMU’s foreword to the 2020 Climate Action Programme: “Germanyʼs Energiewende , or energy transition, is an encouraging example...despite all the challenges its details pose. We intend to continue down this route—with everyone on board, including each individual sector of the economy.”[145] As in the case of its domestic inclusion and international leadership, this ambitious talk has generally in the Energiewende been convincingly backed by action. The sheer volume of legislation passed each year to update and fine-tune the Energiewende , usually in the direction of greater policy ambition, is a testament to a deep-seated incrementalist perseverance. The repeated revisiting of the 2000 Renewable Energy Sources Act is a good example of this. New versions of the act have been passed five times since its original passage, in order to update its pricing mechanisms and the rates of its energy subsidies in light of new evidence and emissions reductions progress, but the core structure has remained in place.[146] This is undoubtedly thanks in part to the way it and other Energiewende policies have intentionally involved and benefited individual citizens, such that reversing it would be fatally unpopular, but updating it remains popularly accepted. This patience of the German environmental-imagination when it comes to leadership and effective action also guarantees that beneficial policy experiments are encouraged, and the government can learn from its mistakes. For instance, after a successful experimental cross-border wind energy auction with Denmark, Germany laid plans to expand its cross-border renewables connectivity within Europe.[147] Such experimentation and improvement within a broader continuity rarely occurs in a modern US environmental-political context defined largely by the desire of each administration to craft its own signature policies on key issues like energy. In the US, more typical than a rhetoric of adjustment, gradual improvement, and persistence are words like “repeal,” “rule unconstitutional,” and “replace.”[148] This pendulum effect on climate and energy policy in the US reflects an environment of partisan hostility, certainly, but also a vision of environmental politics as a zero-sum game played between individuated competing parties. Moreover, the German imagination of temporal continuity and gradual adjustment of laws dovetails with a conceptual continuity of environmental outcomes, which is the opposite of the American case. In contemporary Germany, the climate problem, along with environmental problems generally, tends not to be framed as a binary with either an outcome of glorious victory or devastating failure depending on which of competing policies is selected. Instead, a more realist, incremental perspective prevails: better environmental outcomes can be achieved on a spectrum of possible outcomes by improving the design and implementation of laws. As a BMU dossier explaining Germany’s climate policies put it, “Climate change cannot be reversed...Nevertheless, it is still possible to slow down climate change and limit its impacts on humans and the environment.”[149] Words like “fighting” climate change, rather than “solving” it or “defeating” it, are common.[150] Accordingly, Germany has not just emissions reductions plans, but an official strategy for adaptation to climate change.[151] The US, where action on climate change tends to be framed as either part of a once-and-for-all climate solution or a total failure, has no such plan. There is no place in American environmental-political rhetoric for a reasoned gradualism, even an urgent one: as Obama put it, ours is “the last generation”[152] that can do something about climate change, and that “doing something” is cast usually as “solving” climate change, or failing to do so.[153] Rather than climate change becoming progressively worse the less each generation acts to prevent it, in this imagination the generation of today becomes “the last generation” that can act, the glorious individual agent who either succeeds or fails. The desire in the US political imagination for glorious leadership by a particular individual or group is not limited to competing parties or economic interests, then, but extends over time: America particularizes the present. In Germany, by contrast, persistence, gradualism, and the principle of “fairness between generations”[154] deeply influences the German moral and political compass and produces an approach to policy better suited to the problem of CO2 emissions itself: needful of sustained cuts over time and productive of a problem that can get a bit worse when policy is a bit less effective. To conclude this section: in the German environmental-political imagination, climate change is an issue of collective responsibility on which Germany ought to lead in a persistent, patient, and reciprocal way, both domestically and internationally, with participation from the top to the bottom of society and benefit for all involved. Endnotes [1] Barack Obama, “Remarks Announcing the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan - DCPD-201500546” (Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, August 3, 2015), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-201500546. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-201500546 Obama. [2] Barbara Hendricks, Foreword, in “The German Government’s Climate Action Programme 2020 - Cabinet Decision of 3 December 2014” (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB), December 3, 2014). [3] Jedediah Purdy, After Nature: A Politics for the Anthropocene (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015), 3. [4] See, e.g., Suzanne Moore, “Angela Merkel Shows How the Leader of the Free World Should Act | Suzanne Moore,” The Guardian , May 29, 2017, sec. Opinion, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/29/angela-merkel-leader-free-world-donald-trump . [5] Purdy, After Nature , 6. [7] For a general global analysis, see Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Thomas M. Selden, Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Thomas M. Selden, “Stoking the Fires? CO2 Emissions and Economic Growth,” Journal of Public Economics 57 , no. 1 (May 1995): 85-101. For an early economic analysis linking CO2, growth, and climate, see William D. Nordhaus, William D. Nordhaus, “Economic Growth and Climate: The Carbon Dioxide Problem,” The American Economic Review , no. 1 (1977): 341. For an examination of several industrialized nations, including the US and Germany, that provides empirical evidence against the theoretical notion in environmental economics that beyond a certain level of development, emissions and growth vary inversely, see S.M. de Bruyn et al, Economic Growth and Emissions: Reconsidering the Empirical Basis of Environmental Kuznets Curves , 25 Ecological Econ. 161-175 (1998). For an analysis focused on China, see S.S. Wang et al., “CO2 Emissions, Energy Consumption and Economic Growth in China: A Panel Data Analysis,” Energy Policy 39 (September 1, 2011): 4870–75, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.06.032 . [8] “GDP (Current US$) | Data” (World Bank, 2018), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP. CD?year_high_desc=true. [9] “GDP per Capita, PPP (Current International $) | Data” (World Bank, 2018), https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?end=2015&start=1960&year_high_desc=true. [10] “Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions,” Union of Concerned Scientists, October 11, 2018, https://www . ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-and-impacts/science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html. [11] “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/. [12] United States Environmental Protection Agency, “Our Mission and What We Do,” Overviews and Factsheets, US EPA, January 29, 2013, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do; “About Us,” Umweltbundesamt, September 6, 2013, http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/en/the-uba/about-us. For a lay overview of the EPA’s history and functions, see Robinson Meyer, “How the U.S. Protects the Environment, From Nixon to Trump,” The Atlantic, March 29, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/how-the-epa-andus-environmental-law-works-a-civics-guide-pruitt-trump/521001/. [13] Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 05–1120 (Roberts Court April 2, 2007). [14] “EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS),” Climate Action - European Commission, accessed January 2, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en. [15] Meyer, “How the U.S. Protects the Environment.” [16] “The Clean Power Plan: EPA Interprets the Clean Air Act to Allow Regulation of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Existing Power Plants.,” Harvard Law Review 1152 129, no. 4 (February 2016), https://harvardlawreview. org/2016/02/the-clean-power-plan/. [17] Environmental Protection Agency, “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units | 80 FR 64661” (Federal Register, December 22, 2015), https://www. federalregister.gov/documents/2015/10/23/2015-22842/carbon-pollution-emission-guidelines-for-existingstationary-sources-electric-utility-generating. [18] United States Environmental Protection Agency, “Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2016,” Reports and Assessments, US EPA, January 30, 2018, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventoryus-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks-1990-2016. [19] Barack Obama, “Remarks Announcing the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan.” [20] Robinson Meyer and Matt Ford, “A Major Blow to Obama’s Climate-Change Plan,” The Atlantic, February 9, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/supreme-court-clean-power/462093/. [21] 40 C.F.R. §60. [22] “Clean Power Plan / Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines - Environmental & Energy Law Program,” Harvard Law School, September 27, 2017, https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/clean-power-plan-carbonpollution-emission-guidelines/. [23] United States Environmental Protection Agency, “FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Overview,” Overviews and Factsheets, accessed January 3, 2019, fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-overview.html. [24] Robert Rapier, “Yes, The U.S. Leads All Countries In Reducing Carbon Emissions,” Forbes, accessed January 3, 2019, [25] US EPA, “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines,” ES-6. [26] United States Environmental Protection Agency, “Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” Overviews and Factsheets, US EPA, December 29, 2015, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions. [27] See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi and Henry Fountain, “Bucking Trump, These Cities, States and Companies Commit to Paris Accord,” The New York Times, January 20, 2018, sec. Climate, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/american-cities-climate-standards.html. [28] Hardy Graupner, “What Exactly Is Germany’s ‘Energiewende’?” DW.COM, January 22, 2013, https://www.dw.com/en/what-exactly-is-germanys-energiewende/a-16540762. [29] “Sunny, Windy, Costly and Dirty,” The Economist, January 18, 2014, https://www.economist.com/europe/2014/01/18/sunny-windy-costly-and-dirty. [30] “Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz EEG),” International Energy Agency, 2000, https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/germany/name-21702-en.php. [31] BMWi - Federal Ministry for Economics Affairs and Energy, “Renewable Energy,” 2018, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/renewable-energy.html. [32] See generally Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU), “The Integrated Energy and Climate Programme of the German Government,” 2007. [33] See generally Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply,” September 28, 2010. [34] See generally “The German Government’s Climate Action Programme 2020 - Cabinet Decision of 3 December 2014” BMU, December 3, 2014; BMU, “Climate Action Plan 2050 – Germany’s Long-Term Emission Development Strategy,” 2016, https://www.bmu.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/national-climate-policy/greenhouse-gas-neutral-germany-2050/. [35] Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “The Federal Government’s Energy Concept of 2010 and the Transformation of the Energy System of 2011,” 2011. [36] Jeffrey Ball, “Germany’s High-Priced Energy Revolution,” Fortune, March 14, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/03/14/germany-renewable-clean-energy-solar/. [37] Kerstine Appunn, “The History behind Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out,” Clean Energy Wire, January 2, 2018, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/history-behind-germanys-nuclear-phase-out. [38] See e.g., Sören Amelang, “Germany on Track to Widely Miss 2020 Climate Target – Government,” Clean Energy Wire, June 13, 2018, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/germany-track-widely-miss-2020-climatetarget-government. [39] Eurostat, “Greenhouse Gas Emission Statistics - Emission Inventories,” June 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Greenhouse_gas_emission_statistics_-_emission_inventories. [40] BMWi, “Renewable Energy,” 2018. [50] See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, “Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing the Clean Power Plan: Proposal,” Policies and Guidance, US EPA, October 4, 2017, https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sourcesair-pollution/electric-utility-generating-units-repealing-clean-power-plan-0; Robinson Meyer, “How Obama Could Lose His Big Climate Case,” The Atlantic, September 29, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/09/obama-clean-power-plan-dc-circuit-legal/502115/. [51] OAR US EPA, “Clean Power Plan Final Rule – Regulatory Impact Analysis,” Reports and Assessments, October 23, 2015, /cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-final-rule-regulatory-impact-analysis, 3-23. [52] See, e.g., sections on ExxonMobil, Peabody Energy, and Southern Company in “Who’s Fighting the Clean Power Plan and EPA Action on Climate Change?” Union of Concerned Scientists, https://www.ucsusa.org/globalwarming/fightmisinformation/whos-fighting-clean-power-plan-and-epa-action-climate. [53] OAR US EPA, “FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan By The Numbers,” Overviews and Factsheets, accessed January 3, 2019, fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-numbers.html. [54] See, e.g., Megan Brenan and Lydia Saad, “Global Warming Concern Steady Despite Some Partisan Shifts,” Gallup.com, March 28, 2018, https://news.gallup.com/poll/231530/global-warming-concern-steady-despitepartisan-shifts.aspx. [55] “EPW Republicans Send Letter to EPA in Support of Clean Power Plan Repeal,” U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, January 12, 2018, https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/1/epwrepublicans-send-letter-to-epa-in. [56] Purdy, After Nature, 190. [57] US EPA, supra note 21. [58] Department of Energy, “2017 U.S. Energy and Employment Report,” January 2017, 29. [59] DOE, “U.S. Energy and Employment Report,” 21. [60] For a theoretical overview of environmental justice and its critical discussion of race, see David Schlosberg, “Theorising Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a Discourse,” Environmental Politics 22, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 37–55, https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.755387); For information about the high proportion of black Americans living near a coal-fired power plant, see “Environmental Racism in America: An Overview of the Environmental Justice Movement and the Role of Race in Environmental Policies,” Goldman Environmental Foundation, June 24, 2015, https://www.goldmanprize.org/blog/environmental-racism-inamerica-an-overview-of-the-environmental-justice-movement-and-the-role-of-race-in-environmental-policies/; By contrast, for statistics showing employment in the coal industry to be disproportionately white, see United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employed Persons by Detailed Industry, Sex, Race, and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity,” 2018, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18.htm. [61] Purdy, After Nature, 30. [62] International Energy Agency, “Energy Imports, Net (% of Energy Use) | Data” (The World Bank, 2015), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.IMP.CONS.ZS?locations=US&year_high_desc=false. [63] Nicole Lewis, “Fact Checker: EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt’s Claim That the U.S. Is ‘Leading the World’ in ‘C02 Footprint’ Reductions,” The Washington Post, October 23, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/10/23/epa-administrator-scott-pruitts-claim-the-u-s-is-leading-the-world-in-c02-footprintreductions/?utm_term=.57dfb8ccf34b. [64] Jan Ivar Korsbakken, Robbie Andrew, and Glen Peters, “Guest Post: China’s CO2 Emissions Grew Less than Expected in 2017,” Carbon Brief, March 8, 2018, https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-chinas-co2-emissionsgrew-less-expected-2017. [65] Benjamin Storrow, “Trump’s ‘Affordable Clean Energy’ Plan Won’t Save Coal,” Scientific American, August 21, 2018, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trumps-affordable-clean-energy-plan-wont-save-coal/. [66] Obama, “Remarks Announcing the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan." [67] The European Commission, “EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).” [68] It seems notable here that for the entire period between Obama’s direction of the EPA to craft the CPP in 2013 and his announcement of the final rule in 2015, his approval rating stayed beneath 50%; see Gallup, “Presidential Approval Ratings -- Barack Obama,” Gallup.com, accessed January 4, 2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/116479/Barack-Obama-Presidential-Job-Approval.aspx. [69] The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Memorandum -- Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards,” whitehouse.gov, June 25, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-pollution-standards. [70] See e.g., Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014). [71] Purdy, After Nature, 34. [73] BMU, supra note 15, at 2. [74] Id., at 1. [75] See, e.g., Purdy, After Nature, 24. [76] BMU and BMWi, “Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply,” 4. [77] BMU and BMWi, “Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply,” 5. [78] BMU, “The German Government’s Climate Action Programme 2020 - 2014” 18. [79] “The German Federal Government,” deutschland.de, January 23, 2018, https://www.deutschland.de/en/ topic/politics/the-german-federal-government. [80] “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany - Article 20a [Protection of Natural Foundations of Life and Animals]” (Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection and Federal Office of Justice), accessed January 4, 2019, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0119. [81] “The German Environmental Constitutional Law,” Umweltbundesamt, January 29, 2016, http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/en/the-german-environmental-constitutional-law. [82] Monika Neumann, “The Environmental Law System of the Federal Republic of Germany,” Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 3, no. 1 (1996): 69–110. [83] Jonathan Cannon, Environment in the Balance (Harvard University Press, 2015), http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674736788. [84] Arlan Gerald Wine, “Enforcement Controversy Under the Clean Air Act: State Sovereignty and the Commerce Clause,” Transportation Law Journal 8 (1976): 383–400. [85] See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 05–1120; wherein the Bush-era EPA opposed regulation of CO2 emissions. [86] Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, “History of Environmental Policy in Germany: CDU Perspectives 1958–2015,”n.d.,https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=57153b6c-1ac9-6dd4-4048-b7e8732ba709&groupId=252038. [87] Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, “History of Environmental Policy in Germany,” 2 [88] Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, “History of Environmental Policy in Germany,” 22. [89] For discussion of coal, see BMU, “Climate Action Plan 2050 – Germany’s Long-Term Emission Development Strategy”; for discussion of the abolition of nuclear energy see “German Chancellor Merkel on Energy Nuclear Policy, Jun 9 2011 | Video | C-SPAN.Org” (C-SPAN 3, June 9, 2011), https://www.c-span.org/video/?300059-1/german-chancellor-merkel-energy-nuclear-policy. [90] Paul Hockenos, “The History of the Energiewende,” Clean Energy Wire, June 12, 2015, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/dossiers/history-energiewende. [91] Hockenos, “The History of the Energiewende.” [92] Hockenos, “The History of the Energiewende.” [93] Ball, “Germany’s High-Priced Energy Revolution.” [94] BMU and BMWi, “Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply,” 15. [95] Appunn, “The History behind Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out." [96] “German Chancellor Merkel on Energy Nuclear Policy, Jun 9 2011 | Video | C-SPAN.Org.” [97] “German Chancellor Merkel on Energy Nuclear Policy, Jun 9 2011 | Video | C-SPAN.Org.” [98] See, e.g., Kenneth Bruninx et al., “Impact of the German Nuclear Phase-out on Europe’s Electricity Generation—A Comprehensive Study,” Energy Policy 60 (September 1, 2013): 251–61, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.026; Hardy Graupner, “What Exactly Is Germany’s ‘Energiewende’?,” DW.COM, January 22, 2013, https://www.dw.com/en/what-exactly-is-germanys-energiewende/a-16540762. [99] Poll by Emnid, cited in “4 Jahre Nach Fukushima: Große Mehrheit Für Energiewende - Politik Inland - Bild. De,” Bild, March 14, 2015, https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/atomausstieg/4-jahre-nach-fukushima-grossemehrheit-fuer-energiewende-40148648.bild.html. [100] B.D. Hong and E.R. Slatick, “Emissions Factors for Coal,” Quarterly Coal Report January-April 1994, 1994, 1–8. [101] Kerstine Appunn, “Coal in Germany,” Clean Energy Wire, October 29, 2014, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/coal-germany. [102] Jessica Wentz, “6 Important Points About the ‘Affordable Clean Energy Rule,’” State of the Planet | Earth Institute | Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (blog), August 22, 2018, https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2018/08/22/affordable-clean-energy-rule/. [103] BMU, supra note 34, at 35. [104] Benjamin Wehrmann, “Germany’s Coal Exit Commission,” Clean Energy Wire, May 31, 2018, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-coal-exit-commission. [105] “Nature Protection and Biodiversity - National Responses (Germany),” SOER 2010 Common environmental theme (Deprecated), European Environment Agency, accessed January 5, 2019, https://www.eea.europa.eu/soer/countries/de/nature-protection-and-biodiversity-national. [106] Melissa Eddy, “German Energy Push Runs Into Problems,” The New York Times, December 20, 2017, sec. Business, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/business/energy-environment/german-energy-push-runsinto-problems.html. [107] Ellen Thalman and Julian Wettengel, “The Story of ‘Climate Chancellor’ Angela Merkel,” Clean Energy Wire, November 26, 2015, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/making-climate-chancellor-angelamerkel. [108] Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, “History of Environmental Policy in Germany,” 30. [109] “German Chancellor Merkel on Energy Nuclear Policy, Jun 9 2011 | Video | C-SPAN.Org.” [110] BMU, “The German Government’s Climate Action Programme 2020,” 6. [111] See Meyer, “How Obama Could Lose His Big Climate Case.” [112] BMWi, Monitoring and Steering the Energy Transition (2018), https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/energy-transition.html. [113] BMU, supra note 34, at 12. [114] See, e.g., BMU, “The Integrated Energy and Climate Programme,” 2; 13. [115] BMU, “The Integrated Energy and Climate Programme,” 63. [116] Alexander Franke and Energiewende Team, “How Winning over Rural Constituents Changed the Political Discussions on Renewables in Germany,” Energy Transition (blog), November 18, 2014, https://energytransition.org/2014/11/german-fit-helped-making-energiewende-non-partisan/. [117] Gerhard Stryi-Hipp, “THE EFFECTS OF THE GERMAN RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES ACT (EEG) ON MARKET, TECHNICAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT,” 2004, https://doi.org/10.13140/2.1.1444.6404, 1. [118] BMWi, “Renewable Energy,” 2018. [119] Craig Morris, “Share of German Citizen Renewable Energy Shrinking,” Energy Transition (blog), February 7, 2018, https://energytransition.org/2018/02/share-of-german-citizen-renewable-energy-shrinking/. [120] Franke et al, “How Winning over Rural Constituents Changed the Political Discussions on Renewables.” [121] David Meyer, “95% of Germans Support Green Energy Subsidies Despite Their High Price,” Fortune, August 8, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/08/08/germans-renewable-energy-energiewende-subsidies/. Just as remarkably, 56% of Germans said their average annual electricity bill surcharge of around 240 euros was either reasonable or too low. [122] Former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt, quoted in “Scott Pruitt Signs a Measure to Repeal the Clean Power Plan,” The Economist, October 10, 2017, https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2017/10/10/scottpruitt-signs-a-measure-to-repeal-the-clean-power-plan. [123] BMU supra note 29; see also, e.g., BMU, “The Integrated Energy and Climate Programme,” 14: (“it is therefore...their own interest”). [124] BMU, “The Integrated Energy and Climate Programme,” 65. 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Journal Features Online Features & Interviews Vol. IV | Issue II JPPE Interview Geoff Mulgan Vol. IV | Issue II Foreword Editoral Board Vol. IV | Issue II Vol. IV | Issue I JPPE Interview Danielle Bainbridge Vol. IV | Issue I Vol. III | Issue II Mark Carney The Road to Glasgow is Paved with Data Vol. III | Issue II Douglas Beal The Financial Case for Nations and Corporations to Put People and the Planet First Vol. III | Issue II Vol. II | Issue II JPPE Interview Steven Pinker Vol. II | Issue II JPPE Interview Yanis Varoufakis Vol. II | Issue II JPPE Interview Paul Krugman Vol. II | Issue II Foreword Editorial Board Vol. II | Issue II Vol. II | Issue I Sheldon Whitehouse United States Senator from Rhode Island Vol. II | Issue I Foreword Editorial Board Vol. II | Issue I Vol. I | Issue II Nicola Sturgeon First Minister of Scotland Vol. I | Issue II John R. Allen President of the Brookings Institution Vol. I | Issue II Foreword Editorial Board Vol. I | Issue II Vol. I | Issue I Jorge O. Elorza Mayor of Providence, Rhode Island Vol. I | Issue I Greg Fischer Mayor of Louisville, Kentucky Vol. I | Issue I Foreword Editorial Board Vol. I | Issue I

Journal Features Online Features & Interviews Vol. II | Issue II JPPE Interview Steven Pinker Vol. II | Issue II JPPE Interview Paul Krugman Vol. II | Issue II JPPE Interview Yanis Varoufakis Vol. II | Issue II Foreword Editorial Board Vol. II | Issue II Vol. II | Issue I Sheldon Whitehouse United States Senator from Rhode Island Vol. II | Issue I Foreword Editorial Board Vol. II | Issue I Vol. I | Issue II Nicola Sturgeon First Minister of Scotland Vol. I | Issue II John R. Allen President of the Brookings Institution Vol. I | Issue II Foreword Editorial Board Vol. I | Issue II Vol. I | Issue I Jorge O. Elorza Mayor of Providence, Rhode Island Vol. I | Issue I Greg Fischer Mayor of Louisville, Kentucky Vol. I | Issue I Foreword Editorial Board Vol. I | Issue I

Editorial board Foreword Volume I Issue I Introducing the inaugural issue of JPPE The ambition to start an international, interdisciplinary, academic journal of philosophy, politics, and economics was one that emerged as much as a consequence of a desire to take a new approach to undergraduate scholarship as it was motivated by an affinity for an old idea: ‘philosophy, politics, and economics’ (PPE). PPE is famously a product of the University of Oxford, which, in the 1920s, began to amalgamate the three disciplines into a single degree that could provide a strong, yet broad foundation for future policymakers. And in this regard, the program succeeded. Many major British politicians and public figures—from the Labour Party’s Ed Miliband to Former Prime Minister David Cameron to Christopher Hitchens—studied PPE at Oxford. It is important when considering the emergence of PPE, however, to recall the relative radicalism of the concept at the historical time period in which it emerged. Just as the Russian Revolution came to a close and the First World War left Europe devastated, the United Kingdom began to experience high unemployment. It was in this context of political strife, growing inequality, and seemingly insurmountable threats to global peace and human livelihoods that PPE emerged as a concept that could help spur the thoughtful ethical, political, and economic decisions that might affect positive change. And yet, despite the success of Oxford’s PPE program and the stunning propensity of the program’s top graduates to take seat in British Parliament today, it has not crossed the Atlantic to achieve the same popularity. Much of this is a consequence of a particularly English affinity for generalists; however, whatever the reason, this Journal holds that the failure for PPE to take off in the United States has been a shame. Though PPE has been criticized at times as an academic experience that produces broad knowledge as opposed to deep knowledge, the interdisciplinary program is, at its core, the single most effective tool to analyze modern circumstance as a social scientist. Brown University, to its credit, has seen nascent developments in PPE programming. Every year, students look to pursue Independent Concentrations that mimic Oxford’s program, and the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society, which, like this Journal, is sponsored by the Political Theory Project, highlights this growing trend. We created the Brown University Journal of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics to encourage the growth in PPE-related academic work on Brown’s campus and, most importantly, to provide young people with a space to debate and put forth academic arguments that can kindle the discussions that ultimately transform communities and entire democracies. In achieving in this end, our Journal dedicates itself to five guiding principles. First, we value interdisciplinary understanding. By shifting toward a more broad approach to social sciences, the debates, which are too often compartmentalized, are made more accessible and inclusive. In each issue of JPPE, we aim to highlight the best economic arguments alongside the best philosophical and political arguments. This could for instance illustrate, at once, the ways in which a discussion of the minimum wage can be understood as a question of economic efficiency and as a question of political feasibility, as well as a moral proposition that asks important questions about the permissibility of income inequality. What results from this is not a dearth of deep knowledge, but rather a broad understanding in which the sum is greater than each of its individual parts. The bold idea of this Journal stems from a belief that the lenses of philosophy, politics, and economics are not only useful to considering contemporary circumstance. They are all essential. Second, we value diversity. In order to create a space that effectively reflects the character of contemporary debate among young people, as well as the issues most motivating the next generation of leaders and thinkers, it is essential that diversity of views and backgrounds are highlighted. As a non-partisan publication, we strive to highlight a range of political arguments so long as they are rigorous, thoughtful, and conceived in good faith. And though our Journal selects submissions name-blind, we are committed to promoting an inclusive environment for all our employees, welcoming staff members regardless of ethnic origins, gender, religious beliefs, disability, sexual orientation, or age. This doesn’t just make us a more responsible organization, it makes us a better journal. 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It is the aim of our Journal to highlight these pieces of original analysis, which are too often tucked away into the cupboards of forgotten undergraduate work. Fifth, we value and desire to play an integral part in stimulating global leadership among young people. Though we are an academic publication, we aspire to influence discussions among undergraduates that can help spur re-evaluation, action, and change. In placing an emphasis on global leadership, we recognize that the real value of our Journal comes less through the answers our authors provide than through the discussions they encourage and the audacity of the ideas they propagate. The inaugural issue of our Journal you are now reading perfectly reflects our five guiding principles. In “A More Perfect Union”, for instance, the author encourages readers to more closely analyze the relationship between liberalism and national unity, pondering how a liberal democracy should best understand its relationship to patriotism. And in the “Latent Effects of Cannabis Legalization”, we publish original research on the criminalization of marijuana and its disproportionate effects on black communities. This edition also features pieces from two significant American leaders: Providence Mayor Jorge Elorza and Louisville Mayor Greg Fischer. Both mayors are important figures on the frontlines of local policy that seeks to make economic growth in the 21st century more inclusive and competitive, reducing the barriers to entry and ordinances that too often discourage participation in the American economy and in our democracy. We asked both mayors to highlight their achievements on this front not only as a means to highlight examples of effective local policy implementation, but also in order to more profoundly integrate the literature of future leaders with the work already being done by current leaders. We believe that all of these elements have helped us put forth a powerful combination of essays, and we hope JPPE will be a place where young people can go to consider new ideas and offer innovative solutions to addressing today’s ethical, economic, and political challenges. Our team is united by a shared love of argument, problem solving, and a deeply felt desire to help contribute to conversations that can so greatly impact livelihoods. And in a time where the world is rapidly changing, as forces like technological disruption, globalization, climate change, and political polarization threaten to vastly alter our human experience this century, young leaders will undoubtedly be called upon to develop new ideas to solve the challenges we face. JPPE aims to both facilitate and be a part of this great conversation.

Brooklyn Han, Patrick Leitloff, Sally Yang, Eddy Zou Is a UK Government commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals good for the economy and business in general? Brooklyn Han, Patrick Leitloff, Sally Yang, Eddy Zou One aspect of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) is a sustainable use of natural resources and comprehensive environmental protection, mandating a significant change in economic and industrial practices (1). This discussion paper investigates the impact of a government commitment to the implementation of the UN SDGs relating to natural capital on the economy and business in the United Kingdom. We evaluate existing research and governmental policy declarations. The investigation finds that greater certainty around environmental regulations has a net benefit on business performance and that positive spillovers exist already. Policy gaps in waste and energy regulation exist. We also argue that a more accurate tracking of the progress in the SDGs leads to more commitment and better policymaking. This paper won the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) Renaissance Prize in April 2020 (2). I. Introduction In recent years, rising concerns over the environmental sustainability of human-driven economic practices have called for significant action. Len- ton et al. argue that the world may have already crossed several “tipping points” beyond which environmental degradation becomes irreversible, mandating immediate political and economic response (3). We thus choose to focus on natural capital-based Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in our discussion. Natural capital, defined as “stocks of the elements of nature that have value to society,” is used in combination with human, financial, and social capital to produce valuable goods and services (4). This differs from “natural resources” in the sense that natural capital is natural resources utilised to add value to society and the economy. It directly sustains human life, is not easily replenished, and is non-substitutable in certain cases, highlighting the need for sustainable use (5). We explore this with examples throughout our paper. Our SDGs of focus are: - Goal 12: Efficient use of natural resources and effective waste management - Goal 13: Climate change mitigation and adaptation - Goals 14 and 15: Preservation of water and land ecosystems Henceforth we refer to these goals as NC-SDGs. Figure 1. Natural capital-based Sustainable Development Goals (NC-SDGs) and auxiliary NC-SDGs We consider Goals 6, 7, and 9 as auxiliary NC-SDGs as they have targets relating to water ecosystems, fossil fuels as subsoil natural resources, and “environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes” respectively (6). Figure 1 provides a graphic summary. We refer to “commitment” as the integration of SDG targets and indicators in the design and evaluation of policies, as well as promoting awareness towards achieving SDGs in the indicated timeframe. In the following sections, we outline the UK-specific businesses and economy-wide benefits, then examine positive spillovers from current sustainable development policies. After identifying policy gaps, we reflect on the recent developments in measuring SDGs. II. Improved Business Performance There is strong evidence that environmentally sustainable practices improve business performance. Clark et al’s 2014 review of 200 studies on sustainability and corporate performance found that high environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards lowered costs of sourcing capital and improved financial performance in 90 percent of cases (7). Similarly, Flammer identified a positive causal impact of adopting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) proposals, such as incorporating SDGs in business operations, on accounting performance, labour productivity, and business sales in 2015 (8). Flammer did so by exploiting variation in corporate proposals that are mostly independent of confounding factors, such as the passage of shareholder proposals on CSR that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. Figure 2. The size of incremental SDG-related business opportunities in 2030. Notes : Only the largest opportunities are shown. Source: Business and Sustainable Development Commission, 2017. The implementation of SDGs also opens up new markets for UK businesses. A 2017 report by the Business and Sustainable Development Commission estimates that delivering SDGs in the four “economic systems’”—food and agriculture, energy and materials, cities, and health—can generate over £10 trillion (9) worth of business opportunities per year by 2030 (10). These closely relate to NC-SDGs (summarised in Figure 2) and are highly applicable in the UK. For instance, product-re- formulation strategies, which improve the nutritional content of processed food in the UK and enhance sustainable consumption (SDG 12), require total business investments of approximately £3.7 billion. This is significantly smaller than the estimated gains in Figure 2 (11). Further, this improvement to processed food is projected to improve the health of the population, saving a total of 1.7 million disability-adjusted life years. Healthy workers reduce the burden on the National Health Service by avoiding economic costs associated with falling ill or being hospitalised; they also work and consume more, which are major drivers of GDP. Figure 3. The size of incremental SDG-related business opportunities in 2030, with externalities added. Notes: Evidence at the global level suggests that pricing externalities adds market opportunities substantially. Source: Business and Sustainable Development Commission, 2017. In addition, as shown in Figure 3, adjusting prices to reflect the positive exter- nalities generated by a business focus on SDGs can add up to 40 percent of busi- ness opportunities in the four economic systems identified (12). Figure 4. Low-carbon innovation activity of EU ETS regulated companies compared with the counterfactual scenario. Source: Calel & Dechezleprêtre, 2014 Carbon pricing policies can have a significant effect on business incentives in creating sustainable innovations (13). Figure 4 shows that the introduction of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) has led to an increase in the number of low-car- bon patents from companies. There is potential for the UK government to further commit to SDGs through measures such as maintaining carbon pricing. Such a commitment would result in even greater benefits from encouraging businesses to invest in low-carbon innovations and creating new business areas. As Europe’s centre of sustainable funds management, the UK’s financial industry has long incorporated ESG standards into its investment criteria to support the growth of sustainable finance. One common method of sustainable finance is investment in an eco-friendly fund which applies ESG criteria and focuses its investment options in companies which are less carbon-intensive or earn green revenues. Eco-friendly funds generally design their own metrics of “climate aware- ness” and adjust portfolios towards companies and assets that perform better along those metrics. One example is the Future World Fund managed by Legal & General Investment Management, which only includes companies meeting minimum environmental standards and exposes itself more to companies which, in addition to meeting environmental standards, engage in environmentally friendly activities (14). In 2016, HSBC placed £1.85 billion of its UK employees’ pension savings into the Future World Fund (15). Reasons for HSBC’s decision are reportedly greater expected returns, improved company engagement, and a more widespread perception that addressing climate change should be the “new normal” (16). The notion that eco-friendly funds can generate returns is supported by empirical evidence: Morningstar, a global research agency, compared average return, success and survival rates of 745 sustainable funds with those of 4150 traditional funds. They found that irrespective of the type considered (bond or equities), and the country of origin (UK or abroad), rates of return on sustainable funds either matched or beat their traditional counterparts. Many businesses also publicly urge the government to further commit to strengthening private-public coordination in delivering SDGs (17). While SDGs are beneficial to businesses, without an active governmental commitment to NC-SDGs to address market failure, firms and the economy more broadly may not fully realise these benefits. Market failures, whereby markets fail to achieve socially efficient resource allocations, necessitate government intervention. Many green investments are currently uncompetitive as they involve early-stage innovations yet to be commercialised. Gillingham and Stock use 2018 data from the US Energy Information Administration to compute the costs of abating each ton of CO2 by replacing electricity generated by an existing coal-fired power plant with the cleaner alternative (18). As a comparison, the UK in 2019 proposed a £16 ($19.2) tax per tonne of CO2 emitted by installations. This effectively means abatement costs for switching to most feasible “cleaner alternatives” are much higher than social costs reflected by carbon tax schemes. Furthermore, solar and wind are among the cleanest forms of energy (Figure 5), yet Gillingham and Stock show that solar thermal and offshore wind are the most costly to implement (Table 1) (19). Table 1. New source generation costs when comparing to existing coal generation. Notes : The table shows engineering costs per ton of CO2 abated by replacing electricity gener- ated by a current coal-fired power plant with the new generation source. Source: Gillingham and Stock, 2018 The UK Energy Research Centre’s review of evidence on the timescale of technological innovations showed that across 14 innovations studies, it takes an average of 39 years for an innovation to be commercialised and deployed (22). Furthermore, Gillingham and Stock suggest that much of the “green investments” in renewable energy suffer from path dependence, whereby rates of return go up in the long run only with sufficiently high inputs (23). Furthermore, environmental externalities in current pollutive technologies are not internalised, leading to overproduction. Greener innovations thus tend to be under-funded by private markets, causing deadweight welfare loss for both consumers and producers (24). Consumers continue to suffer the consequences of pollution, while producers forego the opportunity to achieve better business performance in the long run as outlined above (25). Government finance such as the UK Energy Entrepreneurs Fund, which was launched in 2012 and invested £75 million of grant money by 2019, can support the incubation of businesses before they generate revenues. Figure 5. Solar and wind are among the cleanest forms of energy. Source: Ritchie & Roser, 2020. In addition, the government can provide a regulatory base to correct “imperfect information”. Standardisation prevents greenwashing, the act of labelling projects or bonds with detrimental or negligible impact on the environment as “green” to attract investors. Addressing the lack of clear common standards, cited as the largest source of investor uncertainty, can fuel demand for green bonds, which are bonds earmarked primarily for projects improving energy efficiency (SDG 7) (26). This is exemplified by the ASEAN’s adoption of comprehensive Green Bond Standards that categorise projects and specify the exclusion of fossil fuels (27). These actions reduce information asymmetries between firms and investors and may encourage the latter group to more confidently invest in green projects and bonds. The government can also help establish common reporting standards to lower the implementation costs of sustainability practices. HSBC found that 26 percent of the 1000 UK firms surveyed suggested that a confusion with ESG reporting undermined their sustainability practices (28). KPMG also found that one of the biggest barriers to sustainability for firms was the lack of common metrics to assess and compare performances (29). In 2020, the British Standards Institution (BSI) launched the first of its five-year initiative with the UK Government (BEIS) and the UK industry (City of London’s GFI) to develop consensus-based standards in sustainable finance (30). We argue that such country-wide standardisation is only achievable through regulatory changes directed by the government. While firms in the private sector can also attempt to establish uniform standards, their lack of enforcement power gives other businesses considerable discretion over which standards to adopt. This inconsistency not only raises search and adoption costs of standards, but also undermines uniform comparisons of companies’ performances along relevant dimensions. By contrast, government directives provide the incentive to report some common metrics, allowing investors and other stakeholders to better assess such information. Moreover, government-induced standards can go beyond helping companies assess their environmental impacts by tailoring case-specific solutions to incorporate environmental sustainability into existing business practices. This is illustrated by the BSI’s new ISO standards, which aim to allow businesses of all sizes to consider climate change adaptation while designing new policies, strategies, plans, and activities (31). The government can also exercise its authority to endorse consistent information and nudge consumer behaviour. For example, mandating businesses to disclose the environmental impact of their products through labelling highlights the impact of consumption choices and addresses consumers’ behavioural bias (32). Finally, government commitments to SDGs have the potential to improve coordination in the private sector. An example of such improved coordination is industrial symbiosis, where governments promote mutual synergies between firms from different industries. The UK’s National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP), matches participating firms that can use each other’s byproducts with the view that “one company’s waste is another’s raw material.” For example, the waste filter cake produced by an air conditioner manufacturer is used by a fuel manufacturer as an oil absorption agent. In five years, NISP diverted over 47 million tonnes of industrial waste, contributing to improvements in SDG 12, production expansions and costs reductions (33). III. Current Policies and Positive Spillovers In the first year alone, 90 percent of the actions in the 25 Year Environment Plan have been delivered or are being progressed (34). Further, complex interactions and positive spillovers between goals occur. In the NC-SDGs framework, the key areas include air quality, water quality, urban planning, and waste management. Commitments to cleaner air have shown significant progress. The World Bank suggests that 100 percent of the UK population has access to clean fuels and technology for cooking in 2020 (SDG 7.1.2) (35). The ONS also finds that the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption rose exponentially from 0.7 per- cent in 1990 to 10.3 percent in 2017 (SDG 7.2.1) (36). This is expected to enhance climate resilience and encourage the transition to an economy with a lower reliance on high-emission technologies (SDG 13.2.1). Recent policies further support the attainment of NC-SDGs. The Clean Growth Strategy seeks to align economic growth with “clean” development by improving industry efficiency and encouraging the transition to low-carbon transport (37). Climate change policies may shape incentives in technological change, promoting innovation (SDG 9) and sustainable infrastructural development (SDG 11). Secondly, a commitment to cleaner water sources is “good business” because it raises productivity and cuts costs for firms, according to researchers at the Stock- holm International Water Institute (38). Current policies such as the Nitrates Directive and the Water Framework Directive reduce contamination risk to water bodies while enhancing their quality. Such policies ensured that 100 percent of UK households have access to safe drinking water and are connected to wastewater treatment (39). Access to sanitary drinking water is vital for personal health, and healthy workers make valuable contributions to business and the economy. Thirdly, urban planning policies encourage infrastructure innovation. Congestion is a huge cost for the economy in terms of lost time spent waiting in traffic and the continuous emission of pollutants from vehicles. TomTom’s London traffic reports in 2017 to 2019 show that just shy of 150 hours per year are spent by each driver waiting in rush hour traffic jams (40). Further, greenhouse gas emissions from road transport make up 21 percent of the UK’s total greenhouse gas emissions, which motivate the importance of making road planning easier for vehicle owners (41). To maximise the value of public investment, the UK government has established a Transforming Cities Fund worth £2.5 billion to tackle congestion and promote smart traffic management. The government is also considering new vehicle types and innovative ways to simplify journey planning and payments as a part of their Future of Mobility Urban Strategy. The aspects of this strategy are to be tested with a £90 million investment in four “future mobility zones.” These policies complement the goal of achieving cleaner air; as the transport sector is the largest single contributor to greenhouse gas emissions at 34 percent of total emissions, introducing smarter vehicles and tackling traffic congestion can significantly reduce air pollution (42). Furthermore, there is a strong link between the sustainability of cities and communities (SDG 11) and the sustainability of an environmental ecosystem with which the cities and communities interact (43). Finally, waste management policies have also shown promise in maintaining cleaner environmental standards. Since 2000, the UK’s material footprint has shown a downward trend (44). Plastic waste has been a major area of focus for the government, with an aim to reach zero plastic waste by 2042 (45). Better waste management will benefit ecosystems on land and in water and preserve the quality of the resources that are necessary to everyday production and consumption. Further, achieving the sustainable management of natural resources (SDG 12.2) and promoting policies that are in accordance with such management (SDG 12.7) are closely associated with the development of sustainable transport and infrastructure (SDG 9). IV. Shortcomings of Current Policies Despite considerable progress in some areas, there is strong evidence to suggest that gaps still exist, particularly in waste management and energy efficiency. Current trajectories pose a considerable threat to the future availability of natural capital. This necessitates immediate action to be taken against these issues. Hazardous waste generated, such as used oils and chemical waste, rose by over 10 percent between 2010 and 2016 (46). This waste pollutes water bodies and threat- ens aquatic biodiversity. It necessitates greater purification efforts, resulting in major costs of production (47). Energy efficiency is plagued by policy inconsistencies. Relaxations on fracking rules, freezes on fuel duty, uncertainty around the future of carbon pricing, and the end of hybrid vehicle subsidies damage expectations about the government’s commitment to a low-carbon economy (48). Low per capita spending on improving household energy efficiency and uncertainty in the government’s target to up-grade “fuel-poor” homes have caused the improvement in median energy efficiency ratings to level off (Figure 6). The proportion of households in fuel poverty has not changed significantly despite the fuel poverty gap decreasing since 2014 (49). Households are considered fuel poor if their fuel costs are above the national median level and their residual income after fuel costs would fall below the poverty line. A combination of slack minimum energy efficiency regulations, high fixed costs and the fact that returns are typically distributed over the long term means that private incentives, which are based on a series of myopic optimisation, do not bring enough investments to meet current targets (50). Given that energy efficiency is one of the most effective ways to tackle fuel poverty, stagnant improvements in this area stall progress in indicators such as 9.4.1 (CO2 emission per unit of value added) (51). Figure 6. The improvement in median energy efficiency ratings between 2010 and 2015 has lev- elled off in recent years for fuel-poor households and all households Source: Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2018. V. Opportunities for Better Measurement Existing improvements in measurement enable policymakers to track progress on specific SDGs, analyse root causes of challenges in delivering SDGs and de- sign policies that address problems for specific stakeholders, to “Leave No One Behind” (52). The ability to establish quantitative targets for indicators that currently lack clarity will further enhance governmental commitment by reducing the propensity to take discretionary action and exploit the vagueness of said indicator(s). 70 percent of 180 SDG indicators reported using UK data are disaggregated (broken down into subcategories) by at least one variable, such as geographic region (53). This data can be used to compare the socio-economic impact of policies across regions, enabling policymakers to identify and target regional economic disparities. For example, researchers can use UK regional Google patent rank data to quantify regional distributions of economic spillovers from innovation in- vestments (Figure 7). Policymakers can then direct innovation spending to regions with stagnant productivity. Figure 7. A scatter plot of relative regional productivity and relative regional average spillovers for NUTS2 regions of the UK Notes : From this estimation, it is clear that targeting regions with below national average produc- tivity and high innovation spillovers can generate higher benefits. Source: Rydge, Martin & Valero, 2018. For NC-SDGs, we argue that the UK government can leverage the 100 percent coverage of climate action indicators and existing micro-level data to incorporate climate change-induced dynamics when investing in different parts of the UK. Existing literature suggests that foresighted infrastructure investments that con- sider dynamic effects of climate change, including inundation, sea-level rises, and floods, bring significant long-term economic welfare gains (54). An understanding of inter-linkages between SDGs allows policymakers to con- sider the distributional and long-term consequences of their decisions, thereby avoiding policy conflicts between different departments or omitting key areas of policy focus (55). For instance, the UN Statistical Division is collaborating with the ONS and other statistical agencies across developing countries to harmonise the use of indicators in understanding positive linkages between targets, to direct statistical reporting and policies to those with the greatest potential for positive externalities. Figure 8. Proportion of Global Indicators for each SDG that have data reported on the UK National Reporting Platform, as of June 2019. Source: UK Government, 2019b Greater governmental commitment to NC-SDGs is essential to accelerate im- provements in data measurement. As shown in Figure 7, among specific goals we focus on, there is substantial scope for improved data availability in Goals 12, 14, and 15. Many indicators require more details on how they can be met. For instance, none of the transboundary basin areas in the UK currently have an operational agreement on water cooperation (56). In addition to improving local and international water resource management, clarification will also help the UK maintain international ties, the importance of which has only increased since Brexit. VI. Conclusion Sustainable growth cannot be left to the private sector alone; a consistent, well-measured UK government commitment helps deepen the symbiotic relationship between stakeholders. This can help address market failures such as imperfect information and coordination problems in the private sector, where sustainable economic activity has the potential to take place on a large scale. Our assessment of current policies show that a stronger government commitment is consistent with current policy trajectories and that bridging existing policy gaps can deliver large gains. We have demonstrated the ways in which SDGs benefit the UK economy and businesses, such as reducing production costs through the maintenance of water sources, incentivising sustainable innovations through carbon pricing schemes, and strengthening the relationship between environmental ecosystems and the city. Environmental sustainability and economic growth are not always on a collision course. Rather, they should be viewed as complementary aims under the overarching goal of sustainable growth. With the advent of improved data collection methods and measurement of SDG indicators, we can better quantify progress towards a more sustainable future that benefits businesses and the economy. Endnotes 1 We thank Chiara Sotis and Judith Shapiro for their continued support and guidance. We are grateful to the ONS for initiating the prize and agreeing to the publication of the modified version of the paper. We would also like to thank the editors, Alice Jo and Jacob Zeldin, for their comments and suggestions which have significantly improved the paper. 2 www.ons.gov.uk/aboutus/whatwedo/programmesandprojects/economicstatisticstransformation/ theonsrenaissanceprize 3 Lenton, T. M., Rockström, J., Gaffney, O., Rahmstorf, S., Richardson, K., Steffen, W., & Schellnhuber, H. J. (2019). Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against. Nature, 575(7784), 592-595. doi: 10.1038/d41586-019- 03595-0. 4 HM Treasury (2020). The Green Book: Central Government Guidance On Appraisal and Evaluation. 5 Neumayer, E. (1998). Preserving natural capital in a world of uncertainty and scarce financial resources. International Journal Of Sustainable Development & World Ecology , 5(1), 27-42. doi: 10.1080/13504509809469967 6 United Nations General Assembly (2015). Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable development , A/RES/70/1. 7 Clark, G. L., Feiner, A., & Viehs, M. (2015). From the stockholder to the stakeholder: How sustainability can drive financial outperformance. Available at SSRN 2508281 . 8 Flammer, C. (2015). Does corporate social responsibility lead to superior financial performance? A regression discontinuity approach. Management Science, 61 (11), 2549-2568. 9 The original data is in USD. We employ an exchange rate of $1=£1.2. 10 Business and Sustainable Development Commission. (2017). Better Business Better World: The report of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission. 11 Dobbs, R., Sawers, C., Thompson, F., Manyika, J., Woetzel, J., Child, P., ... & Spatharou, A. (2016). Overcoming obesity: An initial economic analysis. McKinsey Global Institute, 2014. 12 Business and Sustainable Development Commission. (2017). Better Business Better World: The report of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission. 13 Calel, R., & Dechezleprêtre, A. (2016). Environmental policy and directed technological change: evidence from the European carbon market. Review of economics and statistics , 98(1), 173-191. Around 300 companies regulated under the EU ETS are included in the sample. “Non EU ETS companies” are a group of 3000 European companies that are not regulated under the EU ETS but operated in the same country and the same economic sector and are comparable in size and innovation capacity to companies regulated under the EU ETS. 14 Legal & General Investment Management (2016). The Future World fund range . 15 Flood, C. (2016, November 8). HSBC’s UK pension scheme to invest £1.85bn in eco-friendly fund. The Financial Times . 16 Bioy, H. & Boyadzhiev, D. (2020). How does European sustainable funds’ performance measure up? Morningstar. 17 UKSSD Network (2018). Measuring up: How the UK is performing on the UN Sustainable Development Goals. 18 Gillingham, K., & Stock, J. H. (2018). The cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Journal of Economic Perspectives , 32(4), 53-72. While they conclude that solar thermal and offshore wind technologies are the most costly to implement, we caution that these measures represent underestimates of true costs of abating CO2, given that they only consider mechanical switching and differ from costs of policy responses needed to encourage switching. 19 Ibid. 20 The original data is in USD. We employ an exchange rate of $1=£1.2. 21 While the technical note was later withdrawn due to further developments in Brexit negotiations, there have since been new calls and consultation processes for implementation of a Carbon Emissions Tax. 22 Hanna, R., Gross, R., Speirs, J., Heptonstall, P., & Gambhir, A. (2015). Innovation timelines from invention to maturity. UK Energy Research Centre . 23 Gillingham, K., & Stock, J. H. (2018). The cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Journal of Economic Perspectives , 32(4), 53-72. 24 Owen, R., Lyon, F., & Brennan, G. (2018). Filling the green finance gap: Government interventions supporting early-stage low carbon ventures. Academy of Management Proceedings , 2018(1), 16419. 25 One example would be Clark et al. (2015). 26 Climate Bonds Initiative (2019). Green Bond European Investor Survey. International Finance Corporation (2020). Green Bond Impact Report. 27 ASEAN (2017). ASEAN Green Bond Standards . 28 HSBC (2018). HSBC Navigator 2018 . 29 KPMG (2017). KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2017 . 30 British Standards Institution (2020a). B SI launches first sustainable finance guide setting standards for financial institutions to align to global sustainability challenges. 31 British Standards Institution (2020b). New international standard helps organizations adapt to climate change. 32 Ölander, F., & Thøgersen, J. (2014). Informing versus nudging in environmental policy. Journal of Consumer Policy , 37(3), 341-356. doi: 10.1007/s10603-014-9256-2. 33 International Synergies (2013). National Industrial Symbiosis Programme . 34 UK Government (2019a). First review of 25 Year Environment Plan published . 35 World Bank (2020). Access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking, percentage of population . 36 Office for National Statistics (2020). Energy use: renewable and waste sources . 37 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2017). Clean Growth Strategy . 38 Sanctuary, M., Haller, L., & Tropp, H. (2005). Making water a part of economic development: the economic benefits of improved water management and services . SIWI. 39 WHO/UNICEF (2020). People using safely managed drinking water services (% of population) . OECD (2020). Wastewater treatment (% population connected). 40 TomTom (2020). London traffic report . 41 Office for National Statistics (2019b). Road transport and air emissions . 42 Department for Transport (2019). 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We the Prisoners Considering the Anti Drug Act of 1986, the War on Drugs and Mass Incarceration in the United States Sophia Scaglioni Boston University April 2021 Introduction America was founded upon the notions of equality of opportunity, success through perseverance, and the idea that anyone, if they are hard-working and driven, can ascend socially and economically. Currently, however, the United States finds itself diametrically opposed to these ideas. The prison system in the United States contradicts rights guaranteed in the Constitution along with the promise of social mobility and the American Dream. “Mass incarceration” is a phrase frequently thrown about the political arena. These two words, however, represent 2.3 million American citizens who are in jail or prison today. To contextualize the gravity of this statistic, consider this: while the US has about 5% of the world’s population, it has about 25% of the world’s prison population. The majority of the victims of mass incarceration are Black and Latino men, who, despite having been promised equal protection under the law and a right to life and liberty, find themselves trapped in a system marked by racial disparity. One out of every three black boys and one out of every six Latino boys born today will go to prison at some point in their life while white boys born today have a 1/17 chance to go to prison in their lives. Despite being subjected, on average, to lower living standards in terms of housing and schooling, minority men are held to higher standards in the criminal justice system. While African Americans and whites report using drugs at similar rates, there are six times more Black men serving time for drug possession charges. The United States, a country founded on the notion of opportunity, get to these gruesomely imbalanced statistics through a series of public policy decisions. The minorities who make up these statistics have been disproportionately targeted by one of the Reagan administration’s keystone programs: the War on Drugs. While the policy battle against drugs was certainly started during the Nixon years and Nixon’s policies certainly influenced the oppression of minorities, the most detrimental and consequential laws of the War on Drugs were enacted during the years of the next administration. The Reagan White House, which controlled the executive branch during the 1980s, pushed policies that attacked drug possession and use with stringent criminal punishment. The administration was able to do this by stimulating public support for the War on Drugs; this mobilized Congress to act. The public angst the White House strived to create was based on largely ungrounded facts meant to instill fear in the general public. Impacts of policies implemented through this formula of fear mongering are felt today in the form of racial disparities in the American Criminal Justice System and the institution of mass incarceration. The Anti-Drug Act of 1986 imposed mandatory minimum sentences on the possession and distribution of certain drugs, allocated $2 billion to the crusade against drugs, involved the military in narcotic control, allowed for the death penalty for certain-drug related crimes and bolstered the authority of law enforcement. This policy was only strengthened in the coming years, and parts of this legislation remain in place today. Going to prison in America as a minority male, even when the crime is minor, constitutes a figurative life sentence due to the punitive nature of the Criminal Justice system, which taints a permanent record, complicates employment, ruptures family units and removes voting clout for prisoners. One of the most detrimental legacies of the War on Drugs, however, is the ostracization of former prisoners by American society. The institution of mass-incarceration is the outcome of policies like The Anti-Drug Act of 1986; this paper will analyze how this policy was born, implemented and how its hateful roots permeate the American society today. The legacy of The War on Drugs today is seen in the racial-biases in every step of the American criminal justice system: from investigation to sentencing to serving time. The shameful condition of American Criminal Justice doesn’t need to exist. Hundreds of thousands of people do not need to be imprisoned for minor charges, namely drug possession. In fact, this essay will argue, the American conscience cannot be clear so long as the institution of mass incarceration and its suffocating consequences are allowed to continue. The pillars and promises of our democracy must be restored and the way to do this is found in Portugal. Portugal’s drug legislation took a completely opposite perspective than the United States’ did when faced with a similar drug crisis; this essay will try to answer why that is the case. On July 1st, 2001 the country chose to “decriminalize the use and possession of all illicit drugs” and has since successfully reduced “problematic use, drug-related harms, and criminal justice overcrowding.” The values promulgated by this public policy emphasize recovery, safety and above all else, human dignity. By passing similar legislation, America would ameliorate the shameful condition of our discriminatory prison system and thus hold true to the roots and morals it was founded upon and has now seemingly forgotten. The United States’ current social, economic, and political climate makes the passing of such legislation unlikely. The institutional and cultural factors which influenced the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 (and their contribution to mass incarceration in the United States), compared to the same institutional or cultural factor when applied to Portugal, makes American unwillingness to rectify its broken criminal justice system evident. Ultimately, this reflects a very deep inconsistency between the notions American was founded upon and the values its government actually promulgates. The vantage points through which this essay will consider the opposite policy reactions of the United States and Portugal to drug use and possession are (1) Party Systems, (2) Welfare States, and (3) the role of religion in politics in America and Portugal. This essay will compare America and Portugal within the scope of three lenses: party systems, welfare systems and religious foundations. The vantage points will reveal Portugal’s proportional representation system is more responsive than the American two-party system; its universal health-care system has stronger infrastructure with which to implement a widespread drug policy; the common Catholic faith brings communities together and unifies public opinion. These factors combine clearly when considering the policy decision Portugal implemented in June 2001. A morally-unified public saw a clear issue in the rise of heroin use and asked their coalition-style government for a solution. Legislators turned to and trusted technical expertise to find a creative solution: decriminalization of drug possession and use. The country’s National Health Service was readily prepared and built on pre-existing welfare infrastructure, to implement the policy’s prevention and recovery programs. Once implemented, the public supported it fully. Now, drugs have ceased to be a controversial issue in Portugal and any mention of returning to a War on Drugs style approach is shot down. Party Systems Literature Review Two common forms of party system structures are a proportional representation system and a two-party system. The names are rather self-explanatory: a proportional representation system awards political parties seats in a country’s representative body in proportion to how many votes they receive, while a two-party system has two dominant groups in a representative body. Historically, proportional representation systems are superior to the two-party system when it comes to creating credible commitments because, since more than two ideologies are represented in the legislature, creating a majority coalition requires compromise. The negotiation and communication this requires fosters trust and understanding that bypasses the pettiness often seen in two-party systems. A multiparty system suggests that the negotiation and deal-making involved in the country’s policy decisions are collaborative, balanced, and focused on long-term gains. Conversely, in a winner-take-all two-party system, a lack of openness and communication is expected, and policy is likely to be directed towards short-term gains. The United States’ government fits the mold of a winner-take-all two-party system; the polarizing, negotiation-adverse effects of the system are felt in the Anti-Drug Act of 1986. To understand the negotiation-adverse climate which the 100th Congress faced, circumstances of the political climate must be considered. Firstly, the House and Senate were divided: the House was controlled by Democrats and the Senate by Republicans. Divided government is a common feature of two-party systems which can obstruct meaningful cooperation. According to scholars, when two conflicting ideologies must cooperate it is much harder to reach win-win outcomes than if the negotiators held similar views. The state of the American Congress in 1986 was characterized by divided and increasingly competitive split party control. This made the starting point for negotiation on drug-policy already compromised. Further research on negotiation tells us that the entirety of the policy-making process is hampered by the two-party system, not just its starting point. Studies modeling two-party negotiations found that time pressures and power-projections are crucial in negotiation outcomes—especially when parties are already ideologically opposed. More time and a lack of feeling the need to establish dominance leads to more effective discussions due to a lessened sense of pressure. These factors impacted the internal negotiation climate of the American Congress in 1986. There was an intense pressure from both the executive branch and the public on the already-divided Congress for pivotal drug legislation. These two pressures largely worked hand in hand. Recall the formula of fear mongering used by the Reagan administration mentioned earlier, best exemplified by the executive decision to hire staff specifically to publicize the use of crack cocaine in inner-cities. This spurred intense media coverage, creating pressure from an anxious public for Congressional action. This combines with the final, most crucial circumstance impacting the 100th Congress and the Anti-Drug Act of 1986: 1986 was a midterm election year. Therefore, when the divided, two-party Congress sat down in September to discuss drug policy, they were influenced by both time-pressure from November midterms and power-pressure from the desire to project efficacy and strength to voters right before elections. A lack of meaningful discussion aimed at a long-term solution ensued. Both Republicans in the Senate and Democrats in the House tried to create the most severe laws to acquiesce public nervousness, prioritizing power-projections over a constructive drug policy. Both Republicans and Democrats were blinded by hopes of re-election and failed to act in a long-term-oriented, collaborative manner. This directly stems from a divided two-party system, which creates a hostile and negotiation-adverse starting point only worsened in 1986 by time and power pressures. Welfare State Literature Review The design of a country’s social protection system is a fundamental factor to consider when assessing a drug policy such as the Anti-Drug Act of 1986. A country’s welfare state has a variety of characteristics to be considered. For example: whether a country implements universal coverage healthcare or chooses to implement a means-tested coverage system or whether healthcare is funded through public taxes, payroll contributions or private funding. The Anti-Drug Act of 1986 is nearly 200 pages long and has 21 sections devoted to anti-drug policy measures. Of these sections, several appropriate resources to criminal law enforcement and outline explicit punishments for the use and possession of drugs. The words “penalty” and “enforcement” are included in almost every section title. What words are missing, however, are terms such as “health”, “prevention” and “recovery”. If dangerous drugs were really sweeping the nation in ways so horrendous the Reagan administration claimed merited a crusade as aggressive as the War on Drugs, then where is the mention of recovery and prevention techniques? There is no mention of implementing healthcare programs to assist those suffering from drug abuse in the list of the 21 sections devoted to anti-drug policy measures. None of these sections emphasize the importance of recovery treatment. To find mentions of such programs, one must delve deep into the document, past authorization for the death penalty for certain drug offenses or the use of illegally obtained evidence in drug trials. Only in the most obscured corners of this legislation is minimal policy for prevention found. It calls for a board to come together thrice annually to assess how drug abuse prevention measures are doing at a national and state level, as well as for an increase in drug education programs in public schools. Although the amount of spending allocated for this is unclear, while the $2 billion allocated to increasing policing is concrete. Prevention and recovery are not emphasized in the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 and this may be partly due to the American welfare state which is characterized by high private social spending supported by government tax subsidies for the upper and upper-middle classes. Also, there are hardly any large public social programs that benefit all United States citizens nationally. Instead, America uses means-tested social assistance programs for poor people and social insurance programs (Social Security) for the middle-class, while the richest members of society rely on private healthcare programs. This divided structure existed when the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 was implemented, the same time as America was suffering from an alleged crack-cocaine crisis. Whether or not this is actually true has been heavily disputed: research suggests the crack-epidemic that conservative figureheads preached about was nonexistent, that drug use in urban neighborhoods was actually declining. Regardless of how real the crack-crisis actually was, the intention of the American government was clearly not to aid its alleged victims in recovery, but rather target urban populations. There was little to no mention of a national health strategy to combat the alleged issue. Perhaps (and very concerning morally) this is because those promoting the policy knew the crack-cocaine crisis was fabricated. However, it is possible that the reason the focus was not on treatment but increased criminal sentencing was due to the divided and privatized healthcare system which provided no clear roadmap or infrastructure for a national drug strategy to combat the (supposed) drug epidemic. Role of Religion Literature Review While surprisingly little research has been done on how religion factored into the War on Drugs, it can be said with confidence that religion acts as a polarizing force in American politics when certain religious groups align themselves with political ideologies. That holds true when considering American drug policy during the 1980s: President Reagan was supported fervently by conservative religious groups of evangelical Christians trying to return America to “traditional values”. This alliance between conservative Christians and the Republican party became known as the Moral Majority, a political group which mobilized Christian voters who felt as though they had been overlooked by their government during the years of the 1960s and 1970s; the War on Drugs was popular among these voters and they became one of Ronald Reagan’s most dependable coalitions. The years that the Moral Majority claimed the government ignored their voices overlap, of course, were the years of the Civil Rights Movement. Many members of the Christian Right overlap with another constituency of Reagan’s: whites who resented civil rights progress such as affirmative action. Research found that racial attitudes were a key determinant of white support to “get tough on crime” and the people most likely to support criminal-punitiveness were rural, conservative whites. The people that constitute this demographic also comprise those most dedicated to the Moral Majority: evangelical Christians. It was none other than this religious coalition which, feeling threatened and overlooked by years of Civil Rights progress, saw the War on Drugs as an opportunity to halt racial reform without seeming explicitly racist. There was notable support from the Christian Right for the Anti-Drug Act of 1986. Party Systems Case Study The United States’ Party System is a winner-take-all two-party system. In stark contrast, Portugal’s government is a multiparty, proportional representation system. Recall that multiparty systems suggest collaborative, balanced, and long-term-oriented negotiation, while a winner-take-all two-party system is likely to lack openness, communication and long-term foresight. These expectations are completely met when comparing the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 and the 2001 Portuguese decriminalization policy. While the United States met its (alleged) drug crisis with a criminal offensive campaign, Portugal reacted to its similar drug crisis with a strategy that vowed to reintegrate drug-users into society; a strategy based on recovery, not revenge. Analyzing party systems shows why the countries moved in such different directions. The heroin crisis that struck Portugal from 1980-2000 saw the highest rate of HIV infection in the entire European Union plaguing the relatively small country. During the two decades prior to the decriminalization policy, the Portuguese government responded to the epidemic by implementing harsh policies administered by the criminal justice system. Conservative politicians who boisterously condemned drug use supported this approach despite its failure to produce results. The heroin crisis was escalating quickly and the coalition government (The Council of Ministers, Portugal’s Parliament) saw the need for innovative policy—and the need to act fast. Proportional-representation governments are known to use deliberative negotiation tactics (like relying on third-party expertise) to form creative credible commitments. In keeping with this standard, Portugal relied heavily on technical expertise in creating their decriminalization policy. A panel of experts (called The Commission for a National Drug Strategy) was assembled to analyze the efficacy of the American-inspired, criminally punitive approach Portugal was using to combat its heroin crisis. The panel stated the War-on Drugs-style approach was “squandering resources” and advised for a revolutionary new tactic. They suggested converting drug use and possession to an administrative offense, rather than a criminal one. The goal was to regard drug users as full members of society rather than outcasts and criminals. The Council of Ministers accepted almost the entirety of the expert report in October 2000 and has since seen a reduced burden on its criminal justice system, increased uptake of drug treatment, fewer deaths and diseases related to opioids and a reduction in retail prices of drugs. While the United States suffered a crack-cocaine crisis (or so the Reagan administration wanted Americans to believe) in the 1980s which directly paralleled Portugal's heroin crisis, there was little to no use of strategies like reliance on technical expertise to find a solution in Congress. Rather, the hyper-competitive, negotiation-adverse two-party system of the United States Congress went straight for power-projecting, shortsighted policies like the Anti-Drug Act of 1986, which drastically increased drug arrests, thus ostracizing thousands of Americans into the punitive criminal justice system. The harsh system created by the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 manifests itself today in the mass-incarceration of ethnic minorities. The permanence of this system is the divisive nature of our two-party system which did not end with the Reagan years. Up until very recently, no actor in the American federal sentencing system, including Congress, the President or the Attorney General, tried to propose innovative legislation to create a real shift in how the United States’ criminal justice system responds to drug use and possession. In fact, even the most significant policy developments have continued to rely upon the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 for federal sentencing structure. The lack of forward-thinking, creative policy in American drug strategy is caused by the divided two-party system which is just as unwilling to unite in the name of long-term collective gains today as it was in the 1980s. When Portugal noticed it had a heroin epidemic, its coalition-style government sought effective action to better its citizen’s health. Simultaneously, Ronald Reagan sought harsh retribution against drug users by targeting black men as criminal offenders over the possession of minor quantities of drugs. Policies from the War on Drugs, like the Anti-Drug Act of 1986, have deprived thousands of people of voting rights and has forced them to live in what some scholars have called an “under-caste” of society”. The United States’ two-party system facilitates the implementation and permanence of policies targeting ethnic minorities for the possession and use of drugs. Welfare State Case Study If the welfare state of a country matters in how drug policy is implemented, a difference is expected between the drug policy of a country with free, universal healthcare and the drug policy of a country with a system like that of the United States (few national programs for all citizens and a division along class lines of where one’s social safety net comes from). Portugal exemplifies the former of these two options: the country’s National Health Service provides free, universal coverage, protecting all citizens regardless of private wealth. For this reason, when the expert panel assessing the drug crisis proposed making drug use a health, rather than a criminal, concern, the Portuguese Council of Ministers was willing to listen. The 2001 decriminalization policy stresses a humane approach to drug abuse by providing resources in the areas of prevention, harm-reduction and treatment programs. The American healthcare system is marked by division between private and public healthcare sources and a lack of universal coverage programs. This resulted in no groundwork for a hypothetical national health strategy when American legislators were considering drug reform in the 1980s (though scholars question if their motivations were genuine enough to consider reform based on healthcare, rather than criminal punitiveness). This juxtaposes Portugal, where the National Health Service had been well-equipped for years to provide universal, free, public-sponsored health coverage and was able to adapt efficiently to the prevention and treatment programs set forth in the 2001 decriminalization policy. João Goulão, the architect of Portugal’s policy, reflected on the conclusions of the expert panel that was obtained to help the government find a long-term, creative solution to the drug issue. “It made much more sense for us to treat drug addicts as patients who needed help, not as criminals,” he said. This leads directly to the chief priority of Portuguese drug strategy: not to allow the marginalization of those using and possessing drugs. In complete antithesis, the marginalization of those using and possessing drugs was, some scholars have argued, the priority of the architects of American drug strategy. This may be partially due to the different welfare states in each country: the American welfare state lacks national unity and thus, promotes individualism while the Portuguese welfare state is quite literally defined by national cohesiveness and inclusivity. Role of Religion Case Study Religion matters when considering policies a country implements because a country with unified religious opinions will see a more broad public consensus over issues while a country where religion acts as a polarizing force will not. The latter of these two options represents the United States, where the Moral Majority supported the War on Drugs despite its racially divisive policies. In what is perhaps the most prominent contrast of this entire paper, Portugal has a public which is incredibly unified religiously. Although Portugal has no official national religion, almost 90% of its population identifies as Roman-Catholic. In keeping with regional trends (with culturally and geographically similar countries like Spain and Italy), regular mass attendance, is on the decline; while devout Catholicism may be fading, the deep-seeded roots of the religion are ingrained both in everyday life and in politics. One of the most important impacts which Catholicism has had on Portuguese society is rendering it rather socially conservative. As the heroin crisis of the 1980s and 1990s escalated, it cut across all classes, impacting those in the highest and lowest echelons of Portuguese society alike. This meant that drug use became unusually visible: from shady street corners to the most fancy of discotheques. This did not bode well with the socially conservative Catholic society and the unified public religion put pressure on public officials to act. Conversely, public religious sentiment in America during the years of the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 were the opposite of unified. Groups of the same religion, such as the Moral Majority and black churches across America, both Christian organizations, failed to see eye-to-eye on drug issues. One group supported the War on Drugs and the other denounced it. The Christian Right’s support for the War on Drugs and the subsequent legacy of mass incarceration it established, shows a fundamental divide between the policy Black Christians desire and what White Evangelicals push for. The lack of unified sentiment from Christians in the United States, both in the 1980s and now, starkly contrasts Portugal where unified religion lead to widespread public support for ethical principles which directly motivated politicians to act. For the thousands of Black and Latino men who face the dark realities of mass-incarceration in the United States, religious-based political arguments and movements have made little headway on aiding their struggles and religion seems to drive parties and their constituencies farther and farther apart on key issues rather than unite and mobilize them. In Portugal, religion unites; in America, it polarizes. Conclusion Fundamental American writings like the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution promise the right to life, liberty and equal protection under the law. It is grim to realize these rights and protections have been unjustly removed for millions of incarcerated citizens. Minorities in America, specifically African American men, have been historically discriminated against, and the United States’ prison system is a continuation of this marginalization, as mass-incarceration locks a large percentage of African Americans out of mainstream economy and society. The shameful condition of the United States’ prison system is a legacy of the War on Drugs and policies like the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 which called for mandatory minimum sentences on the possession of certain drugs and allocated $2 billion to the crusade against drugs. It is still the backbone of federal sentencing guidelines today. Policies like this are why the incarceration rate has skyrocketed since the 1980s despite violent crime rates falling. The persistence of racial-targeting and racial-biases in the American criminal justice system today, including the fact that legislation such as the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 is still referenced, is opposed to the fundamental values upon which America was founded. The right to equal protection under the law, and the right to life and liberty are all desecrated by the institution of mass-incarceration. How did policy like the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 become implemented? It was due to the Reagan White House’s formula of fear mongering: creating public angst over a crack-cocaine crisis (which scholars dispute even existed pre-War on Drugs) to push a punitive criminal agenda. But, if not criminal harshness, what other ways might an industrialized and modern country respond to an increasing drug problem, supposed or real, and protect the rights and liberties of its citizens while doing so? Portugal responded to growing concern over drug use by rejecting a War-on-Drugs-style approach and instead decriminalized drug possession and use. This essay compared America and Portugal within the scope of three lenses: party systems, welfare systems and religious foundations. The vantage points revealed Portugal’s proportional representation system is more responsive than the American two-party system; its universal health-care system has stronger infrastructure with which to implement a widespread drug policy; the common Catholic faith brings communities together and unifies public opinion. These factors combine clearly when considering the policy decision Portugal implemented in June 2001. A morally-unified public saw a clear issue in the rise of heroin use and asked their coalition-style government for a solution. Legislators turned to and trusted technical expertise to find a creative solution: decriminalization of drug possession and use. The country’s National Health Service was readily prepared and built on pre-existing welfare infrastructure, to implement the policy’s prevention and recovery programs. Once implemented, the public supported it fully. Now, drugs have ceased to be a controversial issue in Portugal and any mention of returning to a War on Drugs style approach is shot down. These differences between America and Portugal, revealed by the case studies, are marked by increased responsiveness and morality on the part of the Europeans. This difference is further amplified when considering the country’s similarities: both advanced and well-educated, both industrialized and marked by diversity. If Portugal is able to implement policies which respond to the needs of their citizens, both in terms of health-concerns and political demands, while ensuring human rights are emphasized, why can’t the United States? The observed phenomena emphasizes the United States’ unwillingness to address the flaws of its criminal justice system due to its polarized party-system, divisive welfare-state and religious-infighting. Where the Portuguese Parliament is willing to compromise, the United States Congress chooses to bash negotiation. Where Portuguese healthcare is universal and free, the American welfare state is divisive and lacks coordination. Where Portuguese society is unified socially, American society is only further polarized. All of these lenses show one underlying theme: Portugal values and promotes human dignity while the United States promotes marginalization of its minorities and the polarization of its citizens. It is not America, but rather Portugal which emphasizes the inalienable right to life and liberty and equal protection under the law. While this realization may seem pessimistic, it should be taken constructively. These are, ultimately, American ideals which are being instilled abroad. Before mass incarceration and racial-biases in our prison system can truly end America must do a few things. Some may say these are radical and impossible but rather, they are the only actions in keeping with the country’s founding values. It must strive to increase responsiveness in its party system which currently only provides two diametrically opposed and negotiation-adverse viewpoints. It must attempt to unify a national healthcare strategy to benefit all citizens, regardless of race or wealth. It must remove the use of religion as a political shield during times of policy discussion and use it as a tool for unity instead. Only then, once the American party, healthcare and religious systems are rectified in order to align with this country’s intended values, can the horrors of mass-incarceration be amended. Works Cited Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. New Press, 2010. Bajekal, Naina. “Want to Win the War on Drugs? Portugal Might Have the Answer.” TIME, 1 Aug. 2018. Balakrishnan, P. V. (Sundar), and Jehoshua Eliashberg. “An Analytical Process Model of Two-Party Negotiations.” Management Science, vol. 41, no. 2, Feb. 1995, pp. 226–243. Berman, Douglas A. “Reflecting on the Latest Drug War Fronts.” Federal Sentencing Reporter, vol. 26, no. 4, Apr. 2014, pp. 213–216. “Criminal Justice Fact Sheet.” NAACP, 2019, www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/. Hughes, Caitlin Elizabeth, et al. “What Can We Learn From The Portuguese Decriminalization of Illicit Drugs?”, The British Journal of Criminology, Volume 50, Issue 6, November 2010, Pages 999–1022. “Mass Incarceration.” American Civil Liberties Union, 2019, www.aclu.org/issues/smart-justice/mass-incarceration. Peffley, Mark, et al. “Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political Views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 41, no. 1, 1997, p. 30. Roberts, Dorothy E. “The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities.” Stanford Law Review, vol. 56, no. 5, 2004 Stanford Law Review Symposium: Punishment and Its Purposes, 1 Apr. 2004, pp. 1271–1305. Robinson, Carin. “From Every Tribe and Nation? Blacks and the Christian Right.” Social Science Quarterly, vol. 87, no. 3, 2006, pp. 591–601. JSTOR. Smith, Catherine Delano, and Jose Shercliff. “Portugal: Government and Society.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 2019. United States. Cong. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 99th Cong. Public Law 99-570. Washington: GPO, 1986. Van Het Loo, M., Van Beusekom, I., & Kahan, J. P. (2002). Decriminalization of Drug Use in Portugal: The Development of a Policy. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 582(1), 49–63. Williams, Daniel K. “Reagan’s Religious Right: The Unlikely Alliance between Southern Evangelicals and a California Conservative.” Ronald Reagan and the 1980s, 2008, pp. 135–149.

How Are You the Same Person as When You Were Ten: Favoring the Brain Criterion View over Animalist and Neo-Lockean Views Henry Moon I. Introduction I am the same person as when I was ten years old—this is common intuition [1]. In another sense, as I have a different body and psychology, it seems that I cannot be the exact same person as I was when I was ten years old [2]. In this paper I ask how exactly we were the same people when we were ten. This question is equivalent to asking what the persistence conditions for “an entity of our kind” to remain the same over time: call these diachronic persistence conditions [3]. In asking this question, we ask two separate questions (1) What should “entities of our kind” refer to? (2) What are the persistence conditions for these entities? First, I review the literature regarding the two most popular theories of personal ontology, or the study of what we are. In doing so, I will then introduce the brain criterion based on egoistic concern—the special concern about one’s future that arises from anticipation of continued existence. Providing justification in ontological coherence and ethical plausibility, I submit that the brain criterion is the superior ontology. In the second half of this paper, I will be responding to objections to the brain criterion, specifically regarding persistence by considering commonplace thought experiments. As a synthesis from these objections, indeterminacy thesis and multiple occupancy will be defended as part of the paper’s overall argument. II. What Should "Entities of Our Kind" Refer To? To determine the persistence conditions for some entity, one must start by specifying exactly what that entity is. I say this because whether entities can survive events is subsequent to what the entity is. For example, a square cannot survive being stretched in one axis whereas a rectangle can, because a square is defined must have four sides of equal length. This is to say, the persistence conditions of a square are informed by its ontology. In the same way, the persistence conditions for a person depend on personal ontology. Despite this, much of the contemporary literature on personal identity seems to treat personal ontology as a secondary question. Instead, the focus has been placed upon a gamut of thought experiments [4]. To this, in "What Are We”, Eric Olson blames “the unserious air of many discussions of personal identity” on this lack of focus on personal ontology [5]. There are two dominant answers to the persistence question: neo-Lockeanism and Animalism [6]. Neo-Lockeanism is the view that we are creatures with certain psychological traits essentially [7] Animalism says we are human animals essentially; we are identical with our human bodies. Each view is associated with at least one ontology. Neo-Lockean theory most popularly claims that we are constituted by our animal bodies or that we are temporal parts of our animal body. Most neo-Lockeans would not say we survive a permanently vegetative state, despite our animal bodies being able to survive, and to a neo-Lockean, this is an example of how we differ from our animal bodies. Animalists simply state that we are our human bodies; if our bodies were to enter a permanently vegetative state, we would enter that state as well. Neo-Lockean views lack the “metaphysical leg up” that ontologically focused views like animalism have [8]. Contrastingly, animalism often ignores normative concerns [9]. Despite this trade off between normativity and ontology, when we refer to others, we do not do so as moral agents and organisms separately, but as one unified forensic unit: otherwise this would be absurd [10]. Parfit also touches on similar ideas when he sets out two requirements that a theory of personal identity must satisfy [11] : (1) Whether a future person will be me must depend only on our intrinsic properties. It cannot depend on what happens to other people. (2) Since personal identity is of great importance, whether a future person is me cannot depend on a trivial fact. Parfit also seems to segregate requirements on the basis of (1) a strict ontological concern and (2), an ethical concern. What idea we have converged upon seems to be this: an account of personal identity (and thus, ontology) must be, as Olson puts it, both “ontologically coherent as well as ethically plausible” [12] In the following sections I will forward an account of personal ontology which describes entities of our sort as a human animal under two constraints: (1) That the entity has certain traits that warrant continuous egoistic concern (2) That the entity is the spatial part of a human animal in which (1) necessarily and sufficiently obtains (i.e part of the brain) Evaluating the contemporary two main theories of personal identity, along with our own as delineated above, I will recommend this account of personal ontology to have best fulfilled the need to be ethically plausible and ontologically coherent. A. Ethical Plausibility I propose that to say an account of personal ontology is ethically plausible is to say that it reasonably includes all entities that our normative and ethical concerns refer to when we use the everyday pronouns of ‘I’, ‘you’ or ‘we’, and reasonably excludes all entities that do not. Further, if it is said that you and I are ‘entities of our sort’, we can expect that normative claims which apply to you would also apply to me. We start with cases where the brain-criterion provides for a necessary liberalization of inclusivity. First, in contrast to animalism, brain views allow for entities of our kind to survive after brain transplantation. The common intuition that follows is that after the brain is transplanted into another person’s head, the entity follows with it [13]. Animalists must maintain that because the human organism is left behind and dies during the process of transplantation, we must die along with it. This is a strikingly unintuitive statement to endorse. On the other hand, because physical continuity of the brain is maintained and is presumably enough to warrant egotist function once transplanted, the brain criterion successfully represents the intuition that we would survive after transplantation. Second, in contrast to neo-Lockean continuity, we are able to account for individuals who lack meaningful psychological-connectedness, yet we must still include them as one of us. Jeff McMahan illustrates that in cases of Alzheimer’s, neo-Lockeans seem to imply that the individual ceases to exist and becomes a sort of “post-person.” [14] This is because insofar as a case of Alzheimer’s progresses so that almost no function of memory remains, neo-Lockean theories suggest that this is a case where the psychological connection is broken, and individuals cannot survive [15]. When considering the ethical plausibility of this, we suspect that instead, we would still consider the Alzheimer’s patient an entity of our sort, and that our normative claims and duties would still apply to them. Concretely, if the Alzheimer’s patient was my mother, just because she lacks psychological connection does not mean she is not “one of us”. In contrast to the brain criterion based on egoistic concern, as long as there is brain continuity supporting the function of egoistic concern, we may say the entity is one of us. For example an Alziemer’s patient still has egoistic concerns because she considers actions not as disconnected events that will only impact an entity similar but identical to herself (and that she exists only for a brief moment before her psychological connection deteriorates) but that her actions will influence her future. Note the difference here is that egoistic concerns need not be a degree of psychological unity in which even a semblance of qualitative identity is sufficiently obtained [16]. We see this when we consider two statements, that normatively we take as non-mutually exclusive: My mother has not been the same person recently and does not remember me. That woman who does not remember me is my mother. The first statement expresses our intuition that people can change drastically, even to the point where psychological unity according to a neo-Lockean would be lost. The second statement, however, speaks to our intuition that numerical identity can survive far more liberally, when considering strict psychological relation, than a neo-Lockean claims. Indeed, the exclusionary policy of the brain criterion is the most ethically plausible. There are also cases where the brain criterion restricts cases necessarily. The main difference between neo-Lockean views and general brain-views is that the brain-criteria explicitly requires a physical contingency. This is to say, a sufficient part of the brain which is necessarily part of a living being must remain continuously. From this, we can locate cases that should be excluded, such as that where an entity can survive a total loss of body. Neo-Lockeanism generally endorse teletransportation as an event in which we can survive. Despite whatever prima facie intuitions we may have, consider you were being transported, but a replica of an entity at some point B was created while you were still alive. Thus, you are not the entity at point B, and for there to be one entity, you must have been destroyed at point A [17]. Moreover, Animalist views consider a fetus and an individual in a permanently vegetative state to also fall under our general normative conventions, as they are simply stages in the human animal’s development. Extreme views notwithstanding, common ethical norms tell us otherwise: we have intuitions that it is permissible to kill an early stage fetus, for example, where we do not for toddlers [18]. This is a difference that Animalists do not account for. This difference is crucial in ontology: we say it is permissible to kill a week-old fetus because at that point it more closely resembles an unconscious collection of cells than the entity we normatively refer to we say “you” or “I”. The ethical norms about “entities of our sort” that Animalism implies do not match our commonly held ones; thus, we cannot say an Animalist conception of persons is ethically plausible. Considering both comparisons to neo-Lockean and Animalists views, it is only by using the definition of brains with egoistic concern that we can arrive at a superior ontology. B. Ontological Coherence To say that a theory is ontologically preferable to any other is to say that it answers key issues concerning personal ontology at as little cost in way of unfortunate implications that one must accept. In evaluating the seven main personal ontologies, Olson generally considers one issue as most important: the thinking animal problem. The thinking animal problem is the following argument: (P1) Presently sitting in your chair is a human animal. (P2) The human animal sitting in your chair is thinking. (P3) You are the thinking being sitting in your chair. (C) Therefore, the human animal sitting in your chair is you. The crux of the thinking animal argument is that insofar as rejection of P1-P3 requires us to accrue the cost of, as Olson puts it, an “impenetrable” [19] ontology, we must conclude that we are human-animals. By proving that we can escape this conclusion, we can prove the brain criterion is preferable to neo-Lockean theories which fall victim to the argument. I will now defend the second constraint using a generalization of the thinking animal problem: (P1) There is a spatial part of a human currently located where you are. (P2) The spatial part currently located where you are is thinking. (P3) You are the thinking being located in your chair. (C) Therefore, the spatial part of a human where you are is you. Note that this argument is analogous to the thinking-animal-argument so that we may adopt its conclusion. The difference is that the conclusion is such that we must be spatial-parts of the brain, some that we can be essentially reduced to a part of the brain. Note that any spatial part of an animal with greater inclusivity than what is necessary for a thinking part to think will fall trap to this argument, given the animal with greater inclusivity contained a non-essential part was incorrectly considered essential. This is to say that the argument implies “you” are identical to infinite smaller spatial-parts unless “you” refers to the smallest possible spatial-part of an animal which thinks. This smallest possible part is the only part that is not affected by the argument since, any less inclusive and the animal loses the property of thinking, so P2 falls, making the argument inapplicable. Dualist theories notwithstanding, this smallest spatial-part of a thinking animal must refer to some part of the brain, and so we have proven our second constraint on animalism. To conclude, this makes animalism and the brain criterion at least equal in ontological coherence, which combined with a brain criterion advantage in ethical plausibility allows us to recommend over the other theories. III. What Should “Entities of Our Kind” Refer To? Given we have answered first question of this paper, there are two main objections specifically to how the brian criteria persist : 1. That the brain-criterion is unnecessary and insufficient 2. That the brain-criterion is necessary but insufficient In this section, I will deal with both of these objections, and in doing so maintain that Brain Criterion is both sufficient and necessary. A. Unnecessary and Insufficient Parfit’s “combined spectrum” shows that any account based on “empirical fact” will have cases of indeterminate identity [20][21]. This is because any empirical criteria, such as psychological or physical continuity operate on a spectrum of absolute similarity to no similarity. If that is true, then there are cases on that spectrum where it seems that the connectedness between two entities is indeterminate to whether they are the same entity. Consider our brain criterion: existence is guaranteed in the case of 100% paradigmatic brain-function, and guaranteed false in the case of no function. However, there are cases in-between whereby it is indeterminate that consciousness is present: it is hard to see an argument for consciousness given 2% function, but what of 12% or 24%? There are two possible conclusions we can make of this: That indeterminacy cannot exist, and so some “further-fact” must be considered [22]. Or, we must allow for cases where indeterminacy arises. If we accept the consideration of a “further fact” in indeterminate cases, this implies the same further fact could determine the answer to the persistence question in any other case. What rejecting cases of indeterminacy entails is accepting a “further fact” ontology, such as immaterialism. I will comment that even if we cannot assuage the issue of indeterminacy, it may be preferable than to contend with the burden of proving dualism and other theories associated with immaterialism. In our paper’s defense of the brain criterion, indeterminacy would not mitigate claims that it should be recommended over animalism or neo-Lockean views –– both rely on empirical criteria. Yet as a foundational argument, I will contribute a defense of indeterminacy. Note that indeterminacy in things other than the existence of people is uncontroversial and common, for example, given a tallness spectrum where 7ft is guaranteed to be tall and 4ft guaranteed not to, there must be indeterminate cases of tallness in between. However, indeterminacy seems to be unreasonable when it comes to issues of persistence. Bernard Williams provides a thought experiment where one has to imagine that entity X, which is indeterminately identical to me, will be tortured tomorrow if indeterminacy is true. Does it follow that the feeling of great pain will be indeterminately felt by me? Noonan points out that this merely illustrates the “very great unnaturalness of this way of thinking” that is present in these cases, not that the cases themselves are unnatural [23]. Note then because it must be accepted that indeterminacy exists in other contexts, we must simply prove that indeterminacy in persistence is also acceptable. Many metaphysical arguments have been offered to this end; I will propose a practical one: to assume that issues of persistence must have determinate answers where other reducible substances do not is to assume there is something irreducible about selves. This begs the question on whether there selves are reducible in the first place, and thus we have no reason to reject indeterminacy in persistence. B. Necessary but Insufficient A hemispherectomy is a procedure where one half of the cerebrum is removed. Despite having half their brain removed, patients that undergo hemispherectomy expect to survive the operation. Our intuitions indicate they have good reason to make this assumption: we treat postoperative entities as the same people, and indeed, as their brain hemisphere adapts to serving the role of two, often cognitive function is returned as well [24]. In other words, if I receive a hemispherectomy, theoretically there seems to be enough brain continuity so that the resulting person is me. However, the reality is that whether you survive is indeterminate. If the brain criterion is necessary and sufficient in the light of indeterminacy, we must prove that for all conclusions that could be made, but are unobservable, there is still ethical plausibility and ontological coherence. If I end up in surgery or even if it is indeterminate that surgery kills me, the discussion ends here. Things are more complicated if you survive. Given that we can accept the transplantation of the cerebrum while maintaining continuity, it can be said that transplanting half of a brain also continues the entity. However, in a case there are two candidates, both sharing physical continuity of a human animal in which egoistic concern is retained, it seems that the brain criterion is insufficient to prove persistence which entity persisted. There are three interpretations to this case [25]. (a) I do not survive. (b) I survives as either candidate-A or candidate-B (c) I survive as both First consider (a), commonly referred to as the “non-branching view” [25]. Notice that I would survive if one half was destroyed, but in the case of both being preserved, I die. This seems immediately strange: How is double success considered a failure? Given the symmetry of the problem, (b) is incoherent as well, considering facts about both candidates are equal. We must then turn to (c), the only case in which brain continuity is sufficient. To avoid implicating that candidates A and B are the same, I forward that candidates A and candidates B are distinct entities that were once spatially coincident within the original, or multiple occupancy[26]. Given that either (a) or (b) are both untenable, the implication is that if one wants to reject “further fact” accounts, multiple occupancy must be endorsed [27]. Two things must be proven for us to adopt this: It does not affect the ethical plausibility of the theory It does not affect the ontological coherence of the theory If these two requirements are met, we will have a theory that sans fission preserves our original account and considering fission, will have the most realistic account in approaching it. C. Ethical Plausibility Let us first consider ethical plausibility. Firstly, given that pre-fission agents are unified, there is no change from our original theory. Moreover, the fact that an entity undergoes fission later down the road would not retrospectively change the normative considerations we give to the pre-fission entity. Does our criterion provide the most ethically plausible account of entities post-fission? Consider your spouse undergoing the fission operation. We may measure the ethical plausibility by considering how each post-fission theory affects your duties to your spouse. If (a) is true and whether your spouse lives if there is no second transplant but dies if fission takes place, if there is a gap in time between when half your spouse’s cerebrum is removed, and when it is transplanted into a host body, do you have marital duties toward your spouse during that gap where the second transplantation did not occur, but that these duties disappear the second the operation is successful? That our duty to people should be as arbitrary as the existence of another person seems strange. Strange conclusions are also reached when (b) is considered – why would you have the martial duty to love and be faithful to one of your spouse candidates and no qualms abandoning the other? If we maintain that it is immoral to abandon our duties on arbitrary facts, so (b) is also not a viable conclusion. (c) is the only scenario which is compatible with our conventional moral ideas. Yet it is also true that our commitments to our spouse are not exactly the same: they are, in a way, inflated. I must now commit to caring and providing for two bodies instead of one, being affectionate and loving to two bodies instead of one. However, while our duties to our spouse now split between two people is a commitment that is inflated, it is inflated based upon ideas we already accept as a posteriori moral—compare this to duties suddenly appearing and disappearing based on arbitrary facts. Consider a situation where your spouse is experiencing a mental health crisis. As a result of going through this situation, it is your duty to be more sensitive around them, spend more time and energy tending to their care etc—in other words, your commitment has been inflated. However, we accept this as a natural part of our duty because we hold a duty to a loved one in a difficult situation, despite having our commitments inflated. In the same way, our duties to a spouse do not change on account of this strange situation happening to them; duty is not situational. This is the principle that only multiple occupancy can reach, given all other seniors change duty based on the arbitrary details. Thus, being that it would be most accurate to say you have a duty to both, multiple occupancy is the most ethically plausible interpretation. What may be suspect is the impact on personal ontology. Multiple occupancy does not affect the arguments for ontological coherence we have laid out before if committing to its thesis does not require committing to additional burdens. We may prove this by considering each ontological assumption that our original theory could operate under and prove how multiple occupancy is compatible with the original metaphysical assumptions. Thus, if each assumption that is compatible with our original theory is also compatible with multiple occupancy, we can say that the original theory’s ontological coherence was not affected. There were two metaphysical assumptions we could make in which our account of personal ontology retained: that four dimensionalism was true, and that four dimensionalism was false. Under the assumption of four dimensionalism, the two separate entities after the fission operation are just temporal parts of the original entity that simply stand spatially distinct. This stands unproblematic among thinkers who accept four dimensionalism [29]. However, we require an account with the original metaphysical assumptions free of four-dimensionalism. Note that multiple occupancy seems absurd because common sense counting would suggest that 1 person becomes 2 people. We may resolve this by suggesting that it is possible to count 2 people before the fission operation as well. Before the operation, a singular entity is counted because counting was done by “spatio-temporal coincidence” rather than counting by identity [30]. This itself is also acceptable: if we can say that we can be identical to some entity that is not spatio-temporal coincident with us, as we do in everyday language when we say “my past self" or my “future self,” we are saying that identity and spatio-temporal coincidence represent two different things. Thus, given multiple occupancy can be integrated within either framework without necessitating a revision of our fundamental metaphysical assumptions, we can say it has not impacted the ontological coherence of the original theory. When we consider that both the ethical plausibility and ontological coherence has been preserved, while multiple occupancy is highly counter-intuitive, it must be accepted. IV. Conclusion In answering how we are the same person as when we were ten, I have considered two important questions in personal identity: what “we” are, which is a question of personal ontology, and how "we" persist. I have evaluated the merits of the brain criterion based on egoistic concern against both Animalism and Neo-Lockeanism, arguing that it is this paper’s variant of the brain criterion which best encompasses both ethical and ontological considerations when answering what “we” are. Then, I have argued that the persistence criteria which follow from the proposition that we are brains is necessary and sufficient, on the basis that one rejects a further fact ontology. What follows is the question of multiple occupancy, which seems quite counter intuitive when considering prima facie. However, multiple occupancy as I have proven, remains the only solution to deal with the cases of fission satisfyingly. Footnotes [1] Francisco Muñoz et al., “Spatio-Temporal Brain Dynamics of Self-Identity: An EEG Source Analysis of the Current and Past Self,” Brain Structure and Function 227, no. 6 (2022): 2167–79, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-022-02515-9 . [2] There is quite a lot of unintended semantic conflation in discussions of personal identity. Even the label by which we refer to it almost assumes person essentialism. When I use the term “person”, I refer to the colloquial usage, not the neo-Lockean kind, unless explicitly stated. Moreover, in usages where “person” may be easily conflated, I have substituted the more neutral “self” or “selves”. This is why I refer to the persistence questions with the set of rather than . Most clearly neutral is the term “entities of our sort”, which I have tried to use most often, but selves serves the same purpose with less of a word count cost. [3] Harold W. Noonan, Personal Identity (London: Routledge, 2019), 85-86 [4] David Shoemaker and Kevin Tobia, “Personal Identity,” The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology, 2022, 542–63, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871712.013.28, 9. [5] Eric Todd Olson, What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), v. [6] David Shoemaker and Kevin Tobia, “Personal Identity” [7] Eric T. Olson, “Personal Identity,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal [8] David Shoemaker and Kevin Tobia, “Personal Identity,” [9] Ibid [10] Marya Schechtman, Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 49-56 [11] Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 267. [12] Gendler, Tamar Szabo and Olson, Eric T, The Human Animal. (Philosophical Review, 1999) [13] Nichols, Shaun, and Michael Bruno. “Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Empirical Study.” Philosophical Psychology 23, no. 3 (2010): 293–312. doi:10.1080/09515089.2010.490939. [14] Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 47 [15] Lukas J Meier. “Memories without Survival: Personal Identity and the Ascending Reticular Activating System” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, no.5 (2023): 478–491. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad028 [16] Two things are qualitatively identical if they share all their properties, and numerically identical if they are not two, but one. [17] McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, 57 [18] Steinbock, Bonnie. “Abortion.” The Hastings Center, February 22, 2024. https://www.thehastingscenter.org/briefingbook/abortion/ . [19] Olson, What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology, 214. [20] Noonan, Personal Identity, 18 [21] Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 236 [22] Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 210 [23] Noonan, Personal Identity, 191 [24] Noonan, Personal Identity, 5 [25] Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 248 - 253 [26] Noonan, Personal Identity, 18 [28] Noonan, Personal Identity, 140 [29] Olson, “Personal Identity” [30] Noonan, Personal Identity, 139

Will Matheson Federal 5G Innovation Policy in the Context of Technological Competition between the United States and China Will Matheson Introduction Proponents of 5G pitch the technology as a societal panacea, leading to a ‘fourth Industrial Revolution’ complete with robotic surgeons and near-boundless economic growth (1). Such predictions are premature—the nascence of this technology makes impossible predictions of its economic, political, and societal implications (2). Nevertheless, just as each progression from 1G to 4G brought a greater impact than its predecessor, the transition to 5G holds substantial implications as the largest network overhaul in history, effectually causing tremendous innovation across facets of society. As such, beyond questions of bandwidth, spectrum allocation, and mobile capacity, questions of politics, cybersecurity, and national prestige have shaped the adoption of 5G. In particular, China and its “national champion” telecommunications company, Huawei, have become central to the political questions surrounding 5G. In 2020, Attorney General William Barr delivered a speech accusing China of having unfairly gained an advantage in 5G development through the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) market-distorting support of Huawei, seeming to imply the US is being cheated in this race and needs to begin playing by China’s rules (3). Similarly, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently warned business leaders in Silicon Valley to be aware of intense technological competition with China, suggesting the CCP and Chinese companies have engaged in widespread cheating to steal from US companies and gain a technological advantage over the US (4). This rhetoric draws attention to a more interesting trend: a shift in US government technology policy, particularly in the 5G space, and particularly driven by the Trump administration. As China gains global attention for its technological innovation in 5G, the US has reacted with increased intervention and control in the sector. Traditionally, US economic orthodoxy is associated with a free-market system, in which innovation derives from competition among private firms. Proponents of American capitalism, representing the economic doctrine of both major political parties, embrace this innovation model as a great strength of the system. As the US has shifted towards a more interventionist approach in spaces like 5G in reaction to China’s successes, supporters of this economic approach such as The Economist have, predictably, reacted with surprise and disapproval (5). Of course, this free-market depiction oversimplifies the US economy—the government has played significant and varying roles in technological innovation throughout history—but the shift in strategy matters. It also contradicts historical responses to similar cases of national competition. In the 1980s, fears of Japanese technological innovation outpacing that of the US’s were rampant, leading credible voices to call for direct government involvement in capital allocation analogous to Japan’s system (6). However, such a shift from a free market economy to the interventionist Japanese-style “industrial policy” did not happen. The US never picked specific companies or industries to drive economic growth, did not develop a vast bureaucracy to direct technology adoption and dispersion, and did not adopt widespread protectionist measures. Today, the US government’s shift in technology strategy is not yet on the scale of true industrial policy. However, comments from key Trump administration officials asserting a need to pick “the ‘horse’ we are going to ride in this [5G] race” and the administration’s embrace of tariffs suggest that the reaction to China’s innovation surge differs from the re- action to Japan’s 40 years ago, begging the question, why might the US shift now, but not then? This paper begins to investigate the factors motivating the shift in the US federal government’s 5G innovation strategy. To understand why the government’s reaction to China’s technological rise differs from its reaction to Japan’s, the paper investigates the influence the US-China relationship has on federal 5G strategy, with emphasis on the relative influence of concerns of national security and concerns of economic growth and development. The US’s relationship with China differs greatly from that of the US with Japan in the 1980s; increasingly, policy- makers view the relationship through the lens of great power competition. This essay considers how the differing security relationship with the People’s Republic of China may motivate this shift and investigates the specific ways it may manifest. Economically, the Trump administration’s policies represent a shift in economic orthodoxy in the US as industrial policy has become more mainstream. This strategy results from a reaction to global trade, particularly with China. While these motivations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, this paper’s test of the perceived strength of each motivation illustrates the relative influence of perceived security and economic challenges from China on the US’s domestic innovation strategy. It concludes that while both factors likely play a role in motivating US 5G innovation strategy, the security aspect of the relationship holds a stronger sway over the federal approach to innovation than does the economic aspect. Literature Review The scope of academic research specifically focusing on the US government’s recent shift toward greater intervention in 5G innovation is limited, likely due to the recency of this trend, its ongoing evolution, and the specificity of this change. However, numerous schools of thought have provided useful frameworks for understanding this evolution, and in some cases, academics have applied these frameworks to questions of US technology policy oriented toward China. The following sections delineate these bodies of literature as they apply to this evolution in US tech policy. The “New Cold War” and the Role of Historical Analogy Today, popular discourse increasingly frames the US-China relationship as devolving into a “new Cold War” (7). One key parallel emerging from this discourse is the systematic differences between American democracy and Chinese autocracy (8). At the same time, many challenge these claims, illustrating the multiplicity of views of China in popular discourse and the ongoing use of history as a mechanism to understand the Sino-American relationship (9). Certainly, the Trump administration has seemed to adopt a more confrontational stance toward China that belies a belief in great power competition, perhaps best embodied by its depiction of China as “revisionist” in the 2017 National Security Strategy (10). This discourse holds key implications for US policy. Given its empirical nature and the difficulties of understanding the present and future, history often serves as a heuristic for national leaders. Analogizing the Sino-American relationship to the Cold War will shape how leaders view the relationship and the policies they enact (11). However, a smaller body of literature instead finds that analogies serve more as post hoc justifications for policies (12). Of course, the framing of China as a wholly “revisionist” power that serves as an ideological and geopolitical foe oversimplifies the Sino-American relationship and China’s own behavior on the international stage at the expense of empirical accuracy (13). Nevertheless, the belief in such a “new Cold War” likely influences US policy toward China. Interestingly, some research suggests less conceptually complex leaders—defined as the level of sensitivity to information and its nuances within, measured by relative usage of high and low complexity words—use less sophisticated, more simplistic, and universalizing historical analogies in foreign policy decision-making (14). Political psychology naturally involves significant issues with validity, and this study’s sample size is limited. However, its implication suggests that Trump (a less complex leader by its measure of complexity) is particularly inclined to universalizing analogies such as framing the US-China relationship as a second Cold War. Such analogizing implies that the perception of great power competition with China may be motivating the shift in US technology policy. Indeed, the connection between memory of the Cold War to technological competition with China is beginning to emerge in popular discussion (15). At a baseline level, research detailing government technology strategy during the Cold War provides a rough idea of the lessons leaders analogizing the present may draw. The Cold War national security apparatus routinely dictated innovation strategy and goals across sectors in a departure from market-driven innovation, instead being motivated by a greater focus on pre-eminence in key areas such as radar, jet propulsion, and telecommunications. In particular, the government drove innovation primarily via federal projects (rather than the creation of state- owned enterprises) organized in the constellation of a few critical government lab- oratories, a slightly larger group of independent labs and sources of expertise, and a large array of businesses fulfilling contracts. The sheer scope and size of government funding for these projects was exorbitant and focused on specific technological achievements rather than foundational research (16). The most powerful techno- logical Cold War analogy is the Space Race. This episode condenses the notions of technological competition between great powers and is still reflected today by Americans’ general fascination with space and support for “space leadership” (17). Securitization Another way the US security relationship with China may influence support for 5G technology development is the securitization of various facets of the relation- ship as a result of a rising perception of great power competition. Securitization theory refers to a politicization process in which leaders of states assert policy areas as issues of national security, redefining the way actors treat the issue (18). An array of scholars argue the aforementioned “new Cold War” framing creates depictions of China as a threat that leads to the securitization of the US-China relationship (19). Importantly, securitization is a phenomenon that describes how countries, leaders, media, and other political actors understand things as threats. The securitization of something—such as aspects of the US-China relationship—does not imply that said object does not genuinely constitute a security threat. Rather, the theory is useful for understanding discursive constructions of threats, but the determination of whether that construction is justified is a separate question. Recently, scholars of securitization theory have applied it to the realms of technology and cybersecurity. Hansen and Nissenbaum propose a three-pronged framework for the securitization of cyberspace useful for evaluating possible security constructions of 5G. First, securitization in cyberspace includes depictions of entire infrastructures at risk of devastating, irreversible attack. Second, emphasis on everyday security practice in cyberspace creates powerful links between people’s everyday experience with their personal electronic devices and the threat of devastating attack. Third, emphasis on the technical complexity of the security threats (“technification”) powerfully motivates the securitization of a cyber issue and lends credibility to those securitizing it (20). Given how recently the Huawei issue has risen to public prominence, only a small body of literature specifically argues US discourse securitizes Huawei (and ZTE, another key Chinese telecommunications company) (21). Of course, a wider body of scholarship investigates the ways cybersecurity and critical infrastructure are constructed or securitized, implying the potential securitization of specific Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE (22). The securitization of technology has unique implications, such as substantial restrictions to trade (e.g. export controls, tariffs, localization requirements, restrictions on foreign direct investment). This immediate effect in turn leads to greater securitization of technology (creating a feedback loop), as well as tensions between nation-states (23). Industrial Policy Industrial policy connotes a specific economic intervention by the government. The economic strategy requires government intervention into the economy to tar- get the allocation of capital, alter production models, and provide protection for sectors deemed key drivers of economic growth and job production (that, absent said intervention, would perform significantly less well) (24). Japan’s rapid economic development in the mid- to late 20th century best exemplifies this strategy of a developmental state: a system closely coordinating government and business by limiting the entry of competitors, creating recessionary cartels, coordinating technology uptake and knowledge sharing in key industries, forcing and guiding mergers and industry exits, and providing subsidies through regulating pricing, government purchasing schemes, tax breaks, the use of tariffs, and low-interest rate loans (25). The process results in the “picking of winners and losers” where- by the government plays a key role in determining which companies become the conglomerate drivers of certain industries or sectors. While consensus generally assumed this process was almost entirely bureaucracy-driven (26), recent scholarship has suggested that elected leaders still played a key role in shaping Japanese industrial policy (27). China’s strategic plan, “Made in China 2025,” also reflects the core tenets of industrial policy. The strategy articulates China’s current industrial policy, serving as a ten-year guide to pivot the economy away from low-quality, labor-intensive goods to high-quality, technology-intensive goods and services. The plan provides the framework by which the Chinese government will coordinate massive subsidies, preferential market access, and technology uptake from other nations in or- der to promote specific companies in key industries as national champions (28). “Made in China 2025” identifies key industries including information technology, and Huawei is one of China’s most successful national champions. The multinational technology company Huawei provides a useful case study in Chinese industrial policy: the company benefits from large state subsidies, lucrative contracts with the military, and favorable tax breaks. As a result of its ability to consistently undercut all competitors on pricing, it has experienced massive global market growth (29). Much like how some American thinkers and leaders called for industrial policy in reaction to Japan’s industrial policy successes in the 1980s, today some call for the strategy in reaction to China’s policy (30). This sentiment may be grounded in states modeling their policy behavior off of the actions of one another, particularly in defense policy (31). Donald Trump, and key advisors in his administration such as Peter Navarro, have strong records of supporting industrial policy and have made attempts at enacting such an economic strategy both broadly and in relation to China over the previous three years (32). However, while the administration may have attempted to use strategies like a trade war as a protectionist reaction to China’s industrial policy, China’s recent behavior and industrial planning have continued to emphasize the industrial policy mentality of “Made in China 2025,” suggesting the influence of the administration’s policies on China’s behavior has been limited thus far (33). Nevertheless, this track record demonstrates that in the US, support for industrial policy empirically derives from interactivity with other nations’ economies and that it is reasonable to suggest that the orthodoxy of industrial policy may motivate the Trump administration’s economic strategies. Indeed, research is beginning to investigate how industrial policy motivated by economic competition with China specifically influences technology innovation strategies (34). Methodology Operationalization of the Dependent Variable Understanding the evolution of government policy toward greater intervention and control in technological innovation presents distinct challenges. Because this dependent variable is a recent trend that is continuing to develop, factors that indicate it are subtle. As a result, a composite of indicators best illustrates this change within the past few years. In particular, this shift has three components: protection of domestic technology firms from perceived risks, investment in technological innovation, and intervention specifically designed to support US-based semiconductor manufacturer Qualcomm as it competes with Huawei. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) provides evidence of the protection of domestic technology firms from perceived risk. CFI- US is an interagency governmental body that was created in the 1970s to evaluate potential national security implications of various forms of foreign direct investment. Its powers have generally expanded over time, now focussing on the broader implications of specific investments and on the implications of aggregate investments from certain countries and investors in specific industries. Given this role, its record of enforcement illustrates the protection of domestic firms from foreign—and in particular, Chinese—firms. CFIUS’s scope has expanded significantly over the past 15 years as it increasingly scrutinized Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 2007, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act officially codified CFIUS (which had previously enjoyed the mandate of only an executive order) in a clear push by Congress to give it more sway in screening FDI. In 2015, Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS expanded the presidential powers to use the committee to prevent FDI on claims of national security. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 further expanded CFIUS’s purview, instruct- ing it to both consider the risks of cumulative investments in particular sectors and the broader economic implications of any single investment in national security terms. It also instructs the committee to take into account the country from which FDI originates, signaling its increasing focus on China. In the same year, CFI- US intervened in the hostile takeover of Qualcomm by then Singaporean-based Broadcom, marking the first instance of the committee intervening before a deal was finalized. The cumulative effect has turned CFIUS into a gatekeeper to the US economy, enjoying broad, unappealable power to dictate FDI (35). The data demonstrate this expansion of CFIUS intervention over the previous decade. Crucially, the threat of a CFIUS investigation is the most important way CFIUS influences businesses due to the high costs these entities must shoulder under an investigation (36). Over roughly the past decade, CFIUS has dramatically increased the number of notices it has received as its scope has broadened and has correspondingly pursued a greater number of investigations over time (see “Increasing CFIUS Enforcement and Deterrence, 2009–2017,” above) (37). Correspondingly, this increase in investigations has deterred companies from following through on their transactions, as the number that have withdrawn their notices during investigation or review has increased, as demonstrated by the same chart. This expansion of notices has specifically focused on China. Between 2005–2015, CFIUS dramatically increased the number of transactions originating from China that it covered, and Chinese transactions became a larger part of its port- folio (see “Chinese transactions covered by CFIUS,” next page) (38). In addition, be- tween 2016–17, China far outpaced any other country for the number of CFIUS cases explicitly concerned with acquisitions of critical US technology, totaling over 1/5th of all such cases (a total of 38 cases) (39). Two cases under the Trump administration demonstrate how the 5G/semiconductor fight has particularly shaped this growth in CFIUS’s power. In 2017, President Trump directly blocked the takeover of Lattice Semiconductor by a Chinese-backed investor on the basis of national security (40). In 2018, CFIUS intervened to prevent the hostile takeover of Qualcomm on the national security grounds that the deal could potentially undermine America’s ability to compete with Huawei (41). The application of the national security framework, citing the threat from China, for a case concerning a takeover by a non-Chinese firm underscores how seriously the government has taken 5G. Tracking government investment in 5G is more difficult—for as many times as the White House has had Infrastructure Week, the government still has not put substantial funding toward 5G. Nevertheless, the government has made a number of steps that collectively signal an increasing level of involvement in the 5G space. The FCC’s controversial approval of the T-Mobile and Sprint merger (given the substantial concerns regarding oligopoly among cellular network providers) was explicitly founded upon the reasoning that it would promote “United States leadership in 5G” and conditioned the deal on the company’s provision of 5G to 90% of rural Americans (42). Moreover, the FCC recently announced a $9 billion fund for 5G in rural areas (43). The Department of Labor additionally created and put $6 million toward a public-private partnership to support education and training for jobs considered key to accelerating 5G deployment (44). Most relevant, however, is the Networking and Information Technology Re- search and Development Program (NITRD). NITRD unites various federal agencies, serving as the primary source of direct government research and development for advanced technologies relating to information technology. The “NITRD Bud- get Data, FY2011–2020” graph below captures how the government has ramped up its investment in this area over the past decade (45). This graph demonstrates three important trends. First, from 2011 to 2018, NITRD’s budget increased by 43%, from $3.7 to $5.3 billion, illustrating the substantial shift in the importance the government has placed on its research. While the total amount of funding may seem small by the standards of the government budget, the strong growth rate illustrates the shift to place greater emphasis on the government’s role in technology innovation. Second, the executive branch has begun substantially increasing its requested budget amount every year since 2016, suggesting a concurrent increase in government investment in IT. Third, the actual budget has outpaced the re- quested budget for each year recorded since 2015, suggesting Congress has also played a key role in driving this shift toward more government investment. Finally, the government’s involvement with Qualcomm and Huawei illustrates how it is willing to take low-frequency, high-visibility actions to protect 5G technology innovation. The Trump administration’s 2018 intervention to prevent the Broadcom takeover of Qualcomm signaled the degree to which it will intervene to protect this 5G chip-making company it sees as crucial to national competitiveness. This year, the administration has doubled down on this emphasis on Qualcomm, using the Department of Justice (DOJ) to back Qualcomm in an anti- trust lawsuit. Interestingly, this lawsuit was first brought against Qualcomm by the Federal Trade Commission under the Obama administration, with a district court ruling in favor of the FTC (46). Now, the DOJ (with support from the Departments of Defense and Energy) has supported Qualcomm’s appeal, explicitly making the argument that the courts should allow the company to maintain its business model on grounds that the company itself is integral to the security of the nation (47,48). Similarly, the Trump administration has taken aim at Huawei. In 2019, President Trump issued Executive Order 13873, which dramatically expanded government protections for telecommunications on the basis that such networks faced serious threat from foreign companies and governments and that such threats constituted a national security risk. Though not mentioning Huawei by name, the move was universally regarded as a reaction to the company’s perceived threat in the 5G space. Indeed, at the same time, the Department of Commerce added Huawei to the Entity List, effectively banning Huawei from doing business in the US. The coordination of these actions demonstrates the US government’s specific targeting of Huawei as the face of the Chinese technological competition with the US (49). While other Trump administration officials have spoken on this subject as well, these statements will not be as useful for signaling the existence of a shift in government policy toward more intervention in 5G innovation (50). First, this administration’s statements have conflicted in this area. In 2019, administration officials openly disagreed on the right level of intervention in 5G policy, with Trump finally deciding to oppose a direct federal acquisition of Nokia or Ericsson. However, a year later Attorney General Barr’s aforementioned speech revisited the issue and suggested that acquisition remained on the table (51). Clearly, the statements by the Trump administration send too many conflicting signals to reliably capture the trend of increasing government intervention. Additionally, intervention in the tech space matters for its actual effects on innovation processes, so tracking actions is better than tracking words. However, the concrete actions by CFIUS and the DOJ regarding Qualcomm unequivocally show how the government is increasingly fa- voring an interventionist approach specific to 5G. Taken together, the data from CFIUS, NITRD, and the government’s specific focus on Qualcomm illustrate a growing tendency in the federal government to intervene in technology areas such as 5G in order to promote innovation. Hypotheses The emphasis on great power competition has emerged in the government at the same time this shift in innovation policy strategy has occurred. Especially under the Trump administration, key government documents reflect this shift, arguing that China and Russia present the greatest threats to the United States. These documents forward a collection of related ideas: that great power competition will define the coming decades, that China is a revisionist power, that this competition is not simply a military one but an ideological one, etc. (52). Interestingly, while most of these documents, including the most authoritative such as the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), have emerged during the years of the Trump presidency, the 2016 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority embraced the notion of great power competition between the US and China, showing how this trend is not necessarily exclusive to the Trump administration (53). Clearly, an emerging trend is the perception of great power competition between the US and China, which seems at first glance to motivate or be invoked in the interventions the government is making into the 5G and technology innovation space. As detailed in the literature review, this trend can motivate political behavior, including through the influence of historical analogy and securitization. Given this trend and the literature on technology as a realm of great power competition, an overarching hypothesis for this shift in government innovation policy follows: The perception in the US of great power competition with China has led it to embrace greater intervention in technology innovation. This hypothesis has two implications alluded to by the literature review. First, this perception of great power competition may lead to Cold War analogizing that in turn motivates the shift in government innovation policy. The body of literature on historical memory as a heuristic for policymakers suggests the Cold War analogizing of the US-China relationship may have distinct political effects. Such effects and the general discourse around a “new Cold War” imply that perceptions of great power competition could motivate changes to technological innovation policy. Second, the perception of great power competition may motivate the securitization of the 5G space. Literature on securitization suggests that the US may construct technological innovation as a front in a great power competition, there- by necessitating intervention on national security grounds. Both of these scenarios are particular manifestations of the great power competition hypothesis. Testing each of these possibilities, then, illustrates the ways in which the hypothesis may be true. The results of those tests will specifically highlight the mechanisms by which great power competition leads to the shift in technology policy, and will more broadly illuminate the dimensions of this new era of perceived great power competition. Note that these manifestations are neither mutually exclusive nor dependent. To test the potential for Cold War analogizing, I will track analogizing of 5G to the Space Race with the USSR. This test will examine rhetoric framing 5G as a “race,” including a specific focus on analogies to US and Soviet achievements in the 1960s, over time. Given the rich literature on historical analogies’ influence on political behavior, a trend of such comparisons increasing over time will demonstrate how the administration is framing technology innovation with great power competition. NASA and the race to the moon represent perhaps the most critical Cold War episode concerning technology innovation in competition with another great power. As such, these comparisons are the most likely to take place, given the importance of simplistic analogies in particular, and are thus most illustrative of the use of analogizing in viewing 5G. Because the space race represented a pivot toward greater government intervention in technology innovation, its analogy serves as a likely motivator for a similar shift today. Of course, the government’s intervention in support of 5G is nowhere close to the scale of involvement it took in the space race, but the analogy-driven change in policy matters more than the parity in magnitude between government involvement in innovation in the 1960s and 2010s. This data is admittedly correlational, though the body of literature on the use of historical memory suggests that the perpetuation of specific analogies influences decision making. This suggestion means the greater the use of the analogy, the more likely it is influencing the shift in innovation strategy. To test for securitization, I will examine critical documents to understand if a securitizing discourse is being deployed. Securitization is a discursive process, meaning this review of such wording is the most direct way to detect whether or not the government is constructing technology innovation as a realm of security risk. One key implication of securitization is that the national security apparatus absorbs securitized issues, so to test this hypothesis, I will look at key national security documents such as the NSS, National Military Strategy, and Nuclear Posture Review in order to see if national security discourses are intentionally incorporating questions of technological innovation, especially with explicit reference to or focus on 5G. The literature on the Trump administration’s affinity for industrial policy suggests a different explanation for this shift in innovation strategy. Rather than a reaction to China based on notions of great power security competition, this shift may derive from a reaction based on notions of economic vulnerability to China. In other words, this industrial policy in the 5G area stems from an economic em- brace of industrial policy more broadly, rather than from the security concerns borne out of great power competition. This literature thus suggests the following hypothesis: The Trump Administration’s belief in industrial policy has led it to embrace greater intervention in technology innovation. The strongest evidence that supports the industrial policy hypothesis is the DOJ’s intervention specifically protecting Qualcomm. By advocating for the preservation of an anticompetitive business model, the government is effectively signaling a policy of “picking winners and losers” that characterizes industrial policy. However, to understand if this strategy is industrial policy rather than security strategy, there must be a trend of similar uses of this courts-based strategy that seems to be “picking winners” in sectors beyond 5G. To test this hypothesis, I will track the appellate briefs filed by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division to determine if it is advocating for anticompetitive equilibria that pick winners and losers in other industries as well. The implication of the hypothesis is that the administration is actively embracing the economic orthodoxy of industrial policy, meaning its interventions extend beyond 5G. Observing such a trend would thus imply the economic motivation for the 5G intervention, rather than the security motivation. Of course, this tracking method is imprecise—the individual facts and nuances of each case likely shape the content of the DOJ’s appellate briefs. However, survey- ing all briefs over the previous four years will demonstrate broader trends in the frequency with which the DOJ supports anticompetitive behavior. Results Cold War Analogizing The data on the use of the phrase “race to 5G” demonstrate a dramatic in- crease in the use of the analogy beginning in 2018. Using an analysis of documents employing the phrase between 2014–2019 (accessed through Factiva), the graph at right demonstrates the dramatic adoption of this term as mentions of 5G in- creased from 97 in 2017 to 715 in 2018, a 637% increase. Additionally, when only including documents that specifically make mention of the United States Federal Government or Federal Communications Commission, the data still demonstrate a similar jump from 17 in 2017 to 271 in 2018, a 1,494% increase. This increase serves as a rough indicator of the prevalence of technology race analogizing. Factiva aggregates publications using specific keywords, meaning this data reflect the prevalence of this analogy in the media. However, given the influence of analogies on decision-makers’ thinking, a greater prevalence implies a greater likelihood of such an analogy shaping public policy. Additionally, isolating the publications that specify the FCC or USFG demonstrates the connection between government action and this perceived technology race. A random sampling of these publications also suggests the vast majority employed the analogy, rather than argued against using it. Admittedly, establishing causality between government action and prevalence of the analogy is difficult—the media could be ascribing the analogy to the actions of the government without policymakers ever having employed the analogy. Fortunately, the record demonstrates that policy- makers have adopted this analogy in recent years. Key figures in the government, including President Trump, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai, Chief Technology Officer of the United States Michael Kratsios, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Com- merce, Science, and Transportation Roger Wicker, House Energy and Commerce Ranking Member Greg Walden, and Communications and Technology Subcommittee Ranking Member Bob Latta, have all employed the analogy (54). Moreover, Attorney General Barr has explicitly argued the US has not yet had its “Sputnik moment” in this race, further underscoring the connection to the space race (55). Taken together, the aggregate data from Factiva and the specific examples from key elected officials provide compelling evidence for “Race to 5G” analogizing. Securitization The set of documents articulating national security priorities and assessments provides the best source to scour for the securitization of 5G technology. Because these documents articulate matters pertaining to the security of the United States, their inclusion of 5G specifically and the domestic technology innovation base more broadly indicates the securitization of these spaces. The most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment from the Director of National Intelligence directly addresses 5G, arguing that the creation and adoption of 5G networks by other countries directly implicates data security within the United States due to the interconnectedness of communications and information technology infrastructure. Additionally, the Assessment connects this data infrastructure to threats posed by decryption capabilities growth, underscoring the technical threats to sensitive data in particular (56). Similarly, the 2016 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority specifically connects great power competition with China and Russia to threats to US information technology systems and argues crucial outputs enabled by 5G such as better AI will dramatically influence the balance of power.57 These depictions conform to Hansen and Nissenbaum’s framework by emphasizing a threat to the broad data infrastructure in the US posed by foreign development of 5G technologies and engaging in technification by emphasizing aspects like decryption capabilities growth and complex 5G outputs. The 2017 NSS is particularly important given its reframing of technology issues in a national security framework. The document identifies the need for the nation to excel in technology and innovation domestically to ensure the security of the nation, which in and of itself may not represent a dramatic shift from previous security orthodoxies that emphasized US domestic innovation as a component of national power. However, the NSS also asserts a new idea of a National Security In- novation Base (NSIB), formalizing the notion that technological innovation across the economy (not simply for defense purposes) is crucial to the balance of power the US must maintain to survive inter-state strategic competition. The document directly confronts China for intellectual property theft that it argues undermines the NSIB, discursively creating the notion of a Chinese threat to the securitized domestic innovation base (58). The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) builds on this idea of the NSIB, arguing that non-defense related innovation directly implicates the command of the commons: “The fact that many technological developments will come from the commercial sector means that state competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks eroding the conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed” (59). Crucially, what follows from this assessment that commercial innovation is a security issue is the absorption of non-defense technology development into the military’s purview: “A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military. More than any other nation, America can expand the competitive space” (60). This absorption classically models the discursive securitization of a policy area and the following policy change as the national security apparatus begins to dictate policy in said area. The DOD has specifically applied this notion of commercial innovation as central to the command of the commons. A spokesperson for the DOD framed 5G as a question of ability to function on the battlefield, claiming: “That’s where we are with 5G...we are going to run our entire warfighting ecosystem though communications.” She directly connected this vulnerability to grand ideas of the balance of power, arguing: “If we don’t embrace it and apply it towards our goals, we could be overcome quickly with technical overmatch” (61). Clearly, by connecting 5G in- novation to the nation’s warfighting ability and conventional military superiority, and by directly echoing the phrase “technical overmatch” used in the 2018 NDS when it discusses the national security importance of the NSIB, the spokesperson frames technology innovation as a question of debilitating collapse of the nation’s military, securitizing the issue. This analysis of key national defense documents and statements by members of the national security state provides compelling evidence for the securitization of 5G. Industrial Policy A review of the roughly 80 appellate briefs filed by the DOJ’s Antitrust Divi- sion reveals a dramatically limited scope of interventions supporting specific companies’ anticompetitive practices analogous to the DOJ’s intervention to protect Qualcomm in 2019 (62). During this period, only seven briefs opposed antitrust enforcement. Of these, two related to Qualcomm (briefs for Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm, Incorporated and Karen Stromberg, et al. v. Qualcomm Incorporated ), excluding them from consideration as they pertain specifically to 5G. A third, for State of New York and Other Plaintiff States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, et al. , supported the merger of T-Mobile and Sprint conditioned on the company’s rollout of 5G infrastructure across America, excluding it from consideration as well. Among the four remaining briefs, Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., et al. only weakly supports the notion that the government is supporting anticompetitive behavior in order to promote specific companies. In this case, the DOJ states that it takes no position on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, only stating that proof of reduced competition in a market is necessary in addition to proof of the existence of agreements considered anticompetitive (arguing that behavior must be effectually anticompetitive to be subject to antitrust laws, not simply anticompetitive based on a company’s decisions on paper). Two briefs better demonstrate opposition to antitrust enforcement—those for Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, et al. and Apple Inc. v. Robert Pepper, et al. The final brief, for Intel Corporation and Apple Inc. v. Fortress Investment Group LLC, et al. , also pushes back against the application of antitrust laws, though in favor of Fortress Investment Group; this behavior is puzzling for the “winners and losers” hypothesis because Apple and Intel would likely be considered American national champions of sorts, implying the government would intervene in their favor were it truly interested in promoting their market dominance. Put simply, too few briefs oppose antitrust enforcement to indicate a trend sup- porting the industrial policy hypothesis. Due to their limited number, it is not possible to discern a broader trend from the briefs that do oppose antitrust enforcement. The DOJ may take the position it does in these cases simply based on its reading of the law and understanding of the facts in each individual case. Because there is not a sufficiently discernible trend, it is not possible to confirm the hypothesis that the government is engaging in the picking of winners and losers. This finding complements previous findings that the effects of CFIUS investigations are non-discriminatory, implying their use is based on actual national security (their stated purpose), not protectionism of special interests (63). These findings thus imply the industrial policy hypothesis is less accurate than the great power competition one. However, watchdogs and journalists have noted that under the Trump Administration, the DOJ’s antitrust division has significantly reduced the application of cartel and merger enforcement (64), and the number of personnel working on antitrust cases has similarly declined (65). This trend may indicate an embrace of a permutation of industrial policy, whereby the Trump administration may not be “picking winners and losers” but, rather, allowing rapid consolidation such that the market picks national champions. This evidence thus lends some credence to the industrial policy hypothesis. However, given the observed behavior of the dependent variable includes active intervention to support Qualcomm, this de- cline in enforcement alone does not provide as good of an explanation for the motivation of the Trump administration’s 5G strategy as does the great power competition hypothesis. Conclusion The assessments from the previous section demonstrate stronger evidence for the great power competition hypothesis than for the industrial policy hypothesis. The assessment of aggregate data on publications by Factiva as well as statements by key administration officials demonstrates the substantial growth of rhetoric analogizing 5G to the Cold War space race. This trend demonstrates how US policymakers are employing historical thinking as they understand the US-China security relationship more broadly as well as competition in the 5G space specifically. The assessment of key national security documents and statements illustrates the securitization of 5G, also providing support for the great power competition hypothesis. In contrast, the assessment of the appellate briefs filed by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division reveals the government’s interventions in support of anticompetitive behavior are almost exclusively limited to the 5G space thus far, meaning evidence for the industrial policy hypothesis does not presently exist. The available evidence thus suggests the security relationship, manifested both in historical analogy and in securitization, more powerfully motivates the government’s shift toward greater intervention in 5G technology innovation than the economic relationship and derived inclinations toward industrial policy. As technological innovation appears to be growing into a key facet of the US-China relationship, the change in government policy represents a manifestation of how the Sino-American relationship is evolving. This change in the technology innovation space is particularly important for understanding the broader US-China relationship. Because technological developments like 5G and AI, which have emerged from interconnected economies and had impacts beyond borders, are being framed as areas of competition, the ways the US and China interact in this sphere will have implications for their broader relationship. Beyond speaking to the motivations behind the administration’s 5G strategy, the findings in this paper shed light on how the US more broadly perceives China’s economic and technological behaviors in a national security mindset. Finally, because this trend is relatively nascent, this paper is only a first step to- ward understanding changing government policy in technology spaces. Assessing motivations is difficult, and more research into the topic—particularly involving interviews with actual policymakers—will help better define this trend as it evolves over the coming years. More research is needed to understand the influence and limits of the emerging industrial policy mindset. In particular, the possibility dis- cussed in the previous section that the Trump administration may be “letting the market pick the winners and losers” in a permutation of traditional industrial policy merits attention. Additionally, given the implication that securitization of domestic technology innovation has led to a shift toward more government intervention in the 5G space, future research may seek to understand other manifestations of this securitization. Finally, scholars should explore the motivations behind securitization. While legitimate security threats may exist, proponents of industrial policy may see securitization as an effective means to achieve their ends; similarly, leaders of US technology companies may see securitization as a useful strategy to secure favorable government policies. These possibilities suggest a need for future research into the motivations for different actors deploying securitizing discourse of 5G. 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Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference,” https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr- delivers-keynote-address-department-justices-china. 4 Michael Pompeo, Silicon Valley and National Security (San Francisco, 2020), https://www.state.gov/silicon- valley-and-national-security/. 5 “The Qualcommunist Manifesto: American State Capitalism Will Not Beat China at 5G,” The Economist, February 15, 2020. 6 Robert B. Reich, “Why the U.S. Needs an Industrial Policy,” Harvard Business Review, January 1, 1982, https://hbr.org/1982/01/why-the-us-needs-an-industrial-policy. 7 For example, see Robert D. Kaplan, “A New Cold War Has Begun,” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2019, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/; Niall Ferguson, “The New Cold War? 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Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)” (Congressional Research Service, February 14, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf; Grindal, “Trade Regimes as a Tool for Cyber Policy;” Hunter Deeley, “The Expanding Reach of the Executive in Foreign Direct Investment: How Ralls v. CFIUS Will Alter the FDI Landscape in the United States,” American University Business Law Review 4, no. 1 (2015): 125–52; Kevin Granville, “Cfius, Powerful and Unseen, Is a Gatekeeper on Major Deals,” New York Times, March 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html. 36 Paul Connell and Tian Huang, “An Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Examining Foreign Investment Regulation in the United States,” Yale Journal of International Law 39, no. 1 (2014): 131–64. 37 Data sourced from Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).” 38 Note – chart taken from Grindal, “Trade Regimes as a Tool for Cyber Policy.” 39 Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).” 40 Ana Swanson, “Trump Blocks China-Backed Bid to Buy U.S. Chip Maker,” The New York Times, September 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/trump-lattice-semiconductor-china.html. 41 Aimen N. Mir, “Letter From Treasury Department to Broadcom and Qualcomm Regarding CFIUS,” March 5, 2018, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4407490-Letter-From-Treasury-Department-to- Broadcom-and.html; Chris Sanders, “U.S. Sees National Security Risk from Broadcom’s Qualcomm Deal,” Reuters, March 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcom-idUSKCN1GI1S8. 42 “FCC Approves Merger of T-Mobile and Sprint” (Federal Communications Commission, November 5, 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-360637A1.pdf. 43 “FCC Proposes the 5G Fund for Rural America” (Federal Communications Commission, April 23, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-363946A1.pdf. 44 “WIA Awarded $6 Million DOL Grant to Train 5G Workforce” (Wireless Infrastructure Association, February 19, 2020), https://wia.org/wia-awarded-6-million-dol-grant-to-train-5g-workforce/. 45 Data sourced from the NITRD’s Supplement to the President’s Budgets for Fiscal Years 2012-2020. 46 “United States District Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Public Redacted Version), Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated” (UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION, May 21, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ documents/cases/qualcomm_findings_of_fact_and_conclusions_of_law.pdf. 47 “BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT AND VACATUR” (US Department of Justice, August 30, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case- document/file/1199191/download; Kadhim Shubber, “US Regulators Face off in Court Tussle over Qualcomm,” Financial Times, February 9, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/adbca366-49d3-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441. 48 Note – the government’s support for the T-Mobile-Sprint merger, which (as mentioned earlier) is explicitly premised on 5G rollout to be enabled by consolidated market power, is another example of government intervention supporting anticompetitive behavior in the 5G space. For more, see Thomas M Johnson et al., “Statement of Interest of the United States of America” (United States Department of Justice, December 20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1230491/download. 49 Donald Trump, “Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, Executive Order 13873” (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ executive-order-securing-information-communications-technology-services-supply-chain/; “Department of Commerce Announces the Addition of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. to the Entity List” (US Department of Commerce, Office of Public Affairs, May 15, 2019), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/05/department-commerce-announces-addition-huawei-technologies-co-ltd; Tamer Soliman et al., “US Commerce Department Proposes Sweeping New Rules for National Security Review of US Information and Communications Technology or Services Transactions,” Mayer Brown, December 2, 2019, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/ perspectives-events/publications/2019/12/us-department-of-commerce-proposes-rule-for-securing-the-nations- information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain; Damian Paletta, Ellen Nakashima, and David Lynch, “Trump Administration Cracks Down on Giant Chinese Tech Firm, Escalating Clash with Beijing,” Washington Post, May 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump- signs-order-to-protect-us-networks-from-foreign-espionage-a-move-that-appears-to-target-china/2019/05/15/d982ec50-7727-11e9-bd25-c989555e7766_story.html; Annie Fixler and Mathew Ha, “Washington’s Huawei Ban Combats Chinese Espionage Threat,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 16, 2019, https://www.fdd. org/analysis/2019/05/16/washingtons-huawei-ban-combats-chinese-espionage-threat/. 50 For example, see Barr, “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference;” Michael Pompeo, U.S. States and the China Competition: Secretary Pompeo’s Remarks to the NGA, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1BbswU3i10; and Pompeo, Silicon Valley and National Security. 51 Margaret Harding Mcgill, “Trump Rejects Government Intervention in 5G Wireless Networks,” POLITICO, April 12, 2019, https://politi.co/2P4erlI; Barr, “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference;” Peter Newman, “How the US Buying Ericsson or Nokia Would Impact Networking,” Business Insider, February 10, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-could-buy-ericsson-nokia-to-compete-against-huawei-report-2020-2. 52 Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017;” Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America” (United States Department of Defense, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf; Jim Mattis, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018), https://media. defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT. PDF; Daniel R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2019), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR--- SSCI.pdf; “Description of the National Military Strategy 2018” (US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), https://www.jcs. mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf; John Richardson, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Version 2.0” (United States Navy, December 2018), https://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Richardson/Resource/Design_2.0.pdf. 53 John Richardson, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Version 1.0” (United States Navy, January 2016), https://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf. 54 Todd Haselton, “President Trump Announces New 5G Initiatives: It’s a Race ‘America Must Win,’” CNBC, April 12, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/12/trump-on-5g-initiatives-a-race-america-must-win.html; Ajit Pai, “Remarks of FCC Chairman Ajit Pai at the White House” (Washington, D.C., April 12, 2019), https://docs. fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356994A1.pdf; Michael Kratsios, “America Will Win the Global Race to 5G,” The White House, October 25, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/america-will-win-global-race-5g/; Roger Wicker, “Wicker Convenes Hearing on the Race to 5G” (Washington, D.C.: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, February 6, 2019), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2019/2/wicker-convenes- hearing-on-the-race-to-5g; Greg Walden and Bob Latta, “Walden and Latta Statement on Bipartisan Bills to Boost 5G” (Washington, D.C., January 8, 2020), https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/news/press- release/walden-and-latta-statement-on-bipartisan-bills-to-boost-5g/. To the extent that business leaders’ rhetoric on this issue matters as well, see Katie Lobosco, “AT&T Chief: China Isn’t Beating the United States on 5G — Yet,” CNN, March 20, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/20/business/att-randall-stephenson-5g/index.html. 55 Barr, “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference.” 56 Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.” 57 Richardson, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Version 1.0.” 58 Trump, Donald. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017,” 20-22. 59 Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.” 60 Ibid. 61 C. Todd Lopez, “Pentagon Official: U.S., Partners Must Lead in 5G Technology Development,” US Department of Defense, March 26, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1796437/pentagon- official-us-partners-must-lead-in-5g-technology-development/. 62 To see these briefs, see “Appellate Briefs,” US Department of Justice, n.d., https://www.justice.gov/atr/ appellate-briefs. 63 Connell and Huang, “An Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Examining Foreign Investment Regulation in the United States.” 64 “The State of Antitrust Enforcement and Competition Policy in the U.S.” (American Antitrust Institute, April 14, 2020), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/work-product/antitrust-enforcement-report/; “FCC Proposes the 5G Fund for Rural America;” Kadhim Shubber, “US Antitrust Enforcement Falls to Slowest Rate since 1970s,” Financial Times, November 28, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/27a0a34e-f2a0-11e8-9623-d7f9881e729f. 65 Kadhim Shubber, “Staffing at Antitrust Regulator Declines under Donald Trump,” Financial Times, February 7, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/cf1ed2a6-2619-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf. 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